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Abstract 
This thesis critically examines various contractual mechanisms by which the 
protection of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the energy sector is reconciled with 
other values of sustainable development through a ‘State-Investor-Population (S-I-P) 
Triangle’ lens.  
FDI is a major engine of the world’s economy. Both the UN’s 2015 Addis Ababa 
Action Agenda and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development call for FDI to serve 
as an essential financing element of sustainability efforts. However, because of the 
invasive nature and massive scale of cross-boundary business operations, FDI 
investment projects in the extractive industries are prone to have significant impacts on 
human rights and our natural environment.  
Current research in this fast-changing field mainly concentrates on international 
investment treaties, national regulations, and relevant energy dispute case-law. By 
contrast, project-specific contractual and quasi-contractual instruments have received 
far less attention despite their potential importance as components of a broader 
framework of global energy governance. These instruments are, in many ways, beyond 
the radar of most academics researching this field.  
This thesis seeks to address this research gap. It relies on fresh data sets compiled 
for this specific purpose and includes three primary forms of contracts, namely State-
investor investment contracts (‘S-I’ contracts), Corporate-NGO 
partnerships/agreements (‘I-P’ contracts), and multi-actor (tripartite) investment 
contracts (‘S-I-P’ contracts), within and even beyond the S-I-P Triangle. Based on a 
research methodology combining socio-legal approaches and doctrinal analysis, the 
research conducted for this dissertation leads to three main findings:  
Firstly, contemporary legal frameworks for regulating international energy 
investment are fragmented and imbalanced (in favour of foreign investors). Recent 
global resistances and increasing investment disputes have also demonstrated that 
conflicts between investment protection and other public policy goals - e.g. 
environmental protection, public health and labour rights - are becoming a key 
concern for energy investment projects. Thus, despite some limitations, private 
contractual arrangements can be a useful vehicle to prevent environmental and 
social damages, complement the fragmented regulatory frameworks, and enhance 
multi-level energy governance.        
Secondly, by examining the datasets of various bilateral and multilateral 
contracts, this research re-classified current contractual mechanisms as ‘soft 
contracts’, ‘enforcement contracts’, and ‘innovative contracts’. Original 
conceptual charts have been developed to capture the changing landscape of the 
targeted legal phenomena, and this thesis argues that contracts, especially 
‘innovative contracts’, play a central role in energy governance and regulatory 
innovation. In the context of economic globalisation and community resistance, 
the thesis identifies three key driving actors behind the contracting practices, 
namely multi-national corporations, non-governmental organisations, and 
commercial lawyers, and this thesis suggests that these three change agents would 
be well placed to use these contractual arrangements as a technology to stimulate, 
guide and sustain environment-driven societal change and regulatory innovation. 
Thirdly, the thesis uses China’s outbound FDI in the energy sector as an in-
depth case study to test the conceptual cartography proposed. It is clear from the 
Chinese case that the current ‘top-down’ regulatory and policy developments led 
by the Chinese government and other international institutions are still insufficient 
and may face challenges of efficient implementation. The operations of China’s 
overseas hydropower and extractive industries illustrate that grassroots resistance can 
be a crucial catalyst to stimulate “bottom-up” legal innovations and strengthen the 
existing regulatory frameworks. Through a better understanding and management of 
the drivers of such resistance, Chinese overseas investment may achieve a better 
alignment of the different interests involved. Also, this offers China a chance to be at 
the forefront of the new approaches analysed in this thesis.  
The conclusion provides summaries of the main empirical research findings, 
arguments and their implications for both theoretical discussions and practical policy-
making. Some recommendations for further research have also been addressed. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction   
“Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to 
a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.” – Principle 1 of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a key driver of the world’s economy. In recent decades, 
developing countries have made great efforts to attract FDI in energy and natural resource 
sectors 1 . However, FDI and sustainable development can entertain both conflicting and 
synergistic relationships. 
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development2 and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda3 
both point out that FDI has been an essential part of sustainability efforts4. For example, under 
the Clean Development Mechanism5 and a variety of private environmental financing tools6, 
multi-national corporations (MNCs) can harness technological and financial resources for 
promoting sustainable development actions7. 
However, foreign investment may have an adverse impact on the environment of host 
countries. Due to the invasive nature and large scale of operations, the energy and extractive 
industries are prone to have significant adverse impacts on the environment and surrounding 
communities. A prominent recent example is BP’s Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of 
Mexico8. This tragedy in 2010 caused the largest ever marine oil spill. Although catastrophes 
                                                          
1  Moran, T. H. (2006) Harnessing foreign direct investment for development: policies for developed and 
developing countries. CGD Books, Chapter 3 and 5. 
2  United Nations (2015a) Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development. Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly. See also Nilsson, M., Griggs, D., & Visbeck, M. (2016) Policy: map the 
interactions between Sustainable Development Goals. Nature News, 534(7607), 320. 
3  United Nations (2015b) Outcome document of the third international conference on financing for development: 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda. 
4  See, generally, Dupuy, P.-M., & Vinuales, J. E. (2013) Harnessing foreign investment to promote 
environmental protection: incentives and safeguards. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
5  Streck, C. (2007) The governance of the Clean Development Mechanism: the case for strength and 
stability. Environmental Law (Vol 16 OUP Oxford 2005, 2007), 259, 264. See also Werksman, J. (1998) The 
clean development mechanism: unwrapping the ‘Kyoto Surprise’. Review of European Community & 
International Environmental Law, 7(2), 147-158. 
6  Andonova, L. B. (2010) Public-private partnerships for the earth: politics and patterns of hybrid authority in 
the multilateral system. Global Environmental Politics, 10(2), 25-53. See also Zhang, Z., & Maruyama, A. 
(2001) Towards a private–public synergy in financing climate change mitigation projects. Energy 
Policy, 29(15), 1363-1378. 
7    Dupuy, P-M. & Vinuales, J.E. (2013). 
8  Griggs, J. W. (2011) BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Energy Law Journal, 32, 57.  
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on this massive scale are thankfully uncommon, it still exemplifies the negative impact caused 
by the extractive companies’ international operations.  
The relations between energy infrastructure development and other environmental and 
social values is not a new topic. It has been a critical academic issue in the international energy 
sector for over two decades9, however, remains an issue of enduring and possibly growing 
relevance. For example, a leading international journal, the Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resource Law, and its expert panel selected this issue as the one that would attract the most 
attention in the year 201610. The interplays can involve all kinds of energy infrastructure 
projects, including oil and gas, renewables, natural resource mining, energy transmission, and 
more. 
This thesis investigates this challenging issue from the perspective of a more specific topic, 
namely the form and functions of specific contractual and multi-level governance approaches 
relating to energy FDI, which aim to align the interests of the State, the Investor and the affected 
populations, as well as to protect the natural environment. Based on a novel dataset of 
contractual arrangements gathered for this research project, this thesis critically examines this 
governance approach from a sustainable development analytical lens and discusses their 
potential for future regulatory and policy innovation. Though the empirical dataset collected in 
this study covers a wide range of jurisdictions globally, the scope of this research, however, 
has a strong focus on Greater China region. This point will be illustrated further in the following 
relevant sections.     
This introductory part begins by providing three main observations to justify this research. 
It then outlines the governance issues for trans-boundary energy investment and, finally, it 
defines the objectives of the research. 
1.1 Trends in global energy investment 
To establish the background narratives, it is necessary to discuss three major recent trends 
in global energy investment below. The bird’s-eye observation of these recent trends will serve 
                                                          
9  A comprehensive historical review on this issue can be found in Redgwell, C. (2016) Energy Law in Europe. 
National, EU and International Regulation, Third Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, Chapter 2.  
10  See Smith, D. C. (2015) Looking ahead: The top ten energy and natural resources issues in 2015. Journal of 
Energy & Natural Resources Law, 33(1), 1-9. 
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to identify the emerging and most significant issues, circumscribe the knowledge gap, and 
adjust the suitable analytical lens to approach the subject.  
1.1.1 Synergies - The significance of energy FDI for energy security and sustainable 
development 
Energy enables our modern world to move forward, but many countries still face essential 
energy security challenges, especially the growing energy demands11. Governments have been 
increasingly active in pursuing international energy investment and in replacing existing 
facilities that have approached the final stage of their operational lifecycle, particularly in 
developing economies12.  
For instance, since the early 1990s, China, with limited domestic natural resource reserves, 
began to invest abroad in the oil & gas sectors of resource-rich nations as a critical way to 
satisfy China’s energy demands. With strong policy supports, China has become the world’s 
largest investor in developing low-carbon electricity generation, energy efficiency facilities, 
and energy transmission networks in 201513.  
According to the World Energy Investment Outlook 2017, the scale of global energy 
investment has doubled since 200014. Estimates from the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
suggest that the amount of investment in international energy supply would reach more than 
USD 1.6 trillion every year between 2011 and 2015 (Figure 1.1).  
                                                          
11  See Yergin, D. (2006) Ensuring energy security. Foreign affairs, 69-82. See also Jacobson, M. Z. (2009). 
Review of solutions to global warming, air pollution, and energy security. Energy & Environmental 
Science, 2(2), 148-173. 
12  See Arcas, R. L., Filis, A., & Abu Gosh, E. S. (2015) International Energy Governance. Cheltenham and 
Northampton: Edward Elgar, especially Part 4 of this book and Chapter 16. 
13  International Energy Agency (2014) World Energy Investment Outlook - Special Report. Retrieved from: 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/world-energy-investment-outlook---special-
report---.html. See Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2018) Clean Energy Investment Report. Retrieved 
from: https://about.bnef.com/clean-energy-investment.  
14  Ibid. 
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Figure 1.1 Global investment in energy supply, by fuel, 2000-2016 (columns) and the share of investment going 
towards fossil fuel supplies (orange line). Source: IEA, World Energy Investment Outlook 2017. 
The IEA further estimates that global energy investment fell by 8% (2015’s energy 
investment is USD 1.8 trillion in total, down from USD 2.0 trillion in 2014), with a noticeable 
decrease in oil and gas sectors. Regarding the long-term, the IEA also foresees that until the 
year 2030, at least a USD 26 trillion investment amount will be required in all energy sectors15. 
Additionally, FDI in the energy sector is a large portion of total investment worldwide. 
Some of the largest MNCs worldwide are active in the energy sector. According to a report by 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), almost half of the 
"top-15 Transnational Companies (TNCs)" are involved in extractive industries or the power 
sector16. A growing number of energy multinational corporations are both based in developed 
and developing economies; numerous state-owned enterprises are influential in the sector 
(Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1 The Top 15 non-financial state-owned TNCs; Source: UNCTAD Online Database 
                                                          
15  Ibid. 
16  UNCTAD (2011) World Investment Report: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and 
Development, UN Doc UNCTAD/WIR/2011, 24 and web table 34, retrieved from: 
http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_dir/docs/WIR11_web%20tab%2034.pdf. See also Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance (2018). 
5 | P a g e  
 
 
Recent studies on renewable sources of energy have claimed that foreign investment can 
significantly contribute to satisfying these growing global energy demands and transforming 
the world’s energy systems towards a more sustainable one. Based on WEI’s 2017 report, 
2016’s world investments in renewable energy accounted for about one-fifth of the world’s 
energy cost17. Also, in 2015, building renewable energy infrastructures accounted for the most 
significant portion of investment in the electricity power sector (USD 313 billion)18. 
For example, Under Mission Innovation, launched in 2015 at the Paris climate summit, 
19 countries, including the US, UK, India, Japan and Germany, pledged to double 
governmental clean energy investment within five years19. The data series in the chart above 
ends in 2015, so there is still time for signatories to increase their efforts although early results 
are discouraging as the IEA says available data “indicate a possible further decline in 2016 
following a small decline from 2014 to 201520.” 
Governments are responsible for approximately a third of the total investment and two-
thirds of clean energy R&D21. Among the 29 IEA member countries – including the US, UK 
                                                          
17  International Energy Agency (2017) World Energy Investment Outlook, Executive summary. 
18  Ibid. 
19  See Fues, T. (2017) How Can the G20 Promote the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development (SDG 
17)? Development. Retrieved from http://risingpowersproject.com/g20-global-partnership. See also Falkner, 
R. (2016). The Paris Agreement and the new logic of international climate politics. International Affairs, 92(5), 
1107-1125. 
20  Ibid. 
21  See Jamasb, T., & Pollitt, M. G. (2015). Why and how to subsidise energy R+ D: Lessons from the collapse 
and recovery of electricity innovation in the UK. Energy Policy, 83, 197-205. See also Bosetti, V., Carraro, 
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and Germany, but not China or India – energy R&D doubled between 2000 and 2010 before 
stagnating and remaining below 1980 levels (Figure 1.2).  
 
Figure 1.2 World spending on energy R&D 2012-2015, by the source of funding. Source: IEA World Energy 
Investment 2017.  
These countries put 5 per cent of their total public R&D budgets towards energy in 2015, 
with these budgets comprising 0.1 per cent of public spending. The largest share of their energy 
R&D goes towards nuclear and basic energy research, with renewables and efficiency tied for 
second22. 
Also, energy investment is crucial for the low-carbon transition, but it also creates 
significant risks regarding sustainable development and inclusive growth. Thus, a well-
designed global policy framework for energy FDI should appropriately balance energy security, 
economic growth and other public interest considerations, such as environmental protection 
and human rights23. 
                                                          
C., Massetti, E., & Tavoni, M. (2008) International energy R&D spillovers and the economics of greenhouse 
gas atmospheric stabilization. Energy Economics, 30(6), 2912-2929.  
22  Ibid at 4. 
23  Heffron, R. J. (2015) Energy Law: An Introduction, Springer; Gunningham, N. (2013) Managing the energy 
trilemma: The case of Indonesia. Energy Policy, 54, 184-193; and Jenkins, K., McCauley, D., Heffron, R., 
Stephan, H., & Rehner, R. (2016) Energy justice: a conceptual review. Energy Research & Social Science, 11, 
174-182. 
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The UN General Assembly adopted 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 
September 201524. This 17-principle action plan contains 169 targets and a further set of 
measurement indicators to monitor progress. 
The SDGs aim to guide the global agenda for the years 2015-2030 and replace the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)25, which covered the previous period of 2000-2015. 
While the MDGs focused on developmental aid, the SDGs are significantly more 
comprehensive, applying in high, low and middle-income countries26. SDGs range from ending 
poverty and hunger to reducing inequality within and among countries, and combating climate 
change to promoting access to justice.  
The plan of action recognises the role of private investment strategies to realise the SDGs. 
It also reinforces the need for the government to establish effective rules, institutions and 
processes, and for advocates to increase strategies for influence to ensure that business activity 
in the natural resource sector is aligned with and contributes to achieving the SDGs. 
In 2017, the UN’s Conference on Trade and Development jointly issued a critical policy 
report with the Sustainable Business Institute at the European Business School, which once 
again highlighted the importance of FDI to achieve the SDGs’ number 7 goal regarding 
energy27. 
1.1.2 Conflicts – Energy investment’s negative impacts on environmental protection, 
human rights and social justice 
Energy FDI is politically sensitive because it can influence national sovereignty over 
energy and natural resources. For example, many countries view the oil and gas industry as 
well as the electricity power sectors as a significant strategic sector highly relevant to national 
security28. Energy is also socially sensitive. For the citizens globally, energy supply is a 
                                                          
24  Nilsson, M., Griggs, D., & Visbeck, M. (2016). See also Gupta, J., & Vegelin, C. (2016). Sustainable 
development goals and inclusive development. International environmental agreements: Politics, law and 
economics, 16(3), 433-448. 
25  United Nations Department of Public Information (2015) Millennium Development Goals Report 2015. UN 
Publications. 
26  Ibid at 24. 
27  “SDGs 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all”. See also Nilsson, M., 
Lucas, P., & Yoshida, T. (2013). Towards an integrated framework for SDGs: Ultimate and enabling goals for 
the case of energy. Sustainability, 5(10), 4124-4151. 
28  Bompard, E., Carpignano, A., Erriquez, M., Grosso, D., Pession, M., & Profumo, F. (2017) National energy 
security assessment in a geopolitical perspective. Energy, 130, 144-154. 
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fundamental good which must remain affordable29. FDI in the energy sectors also negatively 
impacts public health, labour safety, and community development30. 
Also, unfortunately, many past natural resource and energy investments, including ‘green’ 
energy and renewables, have delivered disappointing contributions to our environment31. Due 
to the damming of rivers, large hydropower dams can have severe environmental impacts32. 
Both onshore and offshore wind power farms can affect local birds and bats, produce many 
noises and interfere with the amenity of the landscape33.  
The extractive sector has a long history with human rights and social justice issues34. For 
example, at the Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea, BHP’s mining operations have generated 
many years of investment disputes and local resistances35. In 2014, some environmental NGOs 
jointly stopped the same mining company’s operations in New South Wales and Queensland’s 
uranium mines36.   
Although the oil and gas industry has an overall controversial record when it comes to 
engaging with local communities37, the other energy operations, including renewable energy 
(e.g. wind power turbines and biofuels) can also have negative environmental and social 
                                                          
29  See Jenkins, K., McCauley, D., Heffron, R., Stephan, H., & Rehner, R. (2016). 
30  De Brabandere, E., & Gazzini, T. (2014) Foreign Investment in the Energy Sector: Balancing Private and 
Public Interests. BRILL NIJHOFF.  
31  Akella, A. K., Saini, R. P., & Sharma, M. P. (2009) Social, economical and environmental impacts of 
renewable energy systems. Renewable Energy, 34(2), 390-396. See also Abbasi, S. A., & Abbasi, N. (2000) 
The likely adverse environmental impacts of renewable energy sources. Applied Energy, 65(1-4), 121-144. 
32  Bell, D., Gray, T., & Haggett, C. (2005) The ‘social gap’ in wind farm siting decisions: explanations and policy 
responses. Environmental politics, 14(4), 460-477. 
33  Van der Horst, D., & Toke, D. (2010) Exploring the landscape of wind farm developments; local area 
characteristics and planning process outcomes in rural England. Land Use Policy, 27(2), 214-221. 
34  See Simons, P., & Macklin, A. (2014) The governance gap: extractive industries, human rights, and the 
home state advantage. Routledge. See also Haufler, V. (2010) Disclosure as governance: the extractive 
industries transparency initiative and resource management in the developing world. Global Environmental 
Politics, 10(3), 53-73. 
35  Kirsch, S. (2007) Indigenous movements and the risks of counterglobalization: Tracking the campaign 
against Papua New Guinea's Ok Tedi mine. American ethnologist, 34(2), 303-321. 
36  Mudd, G. M. (2010) The environmental sustainability of mining in Australia: key mega-trends and looming 
constraints. Resources Policy, 35(2), 98-115. 
37  Frynas, J. G. (2009) Corporate social responsibility in the oil and gas sector. Journal of World Energy Law 
& Business, 2(3), 178-195. See also Tordo, S., Warner, M., Manzano, O., & Anouti, Y. (2013). Local 
content policies in the oil and gas sector. The World Bank. 
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consequences38. In other words, even ‘green’ energy projects sometimes have their dark sides, 
and the renewable energy industry is inextricably entwined with human rights issues too. 
Kenya provides an apposite illustration of the conundrum faced by a range of countries. 
This country is becoming a new middle-income industrialised economy by the year 203039. In 
the context of UN SDGs, especially Goal 7, Kenya’s Vision 2030 has committed to eradicate 
poverty and provide affordable, modern and clean energy for all citizens in that country40. 
For these purposes, Kenya has put much effort into attracting FDI in renewables, 
especially wind power and geothermal41. However, in Kenya, a large number of renewable 
energy projects are located on indigenous peoples’ territories42. For example, the wind power 
projects in Ngong Hills and Kipeto are exactly located on the Maasai’s ancestral territories43. 
Other potential wind farm projects in some coastal regions, such as Narok, Kajiado, and 
Laikipia regimes, are also within the indigenous peoples’ ancestral territories44. In a majority 
of renewable energy projects in Kenya, land ownership is usually unclear and contested. 
According to Kenya’s land laws, only land that has been issued a formal allocation by the 
government can be recognised, and, due to the historical marginalisation and discrimination, 
many indigenous peoples’ land rights are not formally recognised by Kenya’s land laws45. 
Therefore, those energy infrastructure projects that avoid addressing the land rights issues in 
Kenya may entail both significant impacts on indigenous communities and severe risk for 
foreign investors.   
                                                          
38  Ibid at 30. 
39  Ibid at 13. 
40  Treiber, M. U., Grimsby, L. K., & Aune, J. B. (2015) Reducing energy poverty through increasing choice of 
fuels and stoves in Kenya: Complementing the multiple fuel model. Energy for Sustainable 
Development, 27, 54-62. See also Tigabu, A. D., Berkhout, F., & van Beukering, P. (2015) The diffusion of 
a renewable energy technology and innovation system functioning: Comparing bio-digestion in Kenya and 
Rwanda. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 90, 331-345. 
41  Ibid. 
42  See Sena, K. (2015) Renewable Energy Projects and the Rights of Marginalised/Indigenous Communities in 
Kenya. Published by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) and Indigenous Peoples 
National Steering Committee on Climate Change (IPNSCCC). See also World Bank (2013) World Wildlife 
Fund and World Bank Sign Memorandum of Understanding on Africa’s Extractive Industries. Retrieved 
from: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/05/28/world-wildlife-fund-world-bank-
memora ndum-of-understanding-africa-extractive-industries. 
43  Ibid. 
44  See Larsson, S. (2014) Law and Spatial Planning: Socio-Legal Perspectives on the Development of Wind 
Power and 3G Mobile Infrastructures in Sweden. Lunds University. 
45  Ibid. 
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Besides land grabbing disputes in Africa, indigenous peoples in Latin America also 
oppose energy development projects rigorously46 and may become the target of State violence, 
as illustrated by the social unrest in Mexico. In the cases of the wind power farm in Juchitán 
de Zaragoza (Gas Natural Fenosa’s Bii Hioxo project) and San Dionisio del Mar (run by 
Mareña Renovables), two Mexican NGOs, the Integral Defence Committee of Human Rights 
“Gobixha”(Código DH) and Peace Brigades International (PBI), have reported with concern 
severe risks for human rights advocates and local community leaders47. In these areas, private 
security, hired by energy companies, as well as the municipal and federal armed security forces, 
come together to protect the economic interests of extractive industries. This situation, which 
increased the presence of armed personnel in the region, has sometimes provoked violent 
tensions and clashes with local communities48. 
Similar to Mexico’s trouble with the development of wind farms, in the construction 
process of both the Bonyic dams and Chan 75 in Panama, ‘green authoritarianism’ and state 
violence can also be observed clearly49 . In these two hydropower infrastructure projects, 
Panama’s governmental agencies and private companies worked together to oppress local 
communities. With strong support from the Panama government, dam developers decided to 
use physical force to attack and arrest protesters, including women and children. The 
developers and states let the citizens in Naso and Ngobe villages experience what Radcliffe 
mentioned as ‘geographies of fear’ and inequitable development for Latin American 
Indigenous peoples50. 
Overall, the above selected cases on Kenya, Mexico, and Panama suggest that these 
environmental externalities and community conflicts, including human rights violations, 
indigenous land grabbing, and the required procedures for environmental impact assessment, 
are a crucial issue for studying international energy activities. And, based on the existing 
studies and new empirical datasets, this research aims to explore the Chinese outward energy 
investment as well as the inbound investment into Greater China area.   
                                                          
46  See Finley-Brook, M. (2012) Renewable Energy and Human Rights Violations: Illustrative Cases from 
Indigenous Territories in Panama. In K. S. Zimmerer (Ed.), The New Geographies of Energy (1 ed., pp. 162-
171): Routledge. 
47  PBI (2015) Wind Farms and Concerns about Human Rights Violation in Oaxaca. London. 
48  Ibid. 
49  Finley-Brook, M. (2012). 
50  Radcliffe, S. A. (2007) Latin American indigenous geographies of fear: Living in the shadow of racism, lack 
of development, and antiterror measures. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 97, 385–397. 
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1.1.3 Investment disputes in the energy sector on the rise  
The international energy industry invests in capital-intensive, complex, large-scale 
infrastructure projects that usually have a long operating life cycle51. Even with active public 
preparations, energy investment projects can cause some grievances and concerns from 
affected communities and other stakeholders. Global economic forces, governmental support 
initiatives and circumstances invariably change in these international energy investment cases, 
which may, in turn, lead an investment dispute52. 
Arbitration has fast become the primary form of dispute resolution in international 
transactions and the energy sectors53. The number of disputes submitted to arbitration has risen 
in conjunction with the growth of the world’s economy in large part driven by the number of 
energy projects54. 
As a result, one can see increasing numbers of energy-related disputes in both commercial 
and investment arbitration. Between 2014 and 2015, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration Institute (SCC) has seen a more than 100 per cent increase in the number of energy-
related cases, from 19 filed in 2014 to 43 filed in 201555. The bulk of these cases are related to 
oil and gas disputes, while electricity related disputes comprised approximately 40 per cent. A 
further 19 cases were explicitly brought under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) after 2015 
(Figure 1.3).  
                                                          
51  For fossil fuels, see Patin, S. A. (1999) Environmental impact of the offshore oil and gas industry (Vol. 1). 
East Nortport, NY: EcoMonitor Pub. For renewable energy projects, please see Góralczyk, M. (2003). Life-
cycle assessment in the renewable energy sector. Applied Energy, 75(3-4), 205-211. 
52  In 2015’s Bilcon v Canada case, a majority of the tribunal accepted a foreign investor’s arguments that Canada 
had violated Canadian environmental regulations, which also constituted a breach of the minimum standard 
of investment protection treatment. In another NAFTA tribunal case related to environmental law and 
renewable energy, Mesa v Canada afforded more deference to the respondent government in the 
implementation of regulatory instruments. There are many other similar cases, such as Allard v Barbados 
(PCA Case No. 2012-06).  
53  See Waibel, M. (2014b) Investment Arbitration: Jurisdiction and Admissibility. In A. R. e. al (Ed.), Handbook 
on International Investment Law: C.H. Beck/Hart; Sabater, A., & Stadnyk, M. (2014) International Arbitration 
and Energy: How Energy Disputes Shaped International Investment Dispute Resolution. In K. Talus (Ed.), 
Research Handbook on International Energy Law (pp. 199-224): Cheltenham, UK. See also Alqurashi, Z. 
(2005) International Oil and Gas Arbitration: OGEL. 
54  Sabater, A., & Stadnyk, M. (2014). 
55  The Energy Charter Treaty Database, available at: https://energycharter.org/what-we-do/dispute-
settlement/cases-up-to-18-may-2018. 
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Figure 1.3 Number of investment disputes under the ECT (the year 2001 to 2018). Source: The Energy Charter 
Treaty Database. 
In contrast, 48 cases were administered in 2016 under arbitration rules of the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICISD), with 17 per cent of these cases related 
to electric power and other energy. Furthermore, ICISD’s ECT caseload amounted to 9.5 per 
cent of its total cases56.  
The outcome is that the global energy sectors, along with their related infrastructure 
construction projects, constitute the most significant portion of international commercial 
(contract-based) and investment (treaty-based) disputes around the world57 (please see Figures 
1.4 and Figure 1.5 below). 
                                                          
56  ICC Dispute Resolution Library, available at: https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/professional-
development/icc-dispute-resolution-library. 
57  Ibid at 53. 
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Figure 1.4 International commercial disputes. Source: ICC Dispute Resolution Library. 
 
Figure 1.5 State investments disputes. Source: ICSID dataset. 
Not surprisingly, through this decade more interventions by states hosting investments in 
the energy sector have resulted in increasing investment disputes globally. According to the 
UNCTAD, investment arbitration cases have increased in importance over the last two decades 
as foreign investors have applied the arbitration option offered in a large number of over 3,000 
existing IIAs58. By the end of 2012, some 540 investment arbitration cases had been filed 
worldwide, with 58 cases explicitly filed that year. These figures confirm that foreign investors 
are increasingly using investment arbitration. 
                                                          
58  UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS. 
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According to the UNCTAD, at least 10 new cases on average were filed per year in the 
energy sector since 200159 (Figure 1.6). 
 
Figure 1.6 Number of known energy-related state-investor disputes. Source: UNCTAD Database. 
With the same data source, Figure 1.7 below demonstrates that most of these disputes 
concern the oil and gas sector (44 per cent), followed by power generation (29 per cent) and 
energy transmission and distribution (25 per cent).  
 
Figure 1.7 Sectoral distribution of known energy-related investment disputes from 2001-2011. Source: UNCTAD 
Database. 
The most notable increase occurred in 2003 when emergency measures were taken by 
Argentina to fight the financial crisis. Almost half of all respondents in energy investment 
disputes are countries from Latin America60. Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela were also 
                                                          
59 Ibid. 
60  De Brabandere, E., & Gazzini, T. (2014). See also Sabater, A., & Stadnyk, M. (2014). 
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heavily involved in investment disputes in the energy sector61. Most of the claimant companies 
are from developed countries - more than 9 out of 10 claims62. 
A related trend is the growing number of investment disputes with environmental 
components 63 . Since 2012, over 60 investment dispute arbitrations have touched some 
environmental elements. Amongst these environmental-related cases are several cases in which 
States have sought to enforce the environmental law against investors in investment arbitration.  
Given the social and environmental risks arising from investment in the energy sector, 
this trend goes some way in explaining the increasing conflicts among stakeholders, namely 
energy investors, governments, and affected populations (usually assisted by NGOs and local 
communities). However, these statistics here do not mention the names of the cases specifically, 
mainly due to confidentiality reasons. This research has searched for a large part of these energy 
cases and put them in a list in appendix. Also, a specific table on China’s recent investment 
dispute arbitration cases can be found in Appendix B (including investment arbitration cases 
from Hong Kong SAR and Macau SAR). 
Compared to investment dispute arbitration, other types of dispute settlement have not 
received the same high level of attention. However, human rights and environmental protection 
can also be relevant in these dispute settlement mechanisms. The UN Principles on Responsible 
Contracts states that affected individuals and communities, though they are not parties to the 
State-investor investment contracts, should still have access to an effective grievance 
mechanism. Moreover, these mechanisms can be found in soft control instruments.  
Soft control policy instruments encompass a diverse variety of tools, ranging from basic 
guidelines or codes to fact-finding mechanisms and contractual techniques. Some of these 
policy instruments are quasi-adjudicatory systems, where the actions of a private enterprise or 
                                                          
61  Ibid. 
62  UNCTAD, (2011) ‘World Investment Report: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and 
Development’ UN Doc UNCTAD/WIR/2011,  24  and  web  table  34, Retrieved from: 
http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_dir/docs/WIR11_web%20tab%2034.pdf. 
63  See De Brabandere, E. (2014) The Settlement of Investment Disputes in the Energy Sector. In E. a. G. De 
Brabandere, T. (Ed.), Foreign Investment in the Energy Sector: Balancing Private and Public Interests, Brill 
Nijhoff; Vinuales, J. E. (2016) Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law: The Current 
State of Play’, in K. Miles (ed.), Research Handbook on Environment and Investment Law, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, Chapter 2. See also Parlett, K. (2017) Protection of the environment in investment arbitration 
- a double edged sword, Lexology, available at: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=659b201e-
9676-4930-9175-45cda02a9619.   
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a financing institution are scrutinised to evaluate their conformity with environmental and 
human rights standards.  
For instance, Part II of the OECD Guidelines has a sophisticated accountability 
mechanism for the implementation of the substantive standards 64 . States adhering to the 
guidelines are required to set up ‘national contact points’ (NCP) to receive complaints from 
civil society groups about the implementation of the Guidelines by multinational corporations 
(‘Specific Instances’). After assessing the complaints, NCPs can make a statement, with 
recommendations as appropriate, on the implementation of the Guidelines. So far, over 200 
Specific Instances have been brought before different NCPs, many related to environmental 
and human rights issues.  
Furthermore, the Global Compact designs a mild compliance mechanism and adopts the 
Global Compact Offices system. These offices’ functions are similar to the NCPs. Additionally, 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC) also established the Compliance Advisor 
Ombudsman (CAO) as the independent dispute settlement mechanism65. The CAO deals with 
complaints from project-affected local communities with the purpose of enhancing 
environmental and social impacts on the ground. The inspection panel of the World Bank also 
performs these similar functions.   
It is true that the parties to a dispute case can decide to use other mechanisms rather than 
those mentioned above, such as proceeding with their disputes amicably, either through 
negotiations, mediation (with the help of a third party) or in conciliation (with the assistance 
of independent experts). However, issues may arise regarding if the public interests and 
possible effects on human rights are well represented in these dispute procedures and reflected 
in their decisions. 
1.2 The current legal frameworks and recent regulatory developments 
FDI in the energy sector raises formidable legal questions, often requiring a delicate 
balance between public and private interests of the various stakeholders. The ‘social licence to 
operate’ and ‘good governance’ of MNCs have become important research themes in 
                                                          
64  Gordon, K., Pohl, J., & Bouchard, M. (2011) Environmental Concerns in International Investment Agreements. 
OECD Working Paper on International Investment 2011/01. 
65  Wentzel, W. (2013) Guide to Extractive Industries Documents - Mining World Bank Institute Governance for 
Extractive Industries Programme. London. 
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international energy law, which require a careful evaluation of the social justice and 
environmental consequences of international energy investment projects66. 
A well-designed international agreement for regulating FDI in the energy sectors should 
balance economic growth, energy security, and other public policy (e.g. environmental 
protection and human rights) considerations appropriately. The hard law plays a crucial role in 
determining the conditions and terms applicable to energy FDI and is a significant vehicle for 
managing competing interests. 
Currently, two main legal frameworks regulate FDI in the energy sectors67. First, the 
international legal framework includes the treaties (either bilaterally or multilaterally), 
customary laws and international organisations. Second, the national legal framework covers 
the national laws and other regulatory systems of the countries having jurisdiction over the 
investment projects and the related economic operators. According to this principle, these legal 
rules and contracts have become the basic rule-based architecture within which the investment 
projects are undertaken and operated.    
1.2.1 International law 
 For centuries, global legal systems have intended to vindicate the principle of holding 
those who cause foreseeable, significant damages to others liable for the harm caused by their 
actions 68 . Now this concept is known as the “sic utere” principle and has been widely 
incorporated into international environmental law. Principle 21 of Stockholm Declaration in 
1972 and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration also clearly recognised this principle. These 
Principles acknowledge that countries must “ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or areas beyond the limits of 
                                                          
66  See Penttinen, S. L. (2018). Sustainability in the Energy Sector: Policy Directions and Implementing 
Measures. Oil, Gas & Energy Law Journal (OGEL), 16(3); Mbengue, M.M. and Raju, D. (2014) Energy, 
Environment and Foreign Investment, in De Brabandere, E., & Gazzini, T. (2014) Foreign Investment in the 
Energy Sector: Balancing Private and Public Interests. BRILL NIJHOFF. Leiden. and Schwartz, P. (2009) 
Corporate Activities and Environmental Justice: Perspectives on Sierra Leone's Mining. In J. a. O. Ebbesson, 
P. (Ed.), Environmental Law and Justice in Context. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
67  Mbengue, M. M., & Raju, D. (2014). See also Karl, J. (2014) FDI in the Energy Sector: Recent Trends and 
Policy Issues. In E. D. Brabandere & T. Gazzini (Eds.), Foreign Investment in the Energy Sector: Brill 
Nijhoff. 
68  Dupuy, P.-M., & Vinuales, J. E. (2018) International Environmental Law, Second Edition, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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national jurisdiction.”69 As a result, both sovereign states and private companies need to avoid 
causing damages to others.  
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) are primarily addressed to states and 
have, at best, indirect regulatory implications for MNCs70. By the fundamental ‘polluter pays’ 
principle, a few specialised agreements establish civil liability rules for private actors that have 
the potential to cause particularly grave environmental damage, such as oil spills or nuclear 
leakages. All of these instruments rely on domestic implementation and require the contracting 
parties to establish the necessary enforcement mechanisms.  
Though many treaties have clauses incorporating the sic utere principle, there is no 
consensus so far concerning how this should be applied. Currently, several multilateral 
environmental agreements have been established to address transboundary pollution issues, but 
only a few of these agreements have genuinely entered into force. The inadequacy of 
international environmental agreements on liability for cross-boundary environmental damages 
is clearly illustrated by the facts that no country asserted any liability and compensation claims 
for the worst nuclear accident in history, namely the Chernobyl nuclear accident71.   
National states have been less than enthusiastic about creating responsibilities for 
themselves as MNCs subject to their jurisdiction cause transboundary environmental damages. 
Despite many recent incidents of severe transboundary pollution, the progress in developing 
liability standards under international law environment has been little. Since the 1972 
Stockholm Conference 1992, the international community has invested more effort in 
developing worldwide liability standards. However, scant progress has been achieved by this 
regime. The International Law Commission (ILC) has been working on the principles of 
“International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by 
                                                          
69  "London Convention: Convention On The Prevention Of Marine by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter” 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-10/documents/lc1972.pdf. See also Vinuales, J. (2015) The 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development A Commentary. Oxford: OUP. 
70  Maljean-Dubois, S., & Richard, V. (2013) The applicability of international environmental law to private 
enterprises. In P.-M. Dupuy & J. Vinuales (Eds.), Harnessing Foreign Investment to Promote Environmental 
Protection Incentives and Safeguards. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See also: Affolder, N. A. 
(2009). The private life of environmental treaties. American Journal of International Law, 103(3), 510-525.  
71  Wynne, B. (1992). Uncertainty and environmental learning: reconceiving science and policy in the preventive 
paradigm. Global environmental change, 2(2), 111-127. See also Steinhauser, G., Brandl, A., & Johnson, T. 
E. (2014). Comparison of the Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear accidents: a review of the environmental 
impacts. Science of the Total Environment, 470, 800-817. 
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International Law” since 1978 72 . The ILC’s approach intended to focus liability on the 
economic operator of the activities causing the damages rather than on the national states. This 
approach relies on countries establishing their procedures for compensating environmental 
harm victims. 
In 2001, the ILC released a preamble and 19 articles on “Prevention of Transboundary 
Harm from Hazardous Activities”73. Then in 2004, it also published eight draft principles on 
“The Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous 
Activities”74 for comment. These initiatives and other hard efforts can be a sound foundation 
for future progress, but they still fall short of developing effective and comprehensive global 
liability standards for environmental damages.    
Also, international investment law indicates that MNCs have both rights and duties. There 
is an apparent tendency to make them responsible for certain kinds of conduct; although, at the 
present moment, this has been completed by domestic laws. In short, the recognition of the 
MNCs as a single entity under public international law and the recognition of their 
responsibility for violating international norms is developing slowly75. Although the draft Code 
on Transnational Corporations seeks to address these issues, it never progressed beyond its 
draft status. However, the Code contains many useful principles that may begin to be 
recognised in due course. 
So far, public international law has not yet established a global agreement on liability for 
trans-boundary pollution (although firm commitments were made in both Stockholm and Rio 
Declarations). 
1.2.2 National law 
                                                          
72  McCorquodale, R. (2010) The individual and the international legal system. In M. Evans (Ed.), International 
Law (3rd ed.): Oxford University Press. 
73   See UN Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, available at: 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_7_2001.pdf. 
74   UN draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous 
activities, with commentaries (2006), available at: 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_10_2006.pdf. 
75  Maljean-Dubois, S., & Richard, V. (2013). 
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So far, the international community still lacks a single globally-agreed agreement on 
transnational corporations’ liabilities and responsibilities76. However, remarkable progress can 
be found at the international level and in several jurisdictions, which put the efforts to hold 
polluters liable for the environmental and social damages occurred by their business operations.  
Some jurisdictions are modifying their national regulations to remove the obstacles and 
simplify the procedures for private plaintiffs to file litigations77. These litigations usually aim 
to recover from harm caused by environmental pollution and seek compensation. Public laws 
and policies are also being revised to ensure governmental departments can recover damages 
for severe environmental damages. Currently, in the absence of a global comprehensive 
corporate liability regime, national laws are entertaining more and more international 
environmental lawsuits.  
Regarding human rights issues, there has been a sharp growth in the dispute settlement 
mechanisms, both globally and nationally78. These human rights cases, before the national 
courts of home states, usually allege violations of human rights, environmental standards and 
other social policies. There are still many intuitional constraints in this regime. For example, 
the Bhopal litigation was not successful because of the very conservative interpretation of the 
forum non conveniens doctrine. With new more liberal thinking and recent policy patterns, it 
has become possible, for instance, to hold the parent companies accountable for their 
subsidiaries subsidies’ environmental damages which had been caused in host states. These 
recent trends may continue, which may accelerate the development of principles of liability of 
transnational parent enterprises. 
All the states must ensure compliance with rules and principles which are prescribed in 
treaties and customary international law regarding environmental protection. Multi-national 
companies’ home states also have the power to control their corporate citizens’ behaviours in 
other jurisdictions. MNCs also need to ensure that their operations follow the requirements 
prescribed in international environmental law.   
                                                          
76  Bellmann, C. (2016) Trade and Investment Frameworks in Extractive Industries: Challenges and Options. 
E15 Expert Group on Trade and Investment in Extractive Industries — Policy Options Paper. E15Initiative. 
Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum. 
77  Pathak, P. (2014) Human Rights Approach to Environmental Protection. OIDA International Journal of 
Sustainable Development, 7(1), 17-24. See also Shelton, D. (2011) Human rights and the environment. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
78  Ibid. 
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However, the existing studies point out that national legal systems are often inefficient in 
controlling MNCs’ operations79. In an era of economic globalisation, businesses operate in a 
more decentralised international network, and they can flexibly relocate the profits and their 
projects across the jurisdictions. The national regulatory systems, therefore, have limited 
abilities to control over the possible harmful operations by these modern private entities. 
Moreover, many developing countries heavily rely on the FDI capitals of these large 
transnational corporations. In order to attract and maintain the inward FDI capitals, these 
developing countries may be unwilling to enforce and enact higher environmental and human 
rights standards.  
Meanwhile, private litigations aiming to make environmental polluters liable for damages 
has faced many challenges. In the cases where a large, single and apparent polluting source is 
visible, private plaintiffs sometimes may recover their damages80. These cases include smelter 
litigations and large-scale oil spills cases in the early 20th century. Some particular chemicals 
and toxic substances (i.e. asbestos) can cause unique harm to human beings and the 
environment. However, the obstacles of proving evidence and establishing individual causation 
have made private law a poor instrument for preventing the environmental damages from 
multiple sources. While many countries depend on public and administrative laws and 
mechanisms to prevent environmental harm, these legal and policy instruments do not usually 
provide proper compensation to environmental victims. It becomes very challenging to hold 
transnational corporations and polluters accountable for their severe damages across several 
jurisdictions.  
1.2.3 Recent regulatory developments to recalibrate international investment law with 
sustainable development  
Due to the growing awareness of addressing environmental and social issues in significant 
energy and natural resource projects, new normative developments have recently been 
identified in international investment law81. Modern international investment law and relevant 
policy instruments embrace the environmental and social consequences of international energy 
                                                          
79  Salacuse, J. (2013) The Three Laws of International Investment: National Contractual and International 
Frameworks for Foreign Capital. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
80  Hober, K. (2014) Recent trends in energy disputes. In K. Talus (Ed.), Research Handbook on International 
Energy Law (pp. 225-240): Cheltenham, UK. 
81  Dupuy, P.-M. & Vinulaes, J.E. (2018). See also Douglas, Z., Pauwelyn, J., & Viñuales, J. E. (2014) The 
Foundations of International Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
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activities. These emerging issues include access to energy resources, the conduct of energy, to 
the sale and movement of the end energy product82.  
In recent years, a new generation of international investment agreements (IIAs) has 
developed for regulating investment and addressing environmental and social issues 83 . 
International investment treaties refer to agreements signed by States to protect and promote 
foreign investment. Through these IIAs, countries commit to protecting foreign investment in 
their territory by a variety of principles and standards, which may contain fair and equitable 
treatment and the prohibition of expropriation without proper compensation. IIAs often provide 
foreign investors with the right to enforce such committed protections through international 
investment arbitration mechanisms84. IIAs may also include bilateral investment treaties (BIT), 
Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and other bilateral and multilateral economic partnership 
agreements which incorporate investment provisions. 
In January 2011, the OECD already published a large-scale survey on international 
investment agreements and reviewed a sample of 1,623 IIAs (around half of the world’s 
investment treaty population) 85 . This survey focuses on states’ investment treat-making 
practices regarding environmental policy concerns and the evolution of addressing these 
environmental and social issues over the past decades. There are three main findings of this 
large-scale research project: 1) more modern treaties contain environmental languages; 2) only 
around 8 per cent of the whole sample investment treaties refer to environmental considerations, 
and 3) regarding the content and languages, wide variations can be found across jurisdictions 
and over time.   
After this OECD report was published in 2011, the new generation of IIAs and 
investment-related norms increasingly responded to environmental and social risks associated 
with foreign investment, including through the environmental and human rights provisions and 
                                                          
82  Lyster, R., & Bradbrook, A. (2006) Energy Law and the Environment. Cambridge: CUP. See also Zillman, D., 
Redgwell, C., & Omorogbe, Y. (2008) Beyond the Carbon Economy: Energy Law in Transition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
83 Dupuy P-M., & Vinuales, J.E. (2013). See also Gordon, K., Pohl, J., & Bouchard, M. (2014) Investment Treaty 
Law, Sustainable Development and Responsible Business Conduct: A Fact Finding Survey. Retrieved from: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2469662 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2469662. 
84 Sabater, A., & Stadnyk, M. (2014). See also Berger, K. P. (2003) Renegotiation and Adaptation of International 
Investment Contracts: The Role of Contract Drafters and Arbitrators. Vanderbilt J Trans'l L, 36, 1347. 
85 Gordon, K., Pohl, J., & Bouchard, M. (2011). 
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relevant reporting requirements86. For example, the NAFTA and 2012 US BIT model both 
update or develop the related clauses in the body of these agreements, such as the ‘adherence,’ 
clauses, ‘no-lowering standards,’ clauses, ‘institutional arrangement’ clauses, and ‘corporate 
social responsibility’ (CSR) clauses87. 
The similar trends are also visible in recent international conferences and investment 
policy-making. In 2015, the UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable 
Development (IPFSD) stated that nations are increasingly taking a more active role in 
sustainability affairs88. This trend is affirmed by States creating stronger environmental and 
human rights norms, more actively promoting sustainability and putting more emphasis on the 
role of corporate responsibility for impacts on citizens and the environment.  
On top of IPFSD, the OECD Policy Framework for Investment (OECD PFI) in 2015 also 
demonstrates that placing more emphasis on regulating the world economy does not mean 
discouraging international investment89. The 2015 OECD PFI, on the contrary, states that this 
active role of government is precisely how a nation can ensure foreign investment drives 
broader value creation for promoting sustainability90. 
To reconcile investor protection with other sustainable goals, the international community 
has proposed three reform avenues that can be considered in the area of international 
investment law91: 1) the first suggestion is the reinforcement of requirements regarding the 
exhaustion of local remedies stated in IIAs; investment arbitration dispute claims should only 
be accepted after using all the national remedies; 2) the second is about establishing an appeal 
mechanism for international investment arbitration; the new appeal mechanism could review 
coherence of investment arbitration decisions and address the application of investment treaty 
in various jurisdictions, and 3) specific mechanisms may be designed to ensure foreign 
                                                          
86 Schill, S. W. (2014) Foreign Investment in the Energy Sector: Lessons for International Investment Law. In E. 
De Brabandere & T. Gazzini (Eds.), Foreign Investment in the Energy Sector: Brill Nijhoff. 
87 See NAFTA's Environmental Record - IISD, available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/nafta-environmental-record-commentary.pdf. See also 
2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, available at: 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf. 
88 UNCTAD. Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (IPFSD), available at: 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/IIA-IPFSD.aspx. 
89 OECD The Policy Framework for Investment (PFI), available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/pfi.htm 
90 Ibid. 
91 Schill, S. W. (2014). See also Salacuse, J. (2013). 
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investors’ duties, no matter arising from national laws, investment contracts, or public 
international law, are all integrated into the interpretation of IIAs. 
1.2.4 Summary - The limits of ‘formal’ regulations   
Currently, two major regulations can be applied to regulate MNCs in particular. The 
‘formal’ regulations mentioned here are the ones undertaken by governments (whether at the 
national or local level) or intergovernmental organisations (whether at the multilateral or 
regional level)92. Such regulation can involve conventional ‘command and control’ instruments 
based on laws, regulations, and administrative or judicial decisions and which directly set 
liabilities and responsibilities upon corporations. Regulation can also be conducted through 
some more cooperative approaches93. For example, partnerships with business associations, 
individual companies, and environmental and social NGOs, may be based on mandatory 
obligations included in contractual agreements or on voluntary compliance instruments. 
For global energy governance, there is an urgent need to investigate how these 
international treaties, national laws, soft laws, and other project-specific instruments can 
address the negative environmental and social impacts occurred by international energy 
activities. 
1.3 Knowledge gap in the current academic literature   
FDI in the energy sector indeed raises formidable legal questions, often requiring a 
delicate balance between public and private interests of the various stakeholders. In the current 
literature, a tendency which stops the investigation of ‘law’ at the level of national legislation 
or of an international agreement can be identified94. 
Historically, the internationalisation of domestic laws and other important legal principles 
is a critical feature of energy law95. Before the 1970s, the lack of international energy trade and 
the multi-jurisdictional environmental damages caused by energy activities may explain why 
                                                          
92  See Morgera, E. (2009) Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. See also Ong, D. (2001) The Impact of Environmental Law on Corporate Governance: 
International and Comparative Perspectives. European Journal of International Law, 12. 
93  Orts, E. W., & Coglianese, C. (2007) Debate: Collaborative Environmental Law: Pro and Con. University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 156, 289-311. 
94  Affolder, N. (2011) Why Study Large Projects? Environmental Regulation's Neglected Frontier. UBC Law 
Review, 44(3), 521-554. See also Affolder, N. (2010) Rethinking Environmental Contracting. Journal of 
Environmental Law and Policy, 21, 155. 
95  Cameron, P. (2016). 
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there were not so many international treaties regarding energy or soft laws that focus on global 
energy markets.  
Since the 1970s, the landscape of international energy law has changed rapidly. The 
modern oil and gas laws clearly illustrate the internationalisation process of domestic energy 
law and the evolution of international energy law96 . Also, the WTO and Energy Charter 
Treaty’s related energy arbitrations have contributed to international applications of energy 
investment and trade standards and principles97.   
This significant development may also lead to the prevailing research approaches in 
current international law studies, focusing on the international treaties, dispute case laws, 
related principles, and their interplays with national laws. As Affolder has pointed out, project-
specific environmental governance has not received enough attention from legal researchers98. 
She clearly states that:  
“International lawyers are very good at collecting and collating treaty provisions. We 
well document relevant international resolutions, but we are too often hesitant to roll up our 
sleeves and engage in the time consuming and inherently messy work of seeing how these legal 
requirements are implemented in individual project settings.” 
Thus, this failure to investigate the nature of contractual and quasi-contractual instruments 
as part of a broader regulatory architecture of energy and natural resource governance have 
represented a misleading picture, obscuring the embeddedness of those innovative governance 
mechanisms in its legal environment and cultural context99.  
                                                          
96  Cameron, P., & Kolo, A. (2012) What is Energy Investment Law and Why Does it Matter? 
http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/March_2013/Peter%20&%20Abba%20-
%20Energy%20Investment%20Law.pdf. 
97   Konoplyanik, A., & Walde, T. (2006). Energy Charter Treaty and its role in international energy. J. Energy 
Nat. Resources L., 24, 523. See also Selivanova, Y. (2007). The WTO and energy: WTO rules and 
agreements of relevance to the energy sector. Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development. 
98  Affolder, N. (2013) Beyond law as tools: foreign investment projects and the contractualisation of 
environmental protection. In P.-M. Dupuy & J. E. Vinuales (Eds.), Harnessing Foreign Investment to 
Promote Environmental Protection Incentives and Safeguards. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
99  Ibid. 
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Zhiguo Gao notes that none of the oil and gas contracts he was able to collect for his 1994 
study comprehensively addressed environmental issues100. His conclusions raise the issue of 
whether environmental and social initiatives and values have received more attention in recent 
energy and natural resource investment contracts over the past decades. Nonetheless, since 
Gao’s study was released in 1994, his research could not reflect the likely subsequent changes 
within the international energy law regime or in the more recent energy investment contracts’ 
contents vis-à-vis human rights and sustainability.  
Of course, there is some subsequent research, such as Ong 101 , Viñuales 102  and 
Tienhaara103, which indeed addresses valuable questions. For example, what is the contribution 
of transnational agreements to the development of international law, particularly international 
environmental law? How can foreign investment contracts contribute to global environmental 
governance? Moreover, what are the relations between international economic law, 
international environmental law, and international human rights law? However, this follow-up 
research has not yet wholly evaluated other forms of contractual arrangements – e.g. Business-
NGO partnerships and other multi-actor contracts – and their usefulness for environmental 
governance and human rights protection. To date, existing literature still lacks a comprehensive 
understanding of the contracting landscapes in various geographical regions, industries and 
contracting cultures, so there is an urgent need to understand how these contractual 
arrangements can make significant contributions to often long durations of energy investment 
projects. 
As an important regulatory and governance mechanism, contracts do not operate in 
isolation from international and national legal frameworks. If researchers look at modern 
international investment projects, environmental and social initiatives have been introduced 
through various forms of contractual arrangements.  These project-level initiatives and legal 
instruments, including State-investor contracts, NGO-Business partnerships, community 
                                                          
100  Gao, Z. (1994) International Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation Agreements: A comprehensive 
environmental appraisal International Oil and Gas Investment: Moving Eastward? (pp. 317-335) 
Zuidpoolsingel, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International. 
101  Ong, D. (2001). 
102  Vinuales, J. E. (2016). 
103 Tienhaara, K. (2011) Foreign Investment Contracts in the Oil and Gas Sector: A Survey of Environmentally 
Relevant Clauses. Sustainable Development Law and Policy, 11, 15. See aslo Tienhaara, K. (2013) 
Reconfiguring Investment Contracts to Promote Sustainable Development. In K. P. Sauvant (Ed.), Yearbook 
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development agreements and other cross-sector collaborations, are still mainly operating below 
the radar of mainstream legal researchers, invisible to international environmental law today. 
To sum up, the mainstream scholarship has mainly focused on the study of 'law' at the 
national and international levels. The analysis at a project-level still has not received enough 
attention from legal academia. Also, a systematic review of the dynamic interactions between 
different legal mechanisms for reconciling global energy investment with human rights and 
environmental protection values has not been done properly. An understanding of how 
policymakers can mobilise the potential for creating future legal innovations and synergies. 
Thus, it seems appropriate to investigate such changes that focus on the micro-level of project-
specific regulation. 
1.4 Research questions and the discussion structure  
To fill the research gaps, this thesis aims to critically examine various contractual and 
quasi-contractual arrangements and to investigate the following questions. In so doing, this 
research frames the inquiry by a tripartite framework – states (S), investor (I) and affected 
communities/population (P) - and has three main purposes. 
1.4.1 Research questions and objectives 
1) What is the nature of environmental/social and human rights contractual and quasi-
contractual arrangements between foreign investors, host states and affected communities in 
the context of international energy investment? More specifically, why and where are they 
occurring?  
2) Can some recent patterns be inducted from the diverse avenues of bilateral investment 
contracts and multi-actor contractual arrangements?   
3) Is it possible to identify trends in current and future contracting practices as regards 
FDI in the energy sector? To what extent are such practices influenced by global resistance and 
community involvement?  What main features can be found in the Chinese case study? 
The overall working hypothesis is that these ‘bottom-up’ driving forces, such as NGOs 
and individual citizens, are increasingly mobilising the use and the design of contractual 
arrangements and quasi-contractual agreements/partnerships in the cross-boundary energy 
investment scenario. This thesis illustrates this argument by focusing on the case study of 
Chinese outward and inbound investment in the energy and extractive sectors. 
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This research addresses the above research questions through the following approach:  
Firstly, this research used different online resources open for the public in order to compile 
a dataset covering three major types of contracts: state-investor investment contracts, Business-
NGO partnerships, and multi-actor investment contracts within the ‘S-I-P triangle’.  
Secondly, this research crafted an analytical framework for assessing the empirical data 
and captured specific patterns and features in modern contractual practices. By examining the 
collected data on bilateral investment contracts, Business-NGO partnerships, and multi-actor 
agreements, this research reclassified them into three main types of contracts, namely soft 
contracts, enforcement contracts, and innovative contracts, each with its functioning features. 
This integrative chart will hopefully shed light on the potentials of contractual approaches for 
becoming a regulatory and policy innovation platform. This chart will also highlight the 
dynamic interactions, mutual supportiveness, and disparities among those three current 
regulatory instruments for energy investment.  
Thirdly, this research, in Chapter 7, applies and test the developed original conceptual 
charts on China’s outward energy investment. This China chapter aims to demonstrate that the 
‘bottom-up’ forces mentioned earlier and some key actors, such as NGOs, innovative 
commercial lawyers, and international energy companies, behind the innovative contracting 
practices, are all key factors fostering innovation in contractual practices towards a more 
sustainable and responsible energy investment future. 
1.4.2 The discussion structure 
Chapter 1 has set the background context of this research and identified three main 
purposes. This introduction has justified the significance of this research by providing three 
recent trends in global energy investments. This chapter also identified the knowledge gap in 
current literature and set the research objectives and working scope.  
Chapter 2 will set up the analytical framework for assessing empirical data. It starts by 
reviewing the current international, national, and other ‘softer’ accountability mechanisms for 
regulating foreign investment in the energy sector via a sustainable development lens and 
revisits the “State-Investor-Population” (S-I-P) Triangle. This research project likes to address 
that contemporary legal frameworks for regulating international energy investment are 
fragmented and imbalanced (in favour of foreign investors). Thus, private contractual 
arrangements can be a useful vehicle to prevent environmental and social damages. It also has 
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the potentials to complement the fragmented regulatory frameworks and enhance multi-level 
energy governance. This chapter also presents the methodological part of this research, 
including methods for data collection and data analysis. Also, it will address the research 
contributions and limitations. 
Chapter 3, 4 and 5 compose the main body of this thesis, investigating various contractual 
mechanisms in the ‘S-I-P’ triangle and their practices, effectiveness and interactions with other 
regulatory approaches.     
To be specific, Chapter 3 looks at the ‘S-I’ (State-Investor) dimension, focusing on 
environmental and social considerations in state-investor investment contracts. Chapter 4 
reviews the ‘I-P’ (Investor-Population) dimension. Due to a large number of community 
development agreements / corporate-NGO partnerships around the world, this chapter only 
focuses on examining the values and challenges of Corporate-NGO partnerships in Greater 
China’s oil and gas sectors. This should be an important case study for other energy sectors. 
Chapter 5 turns to the multi-actor investment contracts, and other multilateral initiatives 
within the ‘S-I-P’ (State-Investor-Population) triangle and even goes beyond. The discussion 
focuses on examining the feasibility of the recent proposal for establishing a multi-actor 
investment contract framework and whether these multi-actor contracts can lead to a new 
governance paradigm shift (‘governance by contract’).  
To provide original theoretical insights, Chapter 6 re-classified current contractual 
mechanisms as ‘soft contracts’, ‘enforcement contracts’ and ‘innovative contracts’, and 
developed an original conceptual chart to chart the dynamic interplays of the legal topography 
as targeted. Under a context of economic globalisation and community resistance, this thesis 
identified three key driving actors, namely multi-national energy corporations, non-
governmental organisations and commercial lawyers, for transnational governance. These 
three change agents may see contract as a technology itself, which can stimulate, manage and 
reinvent environment-driven societal transformation and regulatory development. 
After crafting the original conceptual charts, Chapter 7 aims to use this set of charts to 
examine China’s recent outward FDI in the energy sector as an illustrative case study. It looks 
at the environmental and social policies in Chinese overseas energy investment and pays 
particular attention to the community resistance to China’s hydropower and extractive 
industries. This chapter uses the evidence to examine and support an essential argument in this 
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thesis - global resistances and protests are shaping the modern contracting practices in the 
international energy investment regime and, through the platforms provided by various 
contractual arrangements, these ‘bottom-up’ forces can be useful for promoting future legal 
and policy transformation. 
Chapter 8 concludes this research. This chapter will provide summaries of the main 
empirical findings and evaluate the research arguments. The researcher humbly hopes the 
empirical findings and the original conceptual charts are not only useful to offer theoretical 
perspectives but also to serve as a starting point for future interdisciplinary studies. For instance, 
the original conceptual charts may guide economic modelling to empirically test the actual 
impacts of energy investment on the affected communities and the effectiveness of those 
various contractual instruments. 
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Chapter 2 – Setting the analytical framework 
“The current energy system is characterised by inequality.” – Nnimmo Bassey, Nigerian 
environmental activist 
This chapter aims to set the analytical framework for the following chapters, in particular, 
chapter 3, 4 and 5. These three chapters, as the main body of this thesis, empirically examine 
the effectiveness of various contractual mechanisms for safeguarding environmental and social 
values in the context of international energy investment.  
For this purpose, Section 2.1 first rethinks international energy investment through a lens 
of sustainable development. The concept of sustainable development helps to clarify that 
regulating international energy investment requires multi-actor and multi-level collaborations 
(e.g. international, national and individual). Through this critical angle, Section 2.2 turns to 
exam the conflicts and emerging issues in the ‘State-Investor-Population’ triangle (S-I-P 
triangle). Also, this chapter presents the methodological parts of this thesis, including the 
research methods, data collection and data analysis procedures (Section 2.3). Finally, Section 
2.4 outlines the possible contributions, research limitations and ethical considerations of this 
research.   
2.1 Rethink energy investment through a lens of sustainable development 
This thesis defines the concept of sustainable development in broad terms, as a process 
which improves human beings’ lives while also respecting the environment, based on bottom-
up agendas and priorities. This definition builds on the 1992 Rio Declaration’s Principle 1104. 
According to this Principle, people are at the centre of development and are entitled to have a 
healthy, harmonious, and productive life with nature105. This concept has been criticised for 
being too vague106; however, it has important implications for addressing environmental and 
social issues in international energy investment and recalibrating current investment law and 
policy.   
2.1.1 Recent normative developments at the international level 
                                                          
104 Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration 1992, available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-
1annex1.html. 
105 See Dupuy, P.-M., & Vinuales, J. E. (2018). 
106 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, See full text: 
https://www.cbd.int/doc/ref/rio-declaration.html. 
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Today cross-boundary investment is more about quality, not just quantity107. Given both 
the positive and negative impact brought by global energy investment, the United Nations’ 
Development Programme and other international organisations have pointed out that the 
quality of investment, not just quantity, truly matters108.  
International instruments developed over the last thirty years offer specific evidence and 
guidance to support this argument109. The Brundtland Report in 1987110 and the UN conference 
on environment and development in Rio 1992111 took a crucial role in developing the concept 
of sustainable development. Many important legal instruments and policy tools were adopted 
in the Rio conference and the follow-on world summits, such as the Plan of Implementation 
(adopted at the Rio+10 conference), and the critical document ‘The Future We Want’ (adopted 
at the Rio+20 conference) in 2012112. More recently, the recent adoption of a new set of SDGs, 
embodied in the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, provides new 
insight for conceptualising and operationalising the concept of sustainable development113.  
Economic growth is indeed an important goal of sustainable development. Principle 3 of 
the Rio Declaration 1992 states the right to development, while the vision of SDG 8 is to 
encourage ‘sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth’. Achieving these goals for 
development requires attracting private direct investment, including in natural resource sectors 
in countries where these provide an essential basis for economic activities.  
With regard to environmental considerations, the Rio Declaration’s Principle 4 states, 
“environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process”. The 
Rio Declaration is based on concepts developed in the Brundtland Report. Principle 3 of the 
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Rio Declaration also addresses that the right to development needs to consider the 
environmental values of future and present generations 114 . This Principle is about inter-
generational equity, which has significant policy and philosophical implications for 
safeguarding our environment for future generations, and environmental sustainability 
underpins most UN SDGs as well. 
Regarding social considerations, Principle 5 of the Rio Declaration 1992 views poverty 
eradication as “an indispensable requirement for sustainable development”115.  Principle 22 also 
calls on countries to support the interests of local communities and indigenous peoples116. As 
the Rio Declaration emphasises the relations between economic growth and environmental 
sustainability, subsequent World Summits have more fully turned to the significance of social 
dimensions in sustainable development.  
For instance, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development released the Plan of 
Implementation117. This action plan contains language on public health, hunger, poverty, water, 
sanitation, and energy. Corporate social accountability is also mentioned in the document118. 
This plan acknowledged that respect for human rights is essential to achieving sustainable 
development119. In addition, social issues are a vital component of the SDGs, such as ensuring 
healthy lives, access to water and energy, ending hunger and poverty, promoting decent work, 
and reducing inequalities. 
Without taking social and environmental considerations seriously, an investment that is 
economically beneficial (regarding GDP and public revenues) to the host state as a whole still 
should not be viewed as promoting sustainable development120. In some affected communities, 
people are dispossessed of their lands and are attacked by armed security forces.   
                                                          
114 United Nations (1987). See also Sturzenegger, F. (2010) The natural resources trap: Private investment 
without public commitment. MIT Press. 
115 Principle 5 of the Rio Declaration 1992, available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-
1annex1.htm; See also Vinuales, J. (2015). 
116 Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration 1992, available at: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm. 
117 United Nations (2002a) Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. Available at http://www.un-
documents.net/aconf199-20.pdf. 
118 See Morgera, E. (2009). 
119 United Nations (2002b) Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. 
Available at: http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf 
120 Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration 1992, Available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-
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Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration 1992 states that “environmental protection shall 
constitute an integral part of the development process”. Also, Principle 5 of the Declaration 
regards poverty eradication as “an indispensable requirement for sustainable development”121. 
These principles have been applied in some international rulings. For instance, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) has pointed out that the necessity to reconcile economic development 
with environmental protection is explicitly expressed in the concept of sustainable 
development122.  
Implementation of all the UN new SDGs would require investment projects to address 
environmental and social issues adequately123. The social and environmental dimensions of 
investment projects are connected intimately with many fundamental human rights124. The 
2002 World Summit published the Plan of Implementation, which clearly states that “respect 
for human rights is essential for achieving sustainable development.” Human rights are also 
relevant to almost every social matter in an investment project. For instance, land acquisition 
is related to indigenous peoples’ rights to property, food, housing and ancestral lands. Foreign 
investors may also have labour rights issues and need to consider the human rights relevant to 
the environment.  
Environmental degradation can widely influence public health and other recognised 
human rights125. For example, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights affirms the 
right to a clean environment (Article 24)126. In 1993, the Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action also stated the pursuit of economic growth should not trump globally recognised 
                                                          
121 Principle 5 of the Rio Declaration 1992, Available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-
1annex1.htm. 
122 Shiva, V. (2016). Earth democracy: Justice, sustainability and peace. Zed Books Ltd. See also Bosselmann, 
K. (2016). The principle of sustainability: transforming law and governance. Routledge. 
123 Promoting foreign investment in the Sustainable Development Goals, Note by the UNCTAD secretariat, 
available at: http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciid35_EN.pdf. 
124 Diana, S. K. (2013). The Mongolian energy industry: filling in the gaps. Available at: 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/insights/publications/2013/06/the-mongolian-energy-industry-filling-in-the-
gaps/.  See Diana, S. K. & Batsuren, B. (2013). With new law, Mongolia opens to investors. Available: 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2013/11/with-new-law-mongolia-opens-to-investors/.  
125 Zillman, D. M., & Lucas, A. (2002). Human rights in natural resource development: Public participation in 
the sustainable development of mining and energy resources. Oxford University Press. See also Vadi, V. 
(2012). Public health in international investment law and arbitration: Routledge. 
126 Article 24, African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Available at: 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr.  
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human rights. In practice, NGOs and human rights advocates have widely engaged with the 
natural resource investment projects over the past decades127. 
In any investment process, social, environmental and economic considerations are 
interlinked and can involve complex choices. The principles of participatory and accountable 
governance discussed in the previous section provide guidance on how these choices should be 
made. 
2.1.2 Other ‘softer’ accountability mechanisms at the international level 
On a different level of normativity and enforcement, ‘soft law’ initiatives are emanating 
from international organisations128. Many important actors draft principles, rules and standards 
related to international energy law, including international organisations, NGOs, business 
associations, and international financing institutions. International organisations regarding the 
energy sectors include the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Energy Charter Treaty, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, International Renewable Energy Agency (‘IRENA’), 
UN Environment Programme, UN Development Programme, and the OECD Nuclear Energy 
Agency.  
 The importance of soft laws is also a fundamental feature of the discipline of international 
energy law129. Firstly, soft laws may contribute to the formation of binding international norms, 
either via the incorporation of initially non-binding standards into a real treaty, or as these soft 
laws are regarded as legally authoritative by a large number of countries over a sufficient length 
of time, via the establishment of customary law. Secondly, international guidelines also can 
raise the standard expected of energy companies in ways other than their application by the 
tribunals. The industrial practices voluntarily adopted by one leading energy corporation may 
become a model for domestic oil and gas legislation, thereby raising the requirements expected 
by other foreign investors seeking to enter and operate in that jurisdiction in the future130.     
Therefore, this research will also pay attention to the following soft laws concerning FDI 
in the extractive industries:  
                                                          
127 Ferguson, R., & Lovell, S. (2015) Grassroots engagement with transition to sustainability: diversity and 
modes of participation in the international permaculture movement. Ecology and Society, 20(4). 
128  Karl, J. (2014). 
129  Cameron, P. (2010). 
130  Pusceddu, P. (2014) Contractual Stability in the Oil and Gas Industry: Stabilisation, Renegotiation and 
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(1) UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs);  
(2) OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises;  
(3) International Finance Corporation Performance Standards;  
(4) Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights;  
(5) Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative;  
(6) UN Global Compact, and  
(7) UN Principles for Responsible Contracts.  
2.1.3 Incorporating sustainable development into national investment policies 
Even an investment deal which is economically beneficial to the host state as a whole can 
be detrimental if other environmental and social values are not adequately factored in. 
Balancing economic, environmental as well as social considerations is central to responsible 
investment and sustainable development131. Over the past two decades, policymakers at the 
national level have also clarified the implications and trade-offs of this concept132. 
Indeed, law is only one aspect of the whole story. Other public policy instruments outside 
the legal regime, such as macroeconomic policies, can also influence investment projects’ 
patterns133. Although national legislation may nominally protect human rights and the natural 
environment, these laws are usually not enforced adequately because of vested conflicting 
interests, power imbalances, and resource insufficiency.  
Tax law is a proper example when it may be circumvented, as it is not always easy to 
collect tax payments. Some natural resource investment deals have been awarded in violation 
of substantive regulations and prescribed procedures. Legal implementation may take forms in 
some unexpected directions, often reflecting power imbalances between those who can stand 
to obtain or to lose from different interpretations of the law. Whether affected citizens are well-
organised for taking collective actions may significantly impact the legal rights they formally 
hold.   
                                                          
131 Park, P. (2013). International Law for Energy and the Environment (2 ed.): CRC Press. See also Sovacool, 
B. K. (2013) Energy & Ethics: Palgrave Macmillan. 
132 Gordon, K., Pohl, J., & Bouchard, M. (2014). 
133  Horst Keppler, J., & Schulke, C. (2009) Investing in the Energy Sector: An Issue of Governance. Paris. 
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Problems in implementation typically mean that investment projects reflect a gap between 
law and practice134. Law enforcement can have both intended and unexpected outcomes for 
real-life processes. Even well-implemented regulations can have unexpected results, but given 
the role of legal rules in framing the conditions of foreign investment, effective use of legal 
instruments by governmental agencies and advocates alike is a very significant ingredient of 
efforts to make sure that FDI is responsible and can contribute to sustainable development.    
Many governments have become more aware of the far-reaching repercussions of 
investment law, mainly after investors brought international arbitrations challenging the public 
action in wide-ranging policy areas135. Unlike many legal arrangements relevant to foreign 
investment, effective enforcement mechanisms mean that investment treaties and arbitration 
can have real bite.   
At a local level, citizens and NGOs in many developing countries have mobilised social 
movements as well as resorted to legal actions to contest large-scale energy investment projects. 
In many cases, law is a significant part of broader advocacy strategies combining collective 
political actions and legal resource empowerments136. 
Now, most of the massive investments in energy and natural resources are subject to 
public scrutiny137. Corporations face pressures to safeguard social and environmental values 
effectively, and many private enterprises take a proactive role in incorporating corporate social 
responsibilities into their core business operations. The business and human rights issues are 
moving to the mainstream of international business agenda138. However, balancing economic 
considerations with environmental and social values is much more complicated in practice. 
First, there is no global consensus on how to cope with significant trade-offs. Second, 
evaluating and balancing these fundamental values evolve and are inherently context-specific. 
                                                          
134  See Cotula, L. (2010a) Investment Contracts and Sustainable Development: How to Make Contracts for 
Fairer and More Sustainable Natural Resource Investment. London: IIED. See also Cotula, L. (2011) Land 
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Moreover, the sustainability can look very different at various levels139. A decision that may be 
beneficial to development at the national level can be unsustainable to the local communities. 
To sum up, promoting responsible and sustainable investments requires a holistic 
approach to address all the economic, environmental, and social issues at stake in every 
investment stage140. Host states, foreign investors and home states are three major actors with 
fundamental interests in an investment project. Both host states and foreign investors’ home 
states have been working on establishing rules to regulate international transactions and to 
embody principles in various legal instruments. 
Based on the discussions above, the concept of sustainable development provides a handy 
lens to assess quality in energy investment processes. Sustainable development is a flexible 
and evolving concept. So far no universally accepted definition exists141. In the investment 
context, corporations, states, and affected citizens have the chance to discuss competing visions 
of what constitutes the nature of sustainable development and how to balance multiple values142. 
Through this lens, attracting investment is not a final goal in itself but a vehicle to the end. 
While the major concerns of foreign investors usually focus on maximising their commercial 
profits, for host countries and citizens, the primary goal of attracting FDI should be to mobilise 
assets and capitals for a more sustainable future143. 
2.2 Revisit the “State-Investor-Population” (S-I-P) Triangle 
Natural resources are distributed unevenly across geographical areas and do not follow 
national boundaries. Any activity regarding transnational energy and natural resource 
investment involves a matter of sovereignty and is subject to the host country’s regulatory 
powers. 
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Academic studies argue that contemporary international investment law has become 
unbalanced in overemphasising investment protection over the regulatory authority of the host 
countries and, more importantly, the affected citizens and public interests 144 . To fully 
understand the complex interplays within the SIP triangle, one should not only focus on the 
practices of State-investor contracts but also analyse the other different aspects, namely the P-
I and S-P dimensions within the whole triangle that have other regulatory focuses. 
In the existing studies, investment arbitration analysis, traditionally, focuses on the 
conflicts between the private interests of the foreign investor and the public interests of the host 
state145 (Figure 2.1). Under this context, it is not surprising that the substantial analyses of these 
private-public tensions are captured in the current academic discourses and scholars’ writings. 
 
Figure 2.1 Public-private tensions between foreign investors and the host states 
It is hard to deny that studying the investment disputes related to energy FDI could provide 
some benefits because energy investment law can be viewed as pars pro toto for the whole of 
international investment law. Therefore, tribunal decisions and their legal reasoning from a 
specific sector (such as the energy sector) can make theoretical contributions to international 
environmental law and international investment law in general146. 
Nonetheless, if researchers and practicing lawyers can take a step back and review energy 
FDI operations from a broader perspective, not all the tensions regarding environmental and 
human rights in investment treaty arbitration can be properly understood through the lens of 
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this conventional public-private divide. Interestingly, some conflicts even exist within the ‘box’ 
of the public interests – the interests of affected citizens and communities can be different from 
the other public interests protected and promoted by the host state under some national policies. 
The sad truth is that sometimes interests of a host state and a foreign investor can not only 
be aligned in the protection of public interests but also to the detriment of it147. The latter 
phenomenon has been mentioned as the “resource curse” in academic and policy discussions148. 
The resource curse phenomenon occurs quite often in the situation where developing countries 
have an abundance of natural resources but misuse them. In this scenario, a rapacious state can 
exploit the country’s valuable natural resources for its economic benefits, depriving the citizens 
of its due. In fact, the basic triangular relation, what people mention as “State-Investor-
Population” triangle, can be much more complicated in practice. The complexity of the SIP 
triangle can be demonstrated further by the following points: 
Firstly, a host state can have various political and territorial governing subdivisions. 
National, regional, and local governments all may have conflicting interests with each other, 
and therefore hold different views on the same energy investment project. 
Secondly, the host country’s population can also be a heterogeneous category. For 
instance, a renewable energy infrastructure project is very likely to bring the benefits of 
economic growth and energy security to the whole country, but this specific project can be 
harmful to a small segment of the local population. Moreover, interests may also differ inside 
the affected communities, which depends on the extent of who benefits from that energy 
investment project and who does not. 
Thirdly, each aspect of the S-I-P triangle is governed by different bodies of law and 
regulation, and these different bodies of law may collide with each other. For example, the 
protection of human rights in the energy development projects may be governed by the S-P 
dimension’s international human rights laws and domestic constitutional law. These rules may 
not be consistent with the fundamental values of international law on foreign investment 
governing the S-I dimension. 
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Figure 2.2 below demonstrates the S-I-P triangle and how it involves different branches 
of public international law and national law respectively149. 
 
Figure 2.2 The SIP Triangle and its Law. Source: Viñuales, Jorge E. (2015). International Investment Law and 
Natural Resource Governance. P.5, E15Initiative. Geneva, available at www.e15initiative.org 
This tripartite framework provides useful insights for framing the inquiries of this research. 
This research aims to examine the contractual arrangements for safeguarding environmental 
and social values in each dimension of this ‘S-I-P’ triangle, namely the S-I, I-P, and S-I-P 
contracts.    
Also, this tripartite framework highlights the different professional roles that lawyers can 
play in this triangle. Host states, as a primary regulator in this triangle, may have governmental 
lawyers working for them. Foreign investors are usually transnational energy corporations in 
this case; the lawyers working for them are ‘investment lawyers’ or ‘commercial lawyers’. 
Finally, for the affected population, there are also environmental lawyers and human rights 
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Figure 2.3 Different professional roles for lawyers working in this tripartite framework. 
As a contemporary governance mechanism, contracts do not operate in isolation from the 
international and national law150. In fact, contractual arrangements are central to any large 
energy investment project operating within this SIP triangle. Nowadays in modern investment 
contracts, environmental and social initiatives are written in various types of contractual 
clauses and other arrangements. 
Different types of lawyers (e.g. investment, environmental and human rights, and 
governmental lawyers) may have different perspectives on an investment contract. In recent 
investment contracting practices, all these three types of lawyers should start to speak the same 
‘language’, which is the language concerning the environment and social justice values in every 
development project. To be more specific, today commercial lawyers and investment lawyers 
should also play the roles of environmental and human rights lawyers, sometimes even as a 
regulator, in their daily legal and negotiation practices. This research will have a further 
examination on the roles of practicing lawyers for investment projects in the following chapters.   
Based on this tripartite framework, this chapter below will explain how the author 
collected and analysed different contracts within this SIP triangle and found relationships to its 
three dimensions. 
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2.3 Methodologies, data-sets and data analysis 
This section outlines the research methodologies, data sources, and possible research 
limitations. Some methodological discussions on the nature of legal research will also be 
briefly addressed.  
This research aims to combine a traditional doctrinal analysis with socio-legal research 
methodologies. So it mainly has a qualitative approach, employing case studies and a 
comparative design. In short, the whole research process can be divided into two main stages: 
1) primary data collection and 2) critical data analysis. Before going into the details of the 
research methods, it would be useful to reflect on the nature of the legal inquiry, which provides 
a border view to chart the targeted legal and social phenomena in this research.   
2.3.1 Legal inquiry and the targeted legal topography 
The nature of the legal inquiry is to explore the uncharted territory of legal topography, 
such as national laws, international treaties, legal instruments, institutions, practices and 
principles151. Legal scholars should not be prisoners of well-established legal principles and 
concepts. On the contrary, conceptual innovation is very desirable, which can be the best 
foundation for future interdisciplinary research and the best evidence of genuine progress in 
legal study. 
In order to capture specific features of the targeted legal topography, legal scholars and 
practitioners have developed many innovative conceptual charts over the centuries. For 
example, leading legal philosophers, such as Hans Kelsen, Ronald Dworkin and H.L.A Hart, 
all established their original and innovative conceptual charts in legal studies. Under this 
context, a well-established legal conceptual chart is one that can merely: 1) be able to capture 
both empirical and legal features of the targeted topography, 2) apply “legally-sensitive” 
analytical concepts, 3) be appropriately fine-tuned in terms of assessing criteria and scale to 
explore well-defined target’s features, 4) set a number of statements that conditions of success 
are clearly spelt out, 5) establish the chart with a good faith effort152.  
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For this research, the legal research methodologies applied can be put into two main 
categories153. The first category is those methodologies which are internally-focused. This kind 
of methodology views the laws and other rules as a ‘self-contained entity’. The second category 
of legal research methodology is a more applied and integrated methodology and usually 
integrates the academic insights or approaches of another discipline (i.e. economics, politics, 
philosophy, anthropology and geography) into the legal inquiry and applies the concepts and 
insights from other disciplines when discussing a legal problem.  
For social sciences studies, the term empirical means that the research is grounded in the 
experiment, participation observation, investigation or other experiences154. Empirical legal 
research or socio-legal studies aim to understand how the legal rules work. For example, the 
scholars are interested in the possible consequences of legal reforms, how the crucial actors 
behave in some legal regimes, and how laws and regulations are formulated and implemented. 
As a result, empirical approaches of legal research are not just interested in ‘law in books’ but 
‘law in action’ as well.  
Socio-legal and empirical methodologies can include both quantitative and qualitative 
analytical skills on the data collected155. These skills include structured and semi-structured 
interviews, observations, quantitative surveys, case studies, and economic modelling. On the 
other hand, doctrinal methodologies will be able to highlight the legal implications of a 
particular approach or relationships between different legal concepts156. However, they are only 
indirectly concerned with the actual operation of law. Hence, finding a way that sufficiently 
integrates the technical aspects in an inquiry and is also concerned with the practical operation 
of legal techniques (in the present context, contractual and quasi-contractual arrangements) 
requires the development of a suitable analytical framework capable of reading certain features 
of the legal topography. In this research project, the researcher decides to establish them by 
using an empirical or socio-legal methodology. 
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The analytical framework developed in this dissertation aims to organise different types 
of contracts into categories that are both legally relevant and empirically useful. Both the 
empirical and legal dimensions must be considered because ignoring technical aspects of 
contractual arrangements may result in an insufficient understanding of the outcomes of certain 
legal disputes over foreign investment and hence of the mechanisms that play a role in 
unbalancing the system.  
Regarding academic originality, this analytical framework aims to clarify certain features 
of the legal topography, such as the current unbalancing of different interests and the techniques 
that are being used to achieve better balance. With newly developed legally-relevant analytical 
concepts, this research also wishes to become a foundation for future inter-disciplinary research, 
e.g. economics modelling other quantitative evaluations, to empirically evaluate the impacts of 
FDI across the world. 
The following paragraphs will give more details about the data sources, data collection 
process and possible challenges.  
2.3.2 Stage One - Searching three main types of contracts 
The data collection process of this research can be divided into two main stages. In Figure 
2.4, we can see the whole data collecting and analysing process targets a range of data sources, 
including State-investor investment contracts, Business-NGO partnerships, model contracts 
designed by the international organisations, multi-actor investment contracts and other 
contractual mechanisms.  
 
Figure 2.4 This research’s data collection and analyse processes 
1. For finding State-investor contracts: 
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Typically, State-investor contracts are not published and not available to the public, 
despite a recent call for investment contract transparency internationally157. However, luckily, 
several online data banks are still very useful for collecting primary contract materials in the 
energy investment regime. Among all of these online data sources, some are free, but some are 
paid services.  
This research only used the free online data sources for searching energy and resource 
contracts. Both the free website and the paid services can directly provide sample investment 
contracts for downloading and offer the web links to the governmental or corporate official 
websites where they published their free copies of investment contracts online.    
This research mainly uses the websites and the relevant data sources below to establish 
empirical datasets. Many of the contract websites provide helpful functions for the researcher 
to download the samples of published investment contracts and to filter the investment 
contracts by name, contract type, nation, year of the signatory, and specific provisions, such as 
environment, human rights, and community development.  
The following paragraphs will further discuss the specific information of these online data 
sources and how the researcher collects empirical data materials from them. 
1) “Contract Monitoring Roadmap”  
This Roadmap is a very well-designed, informative, and interactive online data resource158. 
This website can provide an overview of all the published investment contracts worldwide. It 
details the direct links and information of how the researcher can gain access to these 
investment contracts and related documents. Very interestingly, this Monitoring Roadmap was 
initially designed to monitor the contract transparency in all jurisdictions around the world. 
However, this website only provides State-investor investment contracts. 
2) “Resource Contracts”  
“Resource Contracts” covers a wider range of different contract types159. It is a more 
comprehensive, searchable, and user-friendly databank, covering State-investor investment 
contracts, community development agreements, environmental impact assessment agreements, 
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contracting.org/2013/10/03/9_steps_for_contract_monitoring_an_interactive_roadmap. 
159 “Resource Contract” official website, available at:  https://resourcecontracts.org. 
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corporate environmental management plans, and other forms of contracts in the energy and 
natural resource industries.  
 
Figure 2.5 “Resource Contracts” provides searching tools for finding and filtering natural resource contracts, 
which collected state investment contracts and other forms of contracts from 1958. Source: 
http://www.resourcecontracts.org/ 
As Figure 2.5 shows, the online databank of “Resource Contracts” already covers 1,382 
petroleum and mineral investment contracts from 89 countries. The period of these contracts 
can be traced back from the year of 1958 to 2017. This research uses this website as a major 
data source because of its abundant information. 
3) “Making transparency a global standard”  
This online data platform targets governments around the world160. The operator of the 
website is also monitoring which country has published their extractive contracts online or 
made them transparent to the public. This website also provides direct links of the investment 
contracts and documents. Not surprisingly, it also aims to conduct online campaigns, which 
oversees governmental authorities who have not established new legislation or any mechanism 
to make their investment contracts transparent. This website also monitors whether these 
mechanisms are implemented successfully or not.  
                                                          
160 “Making transparency a global standard” official website, available at: 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan011683.pdf. 
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Figure 2.6 An online map of jurisdictions that have published investment contracts online. Source: “Making 
Transparency a Global Standard”. 
In Figure 2.6, an online map identifying jurisdictions where energy and extractive 
contracts have been published and with direct access links to the contractual documents. 
4) “Oilwiki guides” 
The Oilwiki guides is a sophisticated website, which not only provides country-level 
energy and natural resources contracts but also offers their publications that summarise 
international and national natural resource policies, other model contracts and the changing 
geopolitics of energy resources161. 
5) “LEITI Contracts, Agreements and Concessions” 
The LEITI online databank is searchable by year, nation and different energy sectors162. 
For instance, if an online data bank user use ‘Liberia’ as a search keyword for finding contracts, 
this online site will provide all available state investment contracts, concessions, joint venture 
agreements, and other environmental agreements signed between Liberia’s government and 
extractive corporations. 
                                                          
161 “Oilwiki guides” official website, available at:  http://goxi.org/group/openoil-ug. 
162 “LEITI Contracts, Agreements and Concessions” official website, available at: 
http://www.leiti.org.lr/contracts-and-concessions.html. 
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6) “Petroleum Production Sharing Contracts” 
This website only emphasises Production Sharing Contracts in the oil and gas sectors, 
especially in developing economies163. For example, it offers direct accesses to the signed PSC 
between international oil companies and worldwide petroleum regulating authorities, such as 
the oil PSC on Timor Sea Zone. 
7) “FAO Contract Farming Resource Centre”  
This FAO centre is initially designed to be a “one-stop” website. It provides not only 
samples of investment contracts in energy sectors but also contracts in agriculture and land 
deals164. 
8) “Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreements”  
This “Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreements” website has a strong focus on Africa. The 
contracts downloaded from this website are of high quality usually with full content165. The 
website also provides online access to those investment contracts in Africa that detail the 
obligations, rights and duties of all parties covering the full lifespan of energy and natural 
resource project. 
9) “Model Mining Development Agreement Project”  
The International Bar Association launched this MMDA project website166. The purpose 
of this MMDA project is to illustrate examples of good practices in the industry and those 
contractual clauses that can promote sustainable and responsible mining. This project also aims 
to do capacity building for professional lawyers and negotiators who work for the local 
communities and private energy and mining enterprises by designing a model mining contract 
and a negotiating checklist template. Also, the IBA experts set up guidelines for sustainably 
implementing mining investment projects. 
10) “UN Principles for Responsible Contracts”  
                                                          
163 “Petroleum Production Sharing Contracts” official website, available at:  
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/PSCs/10PSCs.htm. 
164 “FAO Contract Farming Resource Centre”, available at: http://www.fao.org/in-action/contract-farming/en. 
165 “Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreements”, available at:  
http://www.turquoisehill.com/i/pdf/Oyu_Tolgoi_IA_ENG.PDF 
166 “IBA Model Mining Development Agreement Project”, available at: http://www.mmdaproject.org. 
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On this UN platform, people can find full documentation of the UN’s Principles for 
Responsible Contracts and its related research report and meeting documents167. The UN 
website also designs a set of training materials for negotiators and provides several model 
contract templates with specific draft terms. 
11) “Barrows Collection” 
The Barrows Collection online data source is a paid service. The Barrows Collection 
claims that they have collected the most comprehensive international references for energy 
contracts168. Their dataset includes contracts in oil, coal, gas, renewables, and all other types of 
mining and extractive industries. Besides contracts, the online data source also contains other 
important mining and energy legislation and case laws across various jurisdictions. This 
research did not buy its paid service but used its free functions for searching useful information 
and industrial guidelines.  
12) Other data sources 
Besides all the online databanks addressed above, nowadays more and more national 
governments also voluntarily release their investment contracts online for the public use. These 
contracts published by governments are also useful data sources. For instance, the EU169, US170, 
Canada171, Australia172and some developing countries (such as Ghana173 and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo174 have published their countries’ contracts online.  
Moreover, today energy companies and industry associations also have begun to provide 
useful online data, such as BP. BP works with Oil, Gas & Energy Law (OGEL) to set up an 
online portal focusing on the updates of its Caspian Region - Legal Agreements and portal175. 
This BP webpage 176  provides copies of its formal-signed contracts and relevant legal 
                                                          
167 “UN Principles for Responsible Contracts”, available at:  
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Principles_ResponsibleContracts_HR_PUB_15_1_EN.pdf 
168 “Barrows Collection”, available at:  http://www.barrowscompany.com. 
169 Investment and trade EU Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/investment/ 
170 U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402.html. 
171 Government of Canada, see: https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-
agency/services/tax/businesses/topics/completing-slips-summaries/financial-slips-summaries/return-
investment-income-t5/accrued-interest/investment-contracts/what-investment-contract.html. 
172 “Department of the Premier and Cabinet, Australian Government”, available at:  
http://www.slp.wa.gov.au/legislation/statutes.nsf/main_mrtitle_466_currencies.html. 
173 Government of Ghana, see: http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/media-center/news/2266-government-
newmont-conclude-investment-agreement-negotiations. 
174 Republic of Congo, see: https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/56 
175 “Oil, Gas & Energy Law (OGEL)”, available at:  http://www.ogel.com. 
176 “BP Legal agreements”, available at:  http://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/aboutus/legalagreements.html. 
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documents, such as BP’s recent Production Sharing agreements, Host Government Agreements, 
and Community Development Agreements in the Caspian area as well as other agreements 
about BP’s global operations.  
Civil society groups, such as environmental NGOs, also publish their monitoring reports, 
and these are all significant data sources. These reports provide an independent and external 
perspective on energy companies’ operations. Many of these civil society groups’ reports 
concentrate on examining severe conflicts between communities and investors, environmental 
issues, and human right violations in the extractive and energy industries. Business & Human 
Rights Resource Centre177 is an excellent example for this type of data source. They published 
weekly updates on the corporate responsibilities issues and essential news of human rights and 
business globally. Of course, these reports also addressed the human rights and environmental 
impact of the FDI in the energy sectors.  
For collecting State-investor investment contracts, the researcher covers the investment 
contracts from both developed (e.g. US, Canada, and EU) and developing countries (e.g. 
middle Asia, Latin America, and Africa). In the first data collecting stage, this research uses 
the online platforms to collect published contracts, which come from a wide range of 
jurisdictions around the world. In the end, by utilizing all the databases and data collecting 
avenues discussed above, the dataset of this research covers more than 370 to 400 investment 
contracts (the ‘S-I’ contracts).  
2. For finding the ‘I-P’ contracts:  
There are already more than 1,350 cross-sector collaborative initiatives currently 
published on the UN Sustainable Knowledge Platform 178 . This UN online cross-sector 
collaboration databank was launched after the 2002 World Summit in South Africa, which also 
has searching tools to filter the partnerships by working area and by the collaborative themes.  
However, it may not be possible to examine and discuss so many cross-sector partnerships in 
a doctoral thesis. This research, therefore, decided to use an illustrative case study approach to 
study the contracting practices in the ‘I-P’ dimension. 
1) Illustrative case studies - focusing on the Business-NGO partnerships Greater China 
                                                          
177 See “Business & Human Rights Resource Centre”, available at: http://business-humanrights.org. 
178 “UN Sustainable Knowledge Platform”, available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org. 
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After reviewing the academic literature regarding NGO-Business partnerships, it is fair to 
suggest that studying these cross-sector engagements and arrangements require a deeper socio-
legal investigation, in particular case studies focusing on a jurisdiction or a region, in order to 
capture their operations. 
For social scientists, case study is an intensive examination of just one or a few selected 
cases. Yin argues that the case study method is appropriate to answer research questions about 
‘how’ and ‘why’, and where there are real-life examples of what the researcher likes to study179. 
When the research purpose is to have a deep understanding of single or multiple phenomena, 
the use of the case study method would be appropriate.  
While just one single case study can provide rich information on the nature of the social 
phenomenon or practices which is subject to academic research, having multiple cases usually 
offers a much stronger foundation for theory building180. Yin stresses the significance of not 
just “finding the most convenient or accessible site from which you can collect data”, but to be 
able to provide specific reasons for how and why the specific case should be selected. Moreover, 
using multiple data sources of information can act as an approach of triangulating to ensure 
consistency in the data collected in this study, and to help ensure the overall quality of the 
information collected181.  
For collecting the ‘I-P’ contracts, such as community development agreements and 
Business-NGO partnerships, the researcher noticed that so far the existing literature rarely 
addressed the environmental contracting practices in the Asia-Pacific region and Greater China. 
The researcher is originally from Taipei Taiwan, so a strong focus of this research would be 
placed on mainland China, Taiwan, and ASEAN member countries. This study therefore uses 
two chapters, namely Chapter 4 and Chapter 7, discussing the case of China’s outward and 
inbound energy investment. 
The decision is not only due to the convenience of gaining information, but these regimes 
are now developing rapidly both regarding long-term economic growth and energy market 
revolutions. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has already been launched in 
2015182, and China is actively implementing its ambitious ‘One-Belt-One-Road’ initiative. It is 
                                                          
179  Yin, R. (2013) Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Applied Social Research Methods), SAGE 
Publications. 
180 Ibid. 
181 McConville, M., & Chui, W. H. E. (2007). 
182 Lee, W., & Hein, A. (2017) Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank. Politica Northwestern, 1(1), 6. 
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expected that more and more interactions and international co-operation on energy issues 
would appear in this exciting region. Taiwan has already signed free trade agreements with 
many ASEAN countries, a memorandum of understanding to institutionally cooperate in 
renewable energy generation and energy efficiency management with Mongolia183 and the 
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with mainland China 184. All these 
factors provide a good entry point for the research to conduct case studies in this region.  
For the study of the ‘I-P’ relation, this thesis focuses on the Business-NGO partnerships 
between oil and gas companies and NGOs in the Greater China area. The next section provides 
more information about how the researcher used another online digital mapping platform to 
search and select these cross-sector partnerships in Greater China. 
2) Using digital methods to find and map the landscape of cross-sector partnerships in Greater 
China 
  For exploring the current landscape of CSPs in Greater China, it may be necessary to ask 
first: What are the geographies and current situation of CSPs in Greater China? The academic 
literature should be useful to provide an overview of CSP / Business-NGO partnerships in 
Greater China. However, a powerful online tool already exists – NGO2.0 Map. This platform 
is developed by MIT New Media Action Lab, which can be used for mapping the Business-
NGO engagements in Greater China185 (Please see Figure 2.7). 
                                                          
183 Diana, S. K. & Batsuren, B. (2013). See also Taiwan-Mongolia Mou Signed For Cooperation On Renewable ... 
(n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.eco-business.com/news/taiwan-mongolia-mou-signed-cooperation-
renewabl. 
184 Cross-Strait (Taiwan and mainland China) Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) Available 
at http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/data/051116322071.pdf. 
185 ‘NGO 2.0 Map’, available at: http://www.ngo20map.com.  
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Figure 2.7 Business-NGO engagements map in Greater China. Source: NGO2.0 Map 
http://www.ngo20map.com. 
Due to a large number of cross-sector partnerships in the region, the researcher decided to 
target the large oil and gas companies operating in Greater China. This decision was based on 
the information available so far and these companies’ strong impacts on the environment and 
our society. After this careful consideration, this thesis ended up focusing on the following 
three groups of NGO-Business partnerships in Greater China. They are: 
Group 1 – International oil and gas companies investing in China  
Group 2 – Chinese state-owned oil and gas companies  
Group 3 – Two major Taiwanese oil and gas companies 
All three of these groups of oil and gas companies have different styles of operations. This 
research aims to make some comparisons on their partnering and contracting approaches with 
their NGO partners. These comparisons may provide general insights for observing the 
Business-NGO engagements and their community relations in Greater China. As large 
environmental NGOs are more likely to engage in such resource-demanding engagements186, 
reviewing some of the most active and leading international and Chinese domestic NGOs’ 
practices was an appropriate position to start. 
                                                          
186 Chu, C. (2011) Grassroots NGO's in China: a study of the legitimation process (Doctoral dissertation, The 
University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong). 
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3) For finding other multi-actor contracts: 
Regarding the search of the multi-actor contracts, this research mainly relies on the case 
studies mentioned in the existing literature. So far, the energy industry associations, such as 
the “global oil and gas industry association for environmental and social issues”187 (IPIECA) 
and the “International Council on Mining and Metals” (ICMM)188, establish online datasets and 
publish specific reports on the cross-sector partnerships in their industries. All of these 
extractive industrial associations are useful data sources for collecting cross-sector 
collaborative contracts, instruments and policy initiatives. Additionally, many cross-sector 
partnerships and community development agreements have been available online by a range of 
groups, such as companies, NGOs, policy think tanks, and research institutes189. The researcher 
has found valuable case studies of these multi-actor investment contracts in Africa and Latin 
America, and the functions of this new type of multi-actor contracts would be examined in 
Chapter 6.  
2.3.3 Stage Two – Data analysing approaches 
At the first stage, this research extracts significant theoretical insights from the legal 
documents and contractual materials collected. Then, those carefully selected case studies 
would be assessed by the conceptual charts developed at the second stage.  
This thesis applies both deductive and inductive research strategies for data analysing. 
The deductive reasoning is a useful tool to develop research questions and original theoretical 
frameworks. For example, this research used this skill to formulate research questions in 
Chapter 1 and craft original conceptual charts in Chapter 6. On the other hand, an inductive 
reasoning approach is appropriate to use in the process of informing and expanding theories. 
Applying a more descriptive research design is well suited for this research as it is useful to 
illuminate issues and research fields that have been subject to little existing studies, as is the 
case of cross-sector partnerships and contracts in the global energy investment regime. 
                                                          
187 IPEICA (2006) Partnerships in the oil and gas industry, Retrieved from: 
http://www.ipieca.org/publication/partnerships-oil-and-gas-industry. 
188 Bradshaw, B., & McElroy, C. (2014) Company–community agreements in the mining sector. In C. Louche & 
T. Hebb (Eds.), Socially Responsible Investment in the 21st Century: Does it make a Difference for Society? 
(Vol. 7, pp. 173-193): Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
189 Cotula, L. (2010a). 
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Inductive analytical skill is often viewed as the principal approach for qualitative data 
analysis190. The primary purpose of this analytical rationale is to help research findings to 
emerge from the dominant, frequent, and critical themes that appear in the raw data. Similarly, 
Thomas mentions the inductive method has two main objectives 191 : (1) to condense 
comprehensive and extensive raw data into a concise format; (2) to establish strong links 
between research aims and the initial findings and ensure that these connections are clear, 
transparent, and visible. This analytical approach is also similar to Miles who emphasises three 
vital missions for any qualitative analysis: “data reduction, data display and data verification”. 
The data analysis process of this research generally applies Thomas’s coding process192. 
The analysis follows some critical stages, such as labelling data, data reduction, summarising 
texts, establishing links, and displaying theoretical models. The outcome can be the 
establishment of an original analytical framework or conceptual chart covering legally-
sensitive concepts and conveying key messages. This analytical process requires research skills 
to choose, review, interpret, and distil information from all the raw data materials. 
To put it more specifically, when the analysing procedure begins, the researcher usually 
previews every collected contract first. After understanding the contract’s main structure, 
special attention would be placed on the targeted sections or some keywords. For example, the 
researcher always searches the keywords including environmental protection, sustainable 
development, human rights, community development, labour rights, land rights, social justice, 
and so on. Finally, the targeted paragraphs in the contracts were read carefully. This research 
aims to distil their legal meanings and push the new ideas to a theoretical level.  
For using the online databanks mentioned above, some keywords can be used to search 
for available contracts for further analysing. The keywords can be the name of the country 
signing the contracts or the year of signing these contracts. Please see Figure 2.8 and Figure 
2.9 below. 
Search by ‘country’ – Using ‘Kenya’ as a keyword to do contract search 
                                                          
190 Thomas, R. M. (2003) Blending Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods in Theses and Dissertations: 
Corwin Press. 
191 Cryer, R., Hervey, T., Sokhi-Bulley, B., & Alexandra, B. (2011). 
192 Thomas, R. M. (2003). 
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Figure 2.8 Kenya’s investment contracts in the online data bank 
After this search, in total 24 investment contracts signed between energy corporations and 
the government of Kenya can be found. The dataset shows that these contracts were all signed 
from 1999 to 2013. On the other hand, if a researcher searches by ‘year signed’, the result will 
show 20 investment contracts signed in the years 2015 and 2016.   
 
Search by ‘year signed’ – Using ‘2016’ and ‘2015’ as keywords to do contract search: 
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Figure 2.9 Kenya’s investment contracts signed in 2015 and 2016 
After finding these contracts, this research starts by reviewing the clauses of 
environmental and social development within these selected state investment contracts. Please 
see the Appendix for more information about the dataset.  
2.4 Research limitations and possible contributions 
This research involves a broad range of legal mechanisms for balancing investor 
protection and other public interests. At least, there could be three main limitations of collecting 
data.  
2.4.1 Possible research limitations  
Firstly, information transparency is still a significant issue. Though many contracts are 
already open for the public, contracts concerning energy investment, land deals, biodiversity 
protection, and community development are very often private. Reasonable efforts may help 
to gain access to these investment agreements. However, there is no guarantee that these 
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contracts would be publicly disclosed. The energy industry is a quite sensitive sector and is 
usually relevant to several national security issues. Though this chapter has listed useful online 
databases available, many of these energy investment contracts, cross-sector partnerships and 
community agreements are not published by the governments. As a result, currently, it may not 
be possible to generate a comprehensive list of all these contracting arrangements. It is, 
however, challenging to conduct a sampling process like many other research subjects in the 
social sciences realms. 
Secondly, international energy law itself is still evolving rapidly. Setting the selection 
criteria for collecting the empirical data and choosing case studies could still be challenging. 
For example, there are over 3,000 investment IIAs across the world. A full analysis of all these 
existing investment legal and policy instruments would be far beyond the working scope of 
this research. A smart strategy for dealing with this issue may be to proceed with this study 
based on the previous large-scale empirical studies first, such as World Bank and UN’s joint 
published reports: “Survey on environmental concerns in international investment 
agreements”193. This research tries to update the existing empirical studies with its datasets. In 
fact, many model contracts regulating foreign investment have also been published. Leading 
business and industrial associations, e.g., ICMM and IPIECA, and other relevant international 
institutions released useful information online. Because of the constraints mentioned above, 
the current research, however, only can provide a limited vision for viewing the related 
emerging issues in international energy law.   
Thirdly, some contracts available are not written in English, but rather in Spanish, French 
or other languages. Therefore, this researcher mainly relies on contracts and documents written 
in English or Chinese.  
Due to these research limitations stated above, this thesis has a strong focus on the Chinese 
case studies (See Chapter 4 and 7). However, in other chapters (i.e., Chapter 3, 5 and 6), this 
research also discussed the functions of the contractual approach in a general way. 
2.4.2 Possible research contributions  
This research argues that a contractual approach for regulating investments and promoting 
sustainable development can serve as a significant tool for stimulating regulatory innovation 
                                                          
193 See World Bank (2013), p.15-17.  
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and multi-level governance, especially in the regulatory environment of those developing 
countries. The ultimate goal of this research is to enrich the existing understanding of energy 
investment and sustainable development in context of project-specific contracts and to think 
more broadly about how these contractual mechanisms can be applied as a ‘technology’ to 
stimulate environment-driven societal transformation. 
Based on the detailed analyses of the raw contracting materials, this research also assumes 
that different regional trends (evolution in the type of contractual arrangements by country or 
region), time trends (types of contracts over time) and sector trends (e.g. oil and gas, mining, 
etc.) can be identified.  The working hypnosis is that the participation of affected communities 
and even their resistances would be a significant driving force for innovative contracts. In short, 
this research may argue that the most innovative contracts appear in the jurisdictions where 
residents have more chances to be involved in the contract negotiations, or their local activities 
and resistances have avenues to shape the contracting practices. Without any external 
influences, a pure ‘top-down’ model itself is not likely (or is very slow) to change the status 
quo. This argument will be supported by empirical evidences collected in the Chinese case 
studies (Please see Chapter 4 and 7). 
Afterall, this research likes to more deeply understand how energy is regulated at the 
international level and explore the root and the usefulness of these innovative contracts for 
global governance. The implications are expected to be both practical and theoretical. 
Theoretically, it aims to examine whether there is a new paradigm for contractualising 
environmental governance under the transboundary energy investment context and what this 
integrative and multi-actor approach means for the understanding of international energy law 
and investment law. For the practical aspect, this research explores the contractual techniques 
and why they are robust to manage interactions over time.  
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Chapter 3 –The ‘S-I’ dimension: Environmental and social considerations in State-
investor investment contracts 
“Contracts have the power to transform multinational enterprises into ad hoc legal institutions 
with the power to dictate the law that governs their relations with states and their activities 
within states.” – Susan Leubuscher, former UNEP's Basel Convention secretariat 
This chapter explores the relations between investors and states, namely the ‘S-I’ 
dimension in the ‘S-I-P’ triangle. The evolution of contemporary investment contracts has 
lasted for decades. Investment contracts, functioning with international investment treaties and 
national laws, have a crucial role in regulating both foreign investors and states’ rights and 
responsibilities. The primary purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the contracting practices of 
contemporary State-investor contracts in the extractive sectors, especially those mechanisms 
designed for safeguarding human rights and the environment.  
In the following paragraphs, Section 3.1 provides an overview of the history and recent 
developments of investment contracts. Investment contracts do operate in a broader web of 
legal frameworks194, so the analysis will pay attention to the interactions among investment 
treaties, investment contracts and national laws. The discussion would be focused on how the 
values of environmental protection and human rights have evolved over these years. Section 
3.2 first discusses the mechanism design of environmental protection value in the energy 
investment contract. Some of the more common designs are environmental impact assessments 
and plans for companies to conduct environmental management. 
Then, Section 3.3 turns to the clauses regarding human rights, community development 
and social justice. This part will examine how local governments, energy companies, legal 
professionals, and civil society groups can participate in the design and negotiations of these 
commercial contracts. New principles for drafting these kinds of clauses will be discussed. 
Finally, Section 3.4 will evaluate the actual performances of the environmental and social 
clauses in the recent investment contracts. The discussion will focus on the usefulness of these 
contracts’ innovative designs as well as some practical issues about implementing them 
successfully. 
                                                          
194 Salacuse, J. (2013) The Three Laws of International Investment: National Contractual and International 
Frameworks for Foreign Capital. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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3.1 An overview of the S-I relation: Investment treaties and investment contracts 
There is an apparent paradox in natural resource investments. In recent decades, low and 
middle-income developing countries put effort into attracting FDI for their national 
development 195 . When investments enter, these projects often cause conflicts over 
environmental impacts, land acquisition, or labour issues196. 
To make sense of the nature of this apparent paradox, people should understand the value 
of investments is about its quality for sustainable development, not just its quantity. It is critical 
for developing countries to rethink the types of foreign investments they like to attract and the 
environmental and social standard with which these foreign investors need to comply.  
International legal tools can be useful to coordinate the application of various instruments. 
For instance, these international mechanisms could require tribunals to take into account other 
relevant international rules applicable to the relations among all the contracting parties when 
they interpret investment treaties. 
However, applying different international and national rules in practice often can cause 
difficult issues. For instance: How should an investment tribunal respond if an investor has 
failed in its responsibility to protect human rights197? To have higher certainty and clarity, this 
research requires more explicit treaty clauses on these matters. 
3.1.1 Environmental and social provisions in investment treaties 
The evolution of international investment law and policy is now at a crossroads. The 
heated debates are around the standards of investment protection designed in the investment 
treaties and the clauses that allow foreign investors to file investment arbitrations against 
                                                          
195 See Moran, T. H. (2006). See also Economy, E., & Levi, M. (2014) By all means necessary: how China's 
resource quest is changing the world. Oxford University Press. 
196 Dolzer, R. a. C. S. (2013) Principles of International Investment Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See 
also Miles, K. (2013) The origins of international investment law: empire, environment and the safeguarding 
of capital (Vol. 99) Cambridge University Press. 
197 See Bartels, L. (2016) International Economic Law and Human Rights: Friends, Enemies or Frenemies? In 
European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2016 (pp. 485-492) Springer International Publishing. 
See also Dupuy, P.-M., & Vinuales. J. E. (2015) Human rights and investment disciplines: integration in 
progress. In M. Bungenberg, J. Griebel, S. Hobe, & A. Reinish (Eds.), International Investment Law (pp. 
1739-1767) Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
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states 198 . The international community and many countries have been reviewing their 
investment policies and IIA designs199.  
Also, the investor-state dispute system, with some apparent shortcomings, is also under 
reform at this moment200. As debates go on, another critical area may be neglected in the 
mainstream discussion, which is how the treaty and dispute mechanism reforms could bring 
more sustainable and responsible investment in the energy sectors201. 
The first-generation of investment treaties have a very narrow focus on protection of 
investment202. The traditional investment treaties usually have nothing or very little content 
concerning the standards of responsible investment conduct and the quality of investment 
projects. This fact has caused imbalances in the obligations and rights of other key stakeholders 
involved in the investment projects. Policymakers should consider integrating other standards 
of sustainable and responsible investment into the legal instruments which have a legal bite, 
such as investment treaties. This approach could be possibly applied to the investment dispute 
settlement mechanisms. 
The evolution of sustainable and responsible investment provisions has now become a 
new theme in the regime of international investment law. Though the development of this kind 
of sustainable provisions still progresses slower than the investment protection provisions, 
some innovative and sophisticated designs are emerging203, such as the evolution of (1) treaty 
clauses on state obligations and (2) treaty clauses on investors’ obligations. 
1) Treaty clauses on state obligations 
Some investment treaties intend to clarify what countries need to do for promoting 
sustainable and responsible investment. A few treaties’ preambles mention international legal 
                                                          
198 Sornarajah, M. (2012) Starting anew in international investment law. Perspectives on topical foreign direct 
investment issues by the Vale Columbia Centre on Sustainable International Investment, (74). 
199 Gordon, K., Pohl, J., & Bouchard, M. (2014). 
200 Rivkin, D. W., Lamb, S. J., & Leslie, N. K. (2015) The future of investor-state dispute settlement in the 
energy sector: engaging with climate change, human rights and rule of law. Journal of World Energy Law & 
Business, 8(2), 130-153. 
201 Gehring, M. (2010) Introduction to ‘Sustainable Development in World Investment Law’. In M.-C. 
Cordonier Segger, M. W. Gehring, & A. Newcombe (Eds.), Sustainable Development in World Investment 
Law: Kluwer Law International. See also Gentry, B. S. (2016) International Investment Agreements and 
Investments in Renewable Energy from Barriers to Opportunities: Renewable Energy Issues in Law and 
Policy: Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies. 
202 Gordon, K., Pohl, J., & Bouchard, M. (2014). See also Gao, Z. (1998) Environmental Regulation of Oil and 
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instruments. For instance, the preamble of the EU-Canada CETA treaty204 refers to the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights as well as the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises set by 
OECD205, which do encourage corporations to respect human rights in their operations.  
Many treaties have "non-lowering of standards" provisions designed to prevent host 
countries from deviating from their domestic environmental, social and labour laws. For 
instance, the US Model bilateral investment treaty reaffirms the responsibilities and obligations 
of the countries as members of relevant international organisations and international 
agreements, such as the International Labour Organization and the obligations under this 
organisation’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. The 2016 Morocco-
Nigeria BIT206 also has similar advanced provisions. 
Other treaties can go further. The 2016 Morocco-Nigeria BIT also requires states to 
promise that their national laws and policies should be consistent with international 
environmental and human rights agreements207. Also, other investment treaties, such as the 
2013 Japan-Mozambique BIT 208  and the 2016 Morocco-Nigeria BIT 209 , have provisions 
requiring nations to take actions to combat corruption. 
2) Treaty clauses on investors’ obligations 
Many recent treaties also clarify the obligations of foreign investors. For instance, some 
treaties (or model treaties) ask foreign corporations to comply with specific applicable laws. 
The India Model BIT 2015210, as well as the Intra-MERCOSUR Protocol in 2017211, are 
outstanding examples.  
In many developing countries, compliance with these countries’ national law may not be 
substantial enough to uphold minimum environmental and social standards. Unlike in advanced 
countries such as the UK and the US, which have comprehensive regulatory webs of 
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environmental laws and social regulations in place, the environmental awareness and relevant 
management mechanisms in the developing countries have developed slowly212. 
As a result, several recent investment treaties refer to compliance with relevant 
international agreements and other corporate social responsibility standards, such as combating 
corruptions and/or protecting human rights. For instance, the 2016’s Morocco-Nigeria BIT213 
has an innovative provision to require that investors (in mandatory terms): 
“Uphold human rights 
Act in accordance with ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 
and Comply with environmental impact assessment requirements applicable under the law of 
the home state or the host state, whichever is more rigorous, and maintain appropriate 
environmental management systems.” 
Many other treaties have provisions to prevent foreign investors from engaging in 
corruption, including the 2015 India Model BIT, the Morocco-Nigeria BIT 2016, and the Intra-
MERCOSUR Protocol. 
The US investment treaties provide an advanced example in this field. Over the past 
decades, a bipartisan investment policy goal has enhanced the capacities of US investment 
treaties to protect the environment 214 . In US’s Model BIT 2004 215 , Article 12 is entitled 
“Investment and the Environment”. The US Model BIT 2012 even significantly improved and 
expanded this Article 12 with more extensive sustainable and environmental obligations of 
investors.    
The US’s recent free trade agreements usually cover one specific chapter on trade, 
investment and the environment216. The US model BITs use similarly drafted investment and 
the environment chapters in US FTAs217. Both of them usually protect the state’s ability to 
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regulate in an authentic and non-discriminatory way. Whether regarding the environmental, 
social and other areas, the regulating actions should be consistent with most-favoured-nation 
commitments and other national treatments (among all the foreign investors).  
Annex B of the US Model BIT covers many principles for environmental protection. 
These environmental principles are reinforced in Annex B, which explicitly minimises the 
exposure of non-discriminatory and environmentally-sensitive regulating activities to foreign 
investor statements of indirect expropriation. 
Overall, progress in the US investment treaties and policies has been successful. This US 
bipartisan investment policy reform has formulated a set of balanced negotiation purposes that 
not only liberalise the markets and provide protection for US investors but enhance US 
investment policy goals in environmental protection, transparency, social justice and the rule 
of law. Moreover, the dispute resolution mechanisms designed in these treaties can also provide 
private actors consistent support for coping with environmental harm.   
3) Summary 
The discussions above have shown some progress in this changing field. The innovative 
mechanisms adopted in investment treaties can integrate other sustainable and responsible 
investment standards into the mainstream investment protection narrative. However, the 
progress is still far away from a comprehensive set of solutions. As to the future of investment 
treaties and their environmental and social mechanisms, there are still three main challenges. 
First, treaty practices in this area have not yet settled. Responsible and sustainable treaty 
provisions are still rare and often seem underdeveloped compared to other treaty provisions. 
Even many of the provisions in the model treaties discussed above are yet to be placed into 
real-life treaties. Some investment treaties are even not yet in force, e.g. the Intra-MERCOSUR 
Protocol218 and the Morocco-Nigeria BIT219. 
Second, many complicated legal issues are still at stake. Several international legal 
instruments which treaties could refer to are directed at national states rather than foreign 
investors. Coupled with quite limited treaty practice in the investment realm, these policy and 
                                                          
218 Intra-MERCOSUR Investment Facilitation Protocol (2017). 
219 Morocco - Nigeria BIT (2016). 
 
67 | P a g e  
 
legal complexities can raise challenges for negotiators – for example, how the drafters can 
design effective provisions on investor obligations. 
Third, several fundamental issues remain unresolved, e.g. ensuring the sustainable and 
responsible investment clauses genuinely have a legal bite. Some preambles mentioned above 
merely refer to relevant international standards; this approach does not have much effect. In 
fact, these clauses are not usually mandatory nor supported by effective enforcement 
instruments.  
Facing these questions, one may think about the outcomes of foreign investor non-
compliance in an investment arbitration context. Should non-compliance of these sustainable 
and responsible provisions be a jurisdictional issue, where corporations who do not obey these 
clauses are excluded from investment protection?  
Alternatively, how could investment tribunals apply responsible and sustainable 
investment provisions when deciding the outcome of the dispute? Should host countries be 
allowed to make counterclaims against foreign investors based on alleged violations of those 
environmental and social provisions?  
Also, to what extent, if any, should there be space for third parties to invoke responsible 
and sustainable investment clauses? Several recent investment disputes are originated, at least 
in part, in the tensions that involve third parties, e.g. communities and individual citizens 
affected by the investment project. Recently, a report conducted by IIED pointed out that third-
party perspectives are largely overlooked in the current design of ISDS proceedings and other 
investment arbitration mechanisms220. 
At this stage, these questions are politically and technically challenging to answer. In fact, 
investment treaties may not necessarily be the best vehicle for tackling all these environmental, 
social, and economic issues raised in investment processes221. National regulations and law 
have a critical role to play in every jurisdiction. In addition, several current international 
instruments, form international environmental agreements, human rights conventions to many 
‘soft laws’, have set basic standards related to sustainable and responsible investment actions. 
However, this thesis would like to examine further the contractual mechanisms in this cross-
boundary energy investment scenario. 
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3.1.2 Investment contracts and their historical developments 
A State-investor investment contract is a legal agreement between the host State (where 
the investment project will take place) and the foreign investor, which constitutes part of the 
legal framework for regulating investments222. This form of contract can also implicate the host 
countries’ duties and investors’ responsibilities for human rights and environmental protection. 
Investment contracts, along with national laws and other applicable international 
investment treaties, set up the obligations and rights of both the host state and investor for 
developing, constructing, and operating an investment project.  
Through these state investment contracts, both parties may effectively agree on a majority 
part of the legal frameworks which will govern the investment projects, especially where 
domestic regulations in the under-developed host States, or where the investment is in a nascent 
industry within the host country. In these situations, the contracting negotiations may directly 
have significant impact on the applicable laws and conditions for both parties and the operation 
of the investment project. 
State investment contracts can also shape the balance between economic considerations 
with the other pillars of sustainable development, namely the environmental and social 
aspects223. These investment contracts will define the legal terms of the investment project and 
decide the extent to which this investment project may advance or undermine sustainable 
development in the host country. Therefore, both government’s capacity to negotiate 
investment contracts and civil society’s ability to monitor the commercial deals done by the 
government and the investor are vital factors for formulating a more sustainable investment 
deal in every critical business sector.  
State-investor contracts are widely used in many industrial sectors, particularly oil and 
gas, renewable energy, infrastructure development, agriculture, and mining224. In these critical 
industries, State-investor contracts may have different names, such as Product sharing contracts, 
concession and licensing agreements, host government agreements, host country contracts, 
investment contracts, and state contracts. 
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Typically, in an energy investment project, state investment contracts start to play an 
important role from the initial stage negotiation. Considering the risks and impacts of human 
rights violation and environmental pollution at the contracting stage provides a valuable chance 
to evaluate this investment project. It is especially important in the operating context where 
host states’ national law and other regulations could not provide sufficient support225.  
The origins of modern investment contracts in the energy and extractive sectors can date 
back to before the beginning of the 20th century. At that time, foreign energy companies first 
started to negotiate contracts for investment protection, because they believed many regulating 
actions taken by host states were unjust226. 
A company named Russian Lena Goldfields Company was set up in 1855. The company 
began to develop the Lena River area’s gold mining in Siberia. In 1918, the mining properties 
were nationalised, which led to a renegotiation of Lena Goldfields’ mining concession 
contract227. 
The host state government adopted higher and stricter policy requirements on mining 
concessions with foreign companies. This situation was hostile to the company. The investment 
contract between Lena Goldfield and the government of Siberia contained the first known 
clause for international investment arbitration. The company filed an arbitration against the 
government, and the international tribunal decided for the first time that an investment contract 
between a private operator and a sovereign nation could be ‘internationalised’, and potentially 
based on applicable laws beyond which enacted by the host state228.   
In 1911, Mexico’s constitutional revolution also changed the interests of foreign 
companies in the oil industries229. After that significant constitutional change, the Mexican 
government treated foreign investors’ oil concessions as ‘temporary’ rather than ‘permanent’ 
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interests. This constitutional change was also followed by the enactment of Mexican new 
labour law, which caused a serious labour strike. Mexico’s Supreme Court decided to confirm 
the new labour law can apply to oil projects and support labours’ interests. An expropriation 
order by the Mexican government prohibited multinational oil companies from the country’s 
market. In the following decades, oil concessions in the Middle East were frequently altered 
through renegotiation. This circumstance is due to the changing political and economic 
conditions; the bargaining powers of the host governments, international cartels (e.g., OPEC), 
and transnational oil companies are also changing. This case presented the original model and 
bargaining issues of investment contracts in the energy sector230. 
In the mid of 1980s, a large number of contract negotiators in the energy sector began to 
reflect on the relations between energy development and the environment231. Therefore, they 
introduced environmental policies and the core values of some social legislation into the 
negotiations of state investment contracts. Though the vague environmental and social 
provisions became more sophisticated during the 1980s, the overall conditions still need to be 
improved. 
Even until the 1990s, most of the contractual systems concerning oil and gas industries 
remained quite weak on environmental protection and social development232. Nigeria can serve 
as a proper example: The country is one of the largest oil producers in Africa. However, 
Nigeria’s Model Production Sharing Contract 1995 is surprisingly almost silent on 
environmental control and regulation. The only relevant environmental provision is the 
insurance clause which states that “all insurance policies...shall be based on good international 
petroleum industry practice...” Moreover, many other examples of this kind of contracts can 
be found across the developing regions. 
The application of the environmental and social provisions in investment contracts may 
be part of the legacy from conventional oil and gas concession agreements, which already 
predates the sustainability era233. As the time and demand come for sustainable development, 
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it may be easier to add a few new provisions to the existing contractual templates rather than 
introducing a new set of legislation. 
Gao 234  (in 1994) and Tienhaara 235  (in 2011) have released significant publications 
examining the development of state investment contracts and their environmental clauses. The 
landscape of this legal instrument, however, has been evolving rapidly since these published 
reports. Based on the existing studies, this research intends to study the recent trends in 
contracting practices concerning energy investment among various jurisdictions.  
3.1.3 Recent trends in designing investment contracts  
Since the early 1990s, there have been some improvements in social and environmental 
provisions in various jurisdictions236. For example, Romania’s Model Concession Agreement 
1996 has introduced a specific Article on the environment, safety and insurance. The contents 
of this Article are for the following: 
“1) Compliance with all environmental permitting procedures under 'prevailing 
Romanian Law'; 
2) A 'full environmental assessment'; 
3) Conduct of petroleum operations 'in accordance with generally accepted international 
petroleum industry practice'; 
4) Remedial measures by the government in case the contractor fails to do so; 
5) Insurance Programme property, pollution damage and third-party liability; and 
6) Revocation of contract in the event of repeated violation of environmental 
requirements.” 
To illustrate, this Romanian model contract has significantly improved in the substantive 
content, which covered almost every stage of an energy investment’s operating lifecycle. 
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In April 2009, after initial discussions and cooperation with the World Bank group, the 
Mining Law Committee of the International Bar Association resolved to initiate a new project 
to design a contemporary Model Mining Development Agreement (MMDA) 237 . The new 
MMDA was based on the best practice principles at the international level, which can serve as 
an important model or template for negotiating State-investor contracts in the mining sector, 
especially in developing countries without strong environmental regulations. 
The root of such an MMDA project arose from disagreements between foreign mining 
companies and the governments of developing countries concerning what constituted a best 
practice mining contract or development agreement238. The Democratic Republic of Congo's 
contract review is a crucial example of this. Facing challenges from investors, the investment 
committee of Congo cooperated with the International Institute for Sustainable Development 
as well as the Sustainable Development Strategies Group to identify best practice for mining 
development projects and effective community participation. 
The primary purpose of the MMDA project is to produce a model template of mining 
development agreement. The template is based on international best practice and sustainable 
mining principles adopted in the industry. These practices and principles include almost every 
aspect of a mining project239:  
“efficient macroeconomic management, an effective legal and regulatory framework, 
security of tenure, objective criteria for the grant of exploration and mining licences, limited 
administrative discretion, a defined role for government, efficient mining sector institutions 
and administrative capacity, physical and infrastructure services, competitive fiscal and 
taxation conditions and effective investment protection.” 
The IBA’s MMDA project is intended to be applied as the foundation of negotiations to 
improve investment contracts signed by transnational mining corporations and host states’ 
governments in those jurisdictions where ‘mature’ mining regulations are not in place, where 
a mining law requires supplementation by investment contract or as a negotiation template for 
mining contracts with state-owned energy companies. 
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The final model contract of the MMDA project can be viewed as an ‘innovative product’ 
made by the World Bank and IBA, which has been successfully balancing various conflicting 
values and considerations of an investment project in the international mining sector. 
After this innovative achievement, the UN’s Principles for responsible contracts was also 
published in October 2011240. This project was developed by Professor John Ruggie who was 
the former “UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights”. These principles 
integrate the human rights risks into State-investor contract negotiations and management and 
provide clear guidance for negotiators. 
These ten crucial principles are the final product of four years of study and many inclusive 
multi-stakeholder interviews. This document aims to help integrate the risks of human rights 
violations into investment contract negotiations and the follow-up management. These 10 
principles include a wide range of themes, such as community engagement, compliance and 
monitoring, transparency, operating standards, and stabilisation clauses241. 
This evolution demonstrates the powerfulness and significance of contractual 
arrangements for synergising economic growth with other sustainable development values. 
3.2 Contractual arrangements for environmental protection 
With the theoretical lens of sustainable development, this research below will analyse 
various contractual mechanisms in the context of global energy investment and pay particular 
attention to their functions for promoting sustainable development, namely economic, social 
and environmental dimension, in every energy investment project.  
The “Precautionary Principle” is an important pillar of sustainable development242. This 
principle can have many implications for regulating investment projects, especially the 
environmental aspects. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration in 1992 clearly states243:  
“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied 
by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
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damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”  
This vital Principle in international environmental law offers guidelines on how 
stakeholders can evaluate the environmental risks and possible legal and policy instruments to 
reduce them. Any inaction of the state could not be justified by claiming that they lack full 
scientific evidence and knowledge. According to this Principle, governmental authorities still 
need to take actions to safeguard the environment. Even currently, there is no comprehensive 
scientific evaluation on the certainty and the consequences of the negative impacts. Based on 
the UN’s guideline, this precautionary principle can change the burden of proof between 
governments and foreign investors liable for sustainability.  
The “polluter pays principle” is another important principle in international and national 
environmental law244. Based on this Principle, foreign investors and their subcontractors are 
responsible for the costs caused by the project and the environmental liabilities relating to 
pollution and other damages. This Principle may create an economic incentive to minimise the 
environmental damages because it requires that the contracting party, which has the most 
control over the investment project, should be responsible for the costs and damages245. 
To use this policy incentive successfully, the regulators must decide environmental fines 
very carefully. The level should make it cheaper to pollute the environment than to prevent 
harm.  For instance, some oil and gas contracts exempt foreign investors from paying the fines, 
only in the situation of “gross negligence, reckless behaviour or willful misconduct”. 
It reveals that the host country needs to assume liability for environmental damages that 
are not deemed to be occurred by this kind of action, and it would be difficult to prove that 
investors’ behaviours are ‘gross negligence or misconduct’, not least because of difficulties in 
collecting evidence. Contractual clauses of this kind are thus not viewed as best practice 
because these provisions already undermine economic incentives to prevent environmental 
harm. 
In the areas of natural resource investment, the interactions between contractual 
mechanisms and national legislations vary across jurisdictions. In some countries, investment 
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contracts may have lengthy clauses on environmental impact assessment 246 . In some 
jurisdictions, contractual designs merely refer to national legislation247. In general, national 
laws which can apply to all investments could be more effective and equitable than those 
project-specific contracts and their provisions248. Moreover, if stricter requirements are already 
embodied in national regulations, non-compliance of these rules would be a real violation of 
legislation rather than just a breach of commercial contract249.  
In fact, designing robust instruments to minimise environmental and social risks is still an 
essential part of investment contracts. After reviewing many contract samples, the mechanisms 
for maximising sustainability outcomes can be summarised into three main aspects: 1) 
Environmental impact assessments and management action plans; 2) Connecting applicable 
laws and standards; and 3) Project monitoring, compensation, and sanctions.    
1) Environmental impact assessments and management action plans  
The primary purpose of environmental and social impact assessments is to evaluate the 
possibilities or potential consequences of a proposed investment project before the proposal is 
officially approved250. The environmental and social impact mechanisms also aim to assess 
alternatives to the original proposed project and evaluate preventative or mitigating activities. 
Corporate environmental management plans detail how a specific environmental risk, such as 
air pollution or oil spills, would be addressed throughout the whole operation of the investment 
project. By applying complete environmental and social impact assessments for projects very 
likely to adversely affect local communities and the environment, contractual designs and 
national legislation (e.g. environmental law, mining regulation, oil and gas codes, and other 
industry-specific laws) both can make contributions to sustainable development goals.  
National legal frameworks firstly should clarify the requirements and processes for 
deciding if an investment may seriously affect the environment and communities251. This 
critical issue should also require that the impact assessments be completed during the initial 
stages of project negotiation and the procedure should involve community consultation and 
other public participation opportunities, which invite affected citizens to comment on early 
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investment proposals. Governmental agencies and civil society groups may play a crucial role 
by carefully monitoring how environmental and social impact assessments proceed. Moreover, 
international standards, such as the World Bank Group’ IFC and OECD performance 
requirements. These international standards can offer useful guidelines on impact assessments 
good practice globally. Very importantly, these national regulations concerning impact 
assessments can be supplemented by more specific clauses in the investment contract.  
For instance, a Product Sharing Agreement 1997of Kazakhstan, which governs the oil and 
gas extractive operations in the Karachaganak field, includes a nine-page long Article XVII 
and two important annexes252. The main contents of these contractual arrangements are on 
environmental protection programmes, detailing a baseline research plan, environmental and 
social impact assessment, regular monitoring and reporting mechanisms on the operations, 
corporate environmental management plan and other schemes. These clauses reveal what 
issues should be addressed by these initiatives, their review procedures and the approval (or 
rejection) by governmental authorities, their periodic revision schemes, etc. For example, the 
2008 Concession Agreement between Liberia and Firestone Liberia is an excellent example in 
the agricultural sector 253 . According to this agreement, the Firestone Liberia’s corporate 
environmental management plan and its potential modifications must be approved and re-
examined every five years (section 15(c)).   
In order to ensure that impact assessments are meaningful, contracts should adopt robust 
methodologies, robust baseline studies, extensive public participation from the local 
communities, and proper accountability and sanction mechanisms. According to an 
international NGO (the World Commission on Dams) report, previous cases reveal that 
environmental and human rights risks have usually been underestimated. For instance, an 
independent report on the oil extraction fields of the Chad-Cameroon project pointed out that 
the impact assessments of this project had underestimated the land area acquired by the 
project254 and the number of citizens affected by this project. The real number of households 
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eligible for resettlement is around 900 (the original estimated number was just 60 to 150 
households). Moreover, attention is required to make sure that any mitigation instrument 
covered in the social impact assessments are genuinely integrated into considerations both by 
the foreign investor and its global subcontractors and other suppliers. In this context, guidance 
and training on how to enforce the mitigating schemes are particularly significant if the 
investor’s subcontractors and other local suppliers have limited capacity.  
2) Connecting applicable laws and standards  
It is crucial to understand the substantive rules and performance standards which can apply 
to the project operations255. It would be good practice for the investors to ensure full compliance 
with existing and future national regulations and with evolving international agreements and 
standards. Importantly, these environmental and social requirements are only useful if these 
standards can apply not only to the foreign investors but also to their subcontractors and global 
suppliers, especially when there is no independent policy measure to monitor their 
environmental performances and verify the whole project’s economic feasibility. 
An investment contract sometimes may explicitly point out that national law can apply to 
the project directly, removing any doubts to the contrary. Investment contract may also ask for 
compliance with stricter norms and standards, in particular, if national legislations are lower 
than what is globally acceptable. For instance, the contract can explicitly ask for compliance 
with relevant international human rights (or environmental) agreements, such as the African 
Human Rights Charter. Also, the contractual arrangements can require compliance with other 
international vital standards, such as the Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises adopted by 
OECD as well as the environmental and social performance standards of international 
development banks like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the World Bank Group’s 
IFC. 
If investment projects receive financial funding from ‘Equator Principles’ or other 
multilateral lenders, it is necessary for investors to ensure compliance with lenders’ standards256. 
For instance, an investor needs to comply with all the required performance standards if he is 
awarded a financial loan from the IFC, World Bank and other international and regional 
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256 Traidcraft. (2013) Investors running wild on land: the threats posed by international investment agreements. 
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development banks. However, even if these multilateral development banks are not a lender, 
their environmental and social standards can still be covered into any form of investment 
contracts and applied by contracting parties. This approach is a significant pillar of the well-
developed ‘Equator Principles’. According to these principles, IFC standards can also be 
applied to the investment projects financed by conventional commercial banks.  
As a result, governmental agencies should connect investment contracts with the 
environmental and social performance standards detailed in the policy documents of 
development banks and other multilateral lenders. Civil society groups may also harness public 
pressure on the governments to manage investment projects in this way.  
In some cases, foreign investors can be willing to comply with higher performance 
standards than the basic standards required under national legislation for CSR or other 
reputational considerations. It is true this approach may be helpful for the private enterprises 
to obtain loans on moral grounds. In contrast, foreign investors may ask for exemptions from 
generally applicable performance standards and legislation in some unusual cases. For instance, 
some investors have insisted that some national environmental law and the regulations 
concerning natural parks are very likely to hinder the implementation of an investment project. 
These exemptions should be avoided and are not usually accepted by the regulators. Moreover, 
of course, they are not considered as best practice within the industrial sector. While in some 
exceptional circumstances, this request could be possible to offset the damages suffered from 
other policy instruments. 
In many industrial sectors, investment contracts routinely mention international best 
practice within the industry. However, these contractual provisions have not been 
comprehensively developed. It would be more useful to connect the investment contract with 
specific bodies of international standards applicable, e.g. the World Bank Group’s IFC 
safeguard standards and policies, or requirements set by other international environmental and 
human rights treaties. For instance, a 1982 copper mining contract from Australia requires 
compliance with the operation and environmental standards by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency and the International Commission on Radiological Protection. 
3) Project monitoring, compensation, and sanctions  
The contract provision may ask foreign investors to monitor and report the operations 
regularly to assist host governments in supervising the investment projects. Investment 
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contracts usually can require foreign investors to evaluate the environmental impacts of their 
projects and pay a significant number of funds to the environmental agencies in the host 
countries. It is also common that environmental provisions may require investors to disclose 
their environmental information, which helps the host governments to work with investors to 
manage natural resources affected, such as water and forestry257.  
For oil spills, marine pollution, and other industry-specific contexts, special contractual 
arrangements would be required in investment contracts. This is reasonable to ensure the 
investment contract orders the foreign investor and its global subcontractors to immediately 
take all necessary activities to prevent further obvious environmental and social disasters and 
to recover the natural environment to pre-existing situations. Contractual clauses clarifying a 
foreign investor’s responsibility for environmental harm caused by large-scale oil spills can 
also be very useful. Additionally, thorough decommissioning clauses (for oil platforms), 
extractive site rehabilitation and closure clauses (usually for mining projects) and other similar 
provisions that concern environmental and social requirements at the final stage of an 
investment project are very critical. These contractual provisions can be more useful if 
accompanied by other well-designed financial instruments (i.e. some special trust funds) 
offered by the foreign investor in the project’s initial stages. If any contractual provision refers 
to international standards, the international standards need to be directly related, and the 
contents should be formulated. 
The effectiveness of these environmental management and monitoring mechanisms will 
be enhanced if the provisions establish independent instruments for regulatory authorities to 
gain useful data from the sites258. This independent instrument may contain the power of 
regulatory authorities to implement periodic inspections of investment projects’ facilities, as 
well as third-party’s verifying and monitoring.  
3.3 Contractual arrangements for human rights and social development 
In 2011, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (‘UNGPs’) 
was formally endorsed. These essential principles have stimulated recent legal reforms of 
related key international standards in the area of business and human rights as well as domestic 
                                                          
257 See examples in Tienhaara, K. S. (2009) The expropriation of environmental governance: protecting foreign 
investors at the expense of public policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
258 Traidcraft, (2013). 
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laws. This new global trend means that private enterprises are now under increased global 
pressures to respect human rights throughout their business operations259.  
For private enterprises, a critical response to this global pressure is by introducing human 
rights clauses into their commercial contracts, including investment contracts. This section here 
intends to briefly address some of the important legal issues which may arise for companies, 
governmental officials and lawyers involved with drafting these relevant human rights 
provisions. 
The UNGPs demonstrate that the obligations to respect human rights require that private 
corporations must260: 
“(a) avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own 
activities, and address such impacts when they occur; and 
(b) seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to 
their operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if they have not 
contributed to those impacts.” 
As a business relationship is based on a commercial contract, it should be possible to draft 
provisions in the contract requiring the parties to take actions to identify, mitigate and avoid 
foreseen adverse human rights impacts. Contracting parties would also agree to the standards 
and procedures for the remediation of actual negative impacts on human rights. 
As well as offering a chance to generally establish expectations in relation to companies’ 
future performances on preventing human rights violations, commercial contracts and 
investment agreements allow contracting parties to reallocate responsibility for dealing with 
human rights issues specific to an economic deal or corporation relationship. This point may 
require the one of the contracting parties (and their commercial lawyers) to firstly conduct a 
certain level of human rights due diligence, including identifying any risk that can be associated 
with a specific region/country, industry and the previous human rights performance. 
There is no one-size-fits-all solution, because the range and nature of potential adverse 
human rights consequences may vary depending on the jurisdictions in which corporations 
                                                          
259 Shemberg, A., & Saldarriaga, A. (2016). 
260 Human Right Risk Assessment, Retrieved from https://www.business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Equatorial%20. 
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operate261. In every jurisdiction, the government’s ability to take actions to address human 
rights risks also varies. Though commercial contracts are not the only vehicle by which a 
private enterprise may have the chance to influence the activities of its business partners, 
nowadays contractual clauses directed at decreasing the risks of human rights violations are 
becoming very common. 
Contract clauses relating to labour rights and working conditions have been applied for 
many years in agreements for manufacturing and supplying consumer goods (such as shoes, 
clothing and electronics). For instance, purchasers in the supply chain may require international 
suppliers to do business by those standards. Buyers may insist on a right which allows them to 
conduct audits or investigations to ensure standard compliance. The similar clause may also be 
identified in the governmental procurement contracts globally. 
Transnational corporations in the extractives and energy sectors now are also increasingly 
willing to include the human rights and environmental clauses in their contracts, especially the 
cases of joint venture agreements262. In several joint ventures in the extractive sectors, while 
the contracting parties share the risks and economic benefits of the venture agreement, 
responsibility for operational affairs will typically rest with one party only. In this particular 
context, non-operator parties should hope to ensure that the operational party takes actions to 
ensure and respect human rights. Including relevant human rights responsibilities in the joint 
venture is a reasonable way to achieve this. Another increasingly common feature of extractive 
industry contracts is a contract clause asking that contracting parties ensure operating standards 
related to public health, working safety, environmental protection and human rights are all 
“cascaded” down to the supply chain. 
Similarly adhering to the Equator Principles, the International Finance Corporation and 
other international financing institutions also ask for their borrowers, in specific contexts, to 
offer covenants regarding the management of negative environmental and social 
consequences263. Typically, this kind of covenant may require the borrower to proceed with an 
environmental impact assessment and to prepare a detail management plan for these matters. 
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All these impact assessments and action plans are subject to approval by the development banks. 
This situation can also be found in global supply chain contexts. Lending institutions will 
usually seek a contractual right to make periodic audits and investigations of operating sites 
and working facilities to ensure compliance with social and environmental covenants. 
Following recent improvements to the IFC Performance Standards and Equator Principles, 
lending institutes are likely to require borrowers to set up grievance mechanisms for a range of 
high-risk investment projects. 
3.4 Evaluation: Practices, effectiveness and interactions with other approaches 
For the past several decades, state investment contracts have dominated investments in 
the extractive and energy industries, especially in the oil and gas sector 264. This chapter has 
charted the evolution of the relevant environmental and social provisions embedded in the 
investment contracts. The previous paragraphs have discussed their strengths for preventing 
environmental and social harm and for stimulating future regulatory innovation. These 
advanced contractual arrangements do offer a new avenue to enforce contractual obligations. 
The following section begins to discuss three major practical issues with implementing 
State-investor contracts and move to the debate about how this mechanism can contribute to 
sustainability in the contexts of global energy investment.  
3.4.1 Practical issues about State-investor contract implementation 
With regard to the effectiveness of implementing State-investor investment contracts, this 
chapter points out three practical issues below. 
1) Policy incoherence between contracts and other legal frameworks 
An investment project is usually regulated by three major legal frameworks: national, 
contractual, and international265. Firstly, countries may sign international, regional and bilateral 
investment treaties with each other. Then, by designing and implementing the domestic laws 
and policies, national States decide how FDI would be attracted, protected, and regulated. Also, 
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it is prevalent that governments also apply investment contracts and other contractual 
arrangements.   
Regulating foreign investment is typically the task of host countries and their specialised 
governmental agencies and departments. These specialised agencies are usually narrowly 
focused on the economic dimension of growing FDI and trade flows as well as promoting 
industrial policies. It is a pity that these commercial agencies are not well attuned to the 
investment projects’ negative consequences on human rights and environmental protection. 
They may not fully realise that the host countries also have legal obligations under international 
environmental and human rights laws. Unfortunately, the governmental agencies which are in 
charge of human rights and environmental protection also may not be aware of the interplays 
between investment activities and other public policies in the country. Also, these 
environmental and human rights departments may lack the significant expertise to participate 
in or respond to investment decision-making very properly.  As a result, this shortcoming leads 
to some national investment policies which fail to address host states’ environmental and 
human rights international obligations. 
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights have attempted to address the 
issues of policy incoherence. According to Principles 8266 to 10267, especially Principle 9268 and 
10, national states need to have a holistic approach to the issues of business and human rights. 
This holistic approach should ensure policy coherence between investment-relevant policies 
with other public policies at both the international and national levels.  
Clarifying how the state’s contractual mechanism can contribute to sustainable 
development and investment protection is urgently needed. Kenya can be examined as an 
instance269. Based on the contract materials published on the website of Resource Contracts, 
                                                          
266 Principle 8: “States should ensure that governmental departments, agencies and other State-based institutions 
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the researcher found 8 contracts negotiated between Kenya and natural resource investors from 
2007 to 2013 online: 
“Kenya, ERHC Kenya and CEPSA Kenya-Block11A-Farmout Agreement, 2013; 
CAMAC Energy, Block L27 - Kenya, 2012; 
CAMAC Energy, Block L16 - Kenya, 2012; 
Kenya, ERHC AGC Profond - Block 11A - Production Sharing Contract, 2012; 
CAMAC Energy, Block L1B - Kenya, 2012; 
CAMAC Energy, Block L28 - Kenya, 2012; 
Lion Petroleum, Block 2B - Kenya, 2008; and 
Lion Petroleum, Block 1 - Kenya, 2007.” 
Quite surprisingly, recent energy and resource investment contracts in Kenya do not 
address environmental and human rights protection. For example, in a Production Sharing 
Contract between CMC Energy Company and Kenya’s government, the only environmental 
and human rights relevant contents are demonstrated by the provision below270: 
“9 JOINT LIABILITY AND INDEMNITY (6) In the event of an emergency or 
extraordinary circumstances requiring immediate action, including the safeguarding of lives 
or property or protection of the environment or for health reasons, the Operator, on behalf of 
the Contractor, may take all such actions as it deems proper or advisable to protect the joint 
property, its investments and its employees, and shall give written notice to the Government 
immediately thereafter. Any and all costs incurred in connection with such emergency activities 
shall be regarded as Petroleum Costs for the purpose of cost recovery under Clause 27 and 
the Accounting Procedure.” 
It is not possible in this chapter here to generalise the observations on the environmental 
and human rights provisions in Kenya’s investment contracts, because the researcher has only 
been able to review a small number of contracts of this country. However, this initial survey 
                                                          
270 See Republic of Kenya, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1402281/000135448812003921/cak_ex104.htm See also OpenOil, 
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85 | P a g e  
 
has noticed the issues of policy incoherence and wondered whether Kenya’s regulatory 
authorities have participated in these contracting procedures.  
2) Enforcement of contracts 
The contractual framework is an outcome of negotiation between foreign investors and 
governments (or a relevant agency which is responsible for regulating FDI). The FDI projects 
are also shaped by the national laws in the home countries which were the sources of that 
foreign capitals. In addition, the specific provisions in state investor countries usually either 
integrate national legislation into or exclude them from the investment project. 
In national legislation, both property and contractual rights are the two significant building 
blocks of the investment process and implementation. As a result, how the effectiveness of 
these national legal systems can protect these two fundamental legal rights are very critical for 
contract enforcement.  
In general, economically advanced jurisdictions, on the one hand, can establish more 
effective and efficient measures to ensure the enforceability of the investment contracts. The 
main reason behind this policy attitude is that the stability and enforceability of contractual 
transaction are critical to these countries’ prosperity and economic growth. On the other hand, 
those economically underdeveloped jurisdictions may not pay so much attention to the issue of 
contract’s enforceability, which can eventually impede their economic advancement271. 
Moreover, some legal mechanisms in relation to investment protection may be only 
subject to national legislation exclusively, not a contractual framework. For example, some 
national laws can decide which industrial sectors are open or closed to foreign investors. In 
some specific industries, other national investment laws and policies can require foreign 
investors to have a local partner to cooperate with and ask for the maximum amount of equity 
which foreign investors need to hold in the account of the investment project. Even in the cases 
where governments are not a contracting party in these investment contracts, national 
investment legislation, however, still can set some conditions for foreign investors, such as 
providing technology transfer in the country or asking for some foreign exchange payments272. 
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The enforceability of investment contracts depends on not only national laws but also the 
judiciary systems and other private regulations in the host countries273. Without strong and 
comprehensive legal frameworks, enforcing investment contracts in many developing 
countries may face several practical problems274. 
3) Contract transparency issues 
Although recent calls for contract transparency can be found across the world, State-
investor investment contracts are not often published for the public275. However, disclosing the 
contents of these investment contracts is now a growing practice in the extractive and resource 
industries. Many governments around the world have voluntarily published their countries’ 
investment contracts on the official websites.  
For instance, the Republic of Mongolia has started to publish the full contents of mining 
and large infrastructure investment contracts online since 2016276. As these published contracts 
demonstrate, many contractual provisions state the government’s expectations for contract 
transparency and community participation. In a recent Regional Development agreement 
signed by the Mongolian government and a mining operator, part 4 of this agreement states277:  
 “4.6 The Investor shall conduct all of its local and regional socio-economic 
development programs and activities based on principles of transparency, accountability and 
public participation.” 
“4.7 The Investor shall continue to prepare, conduct, implement, update on an 
appropriate basis, and make public socio-economic baseline studies, socio-economic impact 
assessments, socio-economic risk analyses, as well as multi-year communities plans, 
community relations management systems, policies, procedures and guidelines, and mine 
closure plans, all of which shall be produced with community participation and input and be 
consistent with international best practice.” 
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Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (LEITI) is a collaborative 
mechanism between extractive industries and the Liberian government278. This initiative set up 
a specific website and published all relevant State-investor investment contracts online for the 
stakeholders as well as the public.  Also, recently this LEITI has been reducing the technical 
terms in the contracts and making the language more accessible to the public. The contractors 
also provide summaries or reports to explain the contract terms which have more direct impacts 
on communities and public interests279.  
In 2015, a research report confirmed that even foreign investors in the extractive sector 
are also starting to call for contract transparency280. Representatives from the private sector 
now agree that the publication of investment contracts indeed support investors’ ‘social license 
to operate’ and enhance trust with all the stakeholders.  
There are other transparent initiatives that aim to make investment contracts available to 
the public. For example, the website of ‘Resource Contracts’ (www.resourcecontracts.org) 
focuses on the contract transparency issues in the oil, gas and mining sectors. And the online 
platform of Open Land Contracts (www.openlandcontracts.org) focuses on the contracts in 
agriculture, forestry, and land issues. Of course, many improvements are still expected on the 
issue of transparency. 
3.4.2 Benefits of investment contracts for responsible energy investment 
Proponents for investment contracts believe these well-designed contracts can improve 
environmental conditions in host states by introducing international standards in oil, gas, and 
other energy sectors281 . Nonetheless, this perspective may raise some questions. First, no 
definitive source can be identified when it comes to these international standards. These 
international standards usually adopted by a single industry, and a vague reference to the 
international standards may not be beneficial. Furthermore, this point of view creates a type of 
circular logic. Governments can require that an investment project should adhere to some 
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international practices282, but the so-called international standards may be set up by the very 
same project.  
Proponents also may argue that State-investor investment contracts can improve upon a 
host state’s environmental and human rights level by contractually requiring adherence to the 
business standards of the foreign investor’s home nation. This view is correct, but, sometimes, 
it may ignore the issue of whether business operation standards in those investors’ home state 
are also adequate. Indeed, several international industrial standards have been criticised as 
being too vague or lenient. These industrial standards typically only focus on production 
processes without paying attention to associated environmental and social impacts 283. For 
example, the international standard of plywood manufacturing may not also consider any 
negative impacts on forests. Also, the overall environmental protection and regulation system 
of a country is usually a complicated combination of industrial standards and procedural 
protection for safeguarding citizens’ rights to protect public health and the environment (e.g., 
the right to food, to water, and to information) 284 . These procedural protections, whether 
coming from the host country and the investor’s home government, are never covered in the 
existing State-investor investment contracts and could be nullified in some situations by the 
investment contracts’ international arbitration provisions.  
At last, proponents may also argue that State-investor investment contracts are likely to 
improve the host state’s environmental and social standards by contractually imposing the 
safeguarding mechanisms designed by a multilateral development bank or international 
financing institutes, such as the World Bank Group, Asian Development Bank, and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. However, NGOs and human rights 
advocates have questioned the usefulness and adequacy of these international standards by 
multilateral development institutions for some decades 285. Civil society groups are highly 
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critical of the World Bank Group and its private sector arm - the International Finance 
Corporation. These advocates question whether IFC’s standards can be viewed as an 
international benchmark and examine whether IFC’s proposal is weakening the existing 
international environmental and social frameworks286. Also, some scholars believe the drafters 
of these investment contracts may tend to use these multilateral development institution 
standards as ceilings rather than ground floors to build new project-specific standards up from. 
Also importantly, efforts made by nations with lower environmental or social standards to 
progressively evolve their regulations would be stunted at some point where they met the 
multilateral development institutions’ standards.  
In sum, investment contracts have both advantages and disadvantages. Though these 
investment contracts may include some provisions regarding environmental protection and 
human rights, in general, these provisions so far have not provided enough protection for local 
citizens, communities, and the natural environment. Due to the current fragmented legal 
frameworks, third parties’ rights and interests sometimes may not be enforced effectively.  
The actual performances of these State-investor contracts would depend on the negotiators 
who can participate in the contract negotiations and how they design these critical contracts287. 
3.4.3 Summary  
Based on the selected case studies and the critical discussions concerning the functions of 
modern State-investor contracts, this chapter summarises the assessment into three key points 
below.  
First, today even so-called “green” and renewable energy projects can create adverse 
social and environmental impacts288. It is also necessary to understand both synergistic policy 
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incentives and safeguarding mechanisms for preventing potentially harmful effects of these 
investments.  
Second, State-investor contracts have the potential to become a useful platform or vehicle 
for safeguarding human rights and the environment. The development of both environmental 
and human rights provisions have made significant progress during the past decades. In theory, 
well-designed environmental and social provisions embedded in State-investor investment 
contracts can respond to the challenges brought by the energy investment projects especially 
in those developing countries without robust regulatory environments. However, due to many 
practical limitations and contracting realities, the progress is far from ideal for promoting 
sustainable and responsible investment. Some innovative ‘products’ have been released by the 
International Bar Association, World Bank, and the United Nations, such as the MMDA, UN 
Principles for Responsible Contracts, and the UN Principles for Business and Human Rights289. 
These new developments provide the foundation and important templates for future investment 
contracting and further regulatory innovation.  
At last, the complexity of this S-I-P triangle includes many practical problems. This fact 
also reminds us to examine each dimension of the S-I-P triangle and the interplay among 
various bodies of law and regulation. The root of today’s investment contracts can be traced 
back over one century. However, actors in this changing field, including legislators, 
international financing institutions, MNCs, and civil society groups, are witnessing a reform 
agenda only at the initial stage. There is an urgent need for doing much more legal and policy 
research on these reforms and the progress.   
As awareness of the importance of state contracts rises, so too will the chances to propose 
further policy and legal reforms. Since state investment contracts present a new form of 
synthesis of private and public interests, it may be appropriate to conclude that both public and 
private interests should be protected under further reforms. These ongoing reforms can be 
based on both political and practical reasons. It is also reasonable to conclude that in the years 
that State-investor contracts have evolved, business interests have been defended mostly 
through the coffers of investment project sponsors while the affected communities and 
individuals of host states have been unaware and their essential interests mostly unrepresented.  
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During the same period, national interests of host states have been represented by small 
parts of governments, including governmental agencies whose primary concerns are related to 
energy supply and economic growth—at the exclusion of environmental protection and social 
policy departments, and in some cases national legislators. 
Overall, it would be necessary to address the point that only ‘top-down’ development 
policies cannot ensure the material conditions of local citizens. In several under-developed 
countries (with abundant natural resources), local citizens are power-poor, especially 
indigenous peoples, and several practical issues in relation to negotiation and contract 
enforcement still widely exist. 
Based on the discussions above, it is clear that the contractual approach can bring benefits 
for future responsible energy investment across the jurisdictions. So far the main question is: 
why actors are not yet including sustainability terms in their contracts? Besides the three major practical 
obstacles for implementing sustainable development clauses within the state-investor contracts, the 
reason could be a ‘cultural thing’. If practicing commercial lawyers and governmental officials working 
in the developing economies can realise the significance of having sustainable considerations in their 
business operations, this important ‘green’ awareness may have the potential to totally change the way 
of doing business and serving their corporation clients. So far the International Bar Association has 
provided many practical guild-lines to make this approach possible. In the future, more empirical 
research (such as doing interviews with stakeholders) is required to find out the cultural obstacle behind 
the commercial contracting practices. This is not only a research task for lawyers but also for other 
social scientists.           
 Therefore, Chapter 4 turns to assess the policy and governance potential of the 
community development agreements between investors and affected citizens as well as the 
cross-sector partnerships between energy companies and environmental NGOs. Due to the 
broad scope of these agreements around the world, Chapter 4 has a strong focus on using case 
studies in the Greater China region.  
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Chapter 4 – The ‘I-P’ dimension: examining the values and challenges of Corporate-
NGO partnerships in Greater China’s oil and gas sector 
“Founded on the principles of private initiative, entrepreneurship and self-employment, underpinned 
by the values of democracy, equality and solidarity, the co-operative movement can help pave the way 
to a more just and inclusive economic order." – Kofi Annan, former United Nations Secretary-General 
(1938 - 2018) 
This chapter moves to examine the engagements between investors and communities 
(including civil society groups), namely the ‘S-I’ dimension in the ‘S-I-P’ triangle.  
Corporations are required by national and international laws and policies290, including 
Principle 18 of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 291, to practice 
meaningful consultations, in good faith, with relevant stakeholders and potentially affected 
groups. However, any one sector will find global challenges too complicated for them to tackle 
or solve alone292, and there is growing cognisance that the civil sector and the private sector 
have significant roles in delivering solutions293. 
While changing mindsets and adapting to the potential of partnership models takes time, 
academia has a role to play in investigating the increasing number of successful long-term 
business-NGO partnerships and learning from the lessons of what is and is not successful. Until 
now the existing research mainly focused on western case studies, so overview on the nature 
and extent of these CSPs/engagements and how they function, especially in the Greater China 
area, is lacking. This chapter aims to bridge this gap and hopefully provide the industry, 
environmental NGOs and policy-makers some evidence-based insights for future collaboration, 
value creation and development in Greater China. This type of innovative research and 
dissemination of best practices can support a broader adjustment in attitude and generate a 
more conducive setting for effective multi-sectorial partnering. 
                                                          
290 Gatto, A. (2011) Multinational enterprises and human rights: Obligations under EU law and international 
law. Edward Elgar Publishing. See also Muchlinski, P. (2007) Multinational enterprises and the law. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
291 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights - OHCHR Available at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf. See also Shemberg, 
A., & Saldarriaga, A. (2016) Guide to Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights in Investment Policymaking. 
292 UN Global Compact, (2007) UN Global Compact Leaders Summit 2007 Final Report, Available via 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/newsandevents/event_archives/Leaders_Summit_2007.html. 
293 WSSD. (2002). United Nations: World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg Summit 2002. 
Retreived from http://www.un.org/jsummit/ 
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4.1 The changing relations of modern business and civil society 
While NGOs and businesses have long considered each other as ’adversaries’294, there is 
now a mounting interest in working collaboratively towards a sustainable future. Because 
neither sector is capable of handling intensifying environmental and social concerns 
independently, there is a need to unite. Awareness is building that engaging in partnerships 
could allow access to various core competencies that are often exclusive to each organisation 
and sector295. 
One of the most participatory and effectual mechanisms to implement sustainable 
development and boost international cooperation are partnerships. They are unique by being 
voluntary, multi-stakeholder enterprises linked explicitly to the application of globally agreed 
commitments, particularly the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) (Johannesburg Plan of Implementation) 296 , Agenda 21 297 , the 
Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Rio+20 outcome.  
A Partnerships Forum at Rio+20 consisted of five highly dynamic and interactive sessions 
that highlighted how partnerships make essential contributions to the enactment of sustainable 
development 298 . The Forum’s goal was to showcase dedicated partnerships to enable the 
implementation of priority actions that were agreed upon at the Rio+20 Conference as well as 
fortify this collaborative mechanism making it even more accountable for implementation. The 
Partnerships Forum inspired enthusiasm, commitment and leadership from different 
stakeholders to continue reinforcement partnerships in the Conference follow up299. 
The Rio+20 outcome document also presents valuable mandates and references on 
particular areas to advance additional work on the use of partnerships (UN Sustainable 
                                                          
294 Cohen, J. (2003). State of the Union: NGO-business Partnership Stakeholders. In J. Andriof, S. Waddock, B. 
Husted, & S. S. Rahman (Eds.), Unfolding Stakeholder Thinking 2: Relationships, Communication, 
Reporting and Performance. Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing Limited. 
295 Boué K and Kjæ r K (2010) Creating Value through Strategic Partnerships between Businesses and NGOs - A 
descriptive case study of six partnerships in Norway, Copenhagen Business School 2010 MSc dissertation. 
296 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation - the United Nations, available at: 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf 
297 Agenda 21, available at:https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf 
298 Partnership Drivers, Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, available at: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnershipdrivers.html 
299 UN Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, available at: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/milesstones/wssd. 
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Development Knowledge Platform)300. The Rio+20 outcome document also includes many 
sections for partnership references and interrelated issues. For example, point 55 in the 
document explains301: 
‘We commit ourselves to reinvigorate the global partnership for sustainable development 
that we launched in Rio in 1992. We recognise the need to impart new momentum to our 
cooperative pursuit of sustainable development, and commit to working together with Major 
Groups and other stakeholders in addressing implementation gaps.’ 
Also, point 64 says302: 
‘We acknowledge that involvement of all stakeholders and their partnerships, networking 
and experience sharing at all levels could help countries to learn from one another in 
identifying appropriate sustainable development policies, including green economy policies. 
We note the positive experiences in some countries, including in developing countries, in 
adopting green economy policies in the context of sustainable development and poverty 
eradication through an inclusive approach and welcome the voluntary exchange of experiences 
as well as capacity building in the different areas of sustainable development.’ 
In recent years, a rather fundamental change in the governance of sustainability issues has 
been identified by many scholars. Traditionally governmental organisations had the duty of 
dealing with sustainability issues. However, the private sector and civil society organisations 
have also recently been invited to and have increasingly taken up their share of responsibility, 
which has then opened up the policy arena to actors from other parts of society and 
corporation303. 
In the mid-1990s, societal as well as academic interest in cross-sector collaboration, that 
is a collaboration between actors from the different parts of society, have grown; there are some 
possible explanations for this. To begin, the 1992 World Summit on Sustainable Development 




Point 55, Future We Want, Outcome document, available at: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/futurewewant.html. 
302 Point 64, Future We Want, Outcome document, available at: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/futurewewant.html. 
303 Arts B, Leroy P (eds). (2006) Institutional dynamics and environmental governance. Dordrecht: Springer. 
See also Dubbink W. (2003) Assisting the invisible hand. Contested relations between market, state and civil 
society. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. 
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(WSSD) in Rio de Janeiro firmly placed the pursuit of global sustainable development on the 
political agenda304. 
There are two related ways that partnerships are connected to sustainable development. 
First, it was argued that the complicated character of sustainability problems requires the active 
involvement of all societal spheres in order to resolve them. Secondly, the idea of sustainable 
development itself emphasises the need for mutual achievement of social equity, environmental 
health and economic wealth, for which the responsibilities and resources are apportioned to 
different societal spheres.  
The link between sustainable development and cross-sector partnerships was solidified 
when partnerships were acknowledged as an essential tool for implementing sustainable 
development at the WSSD in Johannesburg in 2002305. 
4.1.1 The benefits and potentials of cross-sector partnerships 
Much debate on the role of different actors in society was initiated by the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio in 1992. A keynote was that 
sustainable development would only be realised if all nations and parts of society would find 
rewarding means of cooperating. The IPIECA publication, Technology Cooperation and 
Capacity Building: Contribution to Agenda 21 (produced in association with UNEP in 1994)306 
reflected this theme and highlighted an evolution in oil and gas industry collaboration with 
stakeholders: from being narrowly fixated on technology cooperation to embracing broader 
sustainable development goals. 
The past ten years have seen a steep change in the number of multi-stakeholder partnering 
initiatives in the oil and gas industry. In 2002, the Johannesburg World Summit for Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) acknowledged that multi-stakeholder partnerships are vital for 
implementing sustainable development goals. Governments formally ‘endorsed’ the opinion 
that business has a part in the solution and business agreed. In 2002, a report on the contribution 
of the oil and gas industry to sustainable development was published in the joint OGP/IPIECA 
                                                          
304 UN Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/ 
305 Eweje G. (2007) Strategic partnerships between MNEs and civil society: the post-WSSD perspectives. 
Sustain Dev 15(1):15 – 27. 
306 Agenda 21, available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf. 
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publication307: The oil and gas industry from Rio to Johannesburg and beyond—contributing 
to sustainable development. The publication investigates partnerships that are variously driven 
by research, policy or product; that comprise different combinations of NGOs, governments, 
international, governmental organisations, community groups, and oil and gas companies; and 
that include varying degrees of contractual responsibility. More importantly, through these 
publications, it is useful to see how the extractive industries respond to this worldwide trend. 
The challenges of sustainable development in the oil and gas sectors often revolve around 
opposing interests. The industry is working with stakeholder groups at all levels all over the 
world to tackle these challenges. Each partnership is one of a kind, shaped by the demands of 
the joint undertaking and by the partners’ specific needs. Some shared benefits and pitfalls of 
working in partnership can be identified by examining the whole set of case studies. There are 
at least seven benefits of cross-sector partnerships for sustainable development, according to 
the IPICA's partnership report308: 
1) Stepping more securely into the arena of sustainable development; 
2) Delivering higher quality project outcomes; 
3) Facilitating development and growth of projects; 
4) Improving stakeholder engagement; 
5) Creating open communication channels with local communities; 
6) Contributing to the local economic development of host communities; and 
7) Contributing to broader regional or global sustainable development efforts. 
A number of environmental NGOs have relationships with the extractive industries309. For 
example, the international mining corporation Xstrata strives to protect biodiversity in 
Australia and safeguard human rights in Colombia. Chevron eliminated the transmission of 
                                                          
307 The oil industry experience: technology cooperation and capacity building, contribution to Agenda 21, 
available at: https://portals.iucn.org/library/node/26420.  
308 IPEICA (2006) Partnerships in the oil and gas industry, available at: 
http://www.ipieca.org/publication/partnerships-oil-and-gas-industry 
309 Han, X. (2010) Environmental Regulation of Chinese Overseas Investment from the Perspective of China. 
The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Volume 11, Issue 3, pp. 375 – 408. See also Weng, L., Sayer, J. 
A., & Xue, L. (2017) Will China redefine development patterns in Africa? Evidence from Cameroon. The 
Extractive Industries and Society. 查道炯、李福勝、蔣姮 (2014) 中國境外投資環境與社會風險案例研
究, 北京大學出版社, 北京. 
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HIV from mother to child in Angola310. However, the performance and driving forces of various 
NGOs are substantially different.  
4.1.2 Typologies for corporate-NGO engagements 
Partnerships between NGOs and businesses are not static, but, as with other types of 
organisations, are dynamic and can progress over time 311 . It is significant to note that a 
partnership could contain elements from one or more of these typologies at the same time and 
are only meant to be illustrative of the different forms and contents of NGO-business 
partnerships. An NGO-business relationship could also develop and progress over time, where 
the partners increase their involvement as they build trust and share resources, but regression 
to a 'lower' or less intense type of partnership is also possible312. 
1) Philanthropy – This is the most basic and conventional type of collaboration between 
businesses and NGOs. The most common type of partnership, it involves a one-way exchange 
of resources to the NGO from a business. They are limited in cooperative efforts and do not 
require the sharing of resources. Being simple in initiation and organisation with low levels of 
engagement and only a peripheral connection to business’ activities are often characteristics of 
philanthropic partnerships313.   
2) Reciprocal exchanges – This type includes partnerships in which the relationship 
between a business and an NGO is constructed on an exchange of resources for a selected 
activity; a cause-related marketing campaign would be an example. In these sorts of 
partnerships, a company agrees to give a fixed sum of money for the sale of certain merchandise 
with the partner NGO’s logo314. The partnership between IKEA and UNICEF is an example 
where, for each teddy bear sold by IKEA, IKEA would donate €1 to UNICEF’s work towards 
                                                          
310 Ibid. 
311 Austin, J. E. (2007). Sustainability through Partnering: Conceptualizing Partnerships Between Businesses 
and NGOs. In P. Glasbergen, F. Biermann, & A. P. Mol (Eds.), Partnerships, Governance and Sustainable 
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312 Neergaard, P., Thusgaard, J., & Crone Jensen, E. (2009). Barriers and Success Factors in the Establishment 
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313 Jamali, D., & Keshishian, T. (2009). Uneasy Alliances: Lessons Learned from Partnerships between 
Businesses and NGOs in the context of CSR. Journal of Business Ethics, 84, 277–295. 
314 Googins B.K. and Rochlin S.A. (2000) Creating the Partnership Society: Understanding the Rhetoric and 
Reality of Cross-Sectorial Partnerships. Business and Society Review, 105(1), 127–144. 
98 | P a g e  
 
children’s well-being. IKEA gets publicity and the public relations benefit of connecting to a 
good cause while UNICEF gets money for their mission315. 
3) Independent value creation – This type engagement means that both partners work 
together in order to generate desired value but have individual goals. This necessitates much 
more effort from both partners compared to the previous two types of partnerships 316 ; 
Neergaard et al. coined this as semi-strategic collaborations317. An illustration of this is a 
partnership where the company contributes their employees’ time and technical knowledge to 
an NGO’s relief work during an international catastrophe. In this case, the partnership would 
offer an advantage to the company by inspiring their employees and humanising their image, 
and to the NGO by bettering the quality of their relief work318. 
4) Strategic partnerships - In these partnerships, partners work together purposefully “on 
a common problem which they would both like to see resolved”319. Such endeavours create a 
much more reliant association between the partners, and “value will only be created through a 
mutually dependent exchange of ideas, resources and efforts” 320 . In these situations, the 
partners see difficult problems affecting their missions, and they are not in a place to resolve 
things by themselves and are thus required to cooperate in order to be successful. These are the 
real ‘strategic partnerships.' According to partnership theory, strategic partnerships possess the 
most potential for added value because combining forces permit actors to arrive at outcomes 
that were unachievable by either partner on their own321. 
In countries with plentiful natural resources, Company-Community development 
agreements (CDAs) are extensively utilized in the relationships between investors and 
communities. Signed by businesses and affected communities, CDAs have many forms and 
terms across the world. For instance, Chevron had a Global Memorandum of Understanding 
(‘GMoU’) with Niger Delta communities in 2015322. The conditions in this GMoU stated that 
                                                          
315 UNICEF. (2009). IKEA Social Initiative. Retrieved 2014, 20-June from UNICEF's Corporate Partnerships: 
http://www.unicef.org/corporate_partners/index_25092.html. 
316 Googins B.K. and Rochlin S.A. (2000). 
317 Neergaard, P., Thusgaard, J., & Crone Jensen, E. (2009). 
318 Ibid. 
319 Neergaard, P., Thusgaard, J., & Crone Jensen, E. (2009). 
320 Googins B.K. and Rochlin S.A. (2000). 
321 Ibid. 
322 Chevron's Model Community Empowerment Program in the Niger Delta, see full text: 
https://www.chevron.com/-/media/chevron/stories/documents/nigeria-case-study-GMoU.pdf. 
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Chevron should deliver benefits agreed upon by the host communities. A similar model is used 
by Shell, BP and other giant oil and gas companies to negotiate a CDA with the communities323.  
Another popular type of CDA is the Impact and Benefit Agreements (‘IBAs’) between 
companies and communities. In Canada, mining corporations occasionally sign IBAs with host 
mining communities. These IBAs occur between indigenous communities in Canada and the 
Canadian Crown. In all types of Company–Community contracts, bilateral agreements have 
grown to hold a significant place in defining relationships concerning natural resource 
development and other pertinent activities. In some jurisdictions, legislation even asks for 
CDAs between companies and affected communities 324 . As discussed in the literature, 
company-community agreements are vital for the energy sector to have legal accountability 
and responsibility, and the International Bar Association also offers model CDA in section 22 
of their Model Mine Development Agreement325. 
Currently, a significant number of studies on the CDAs functioning globally already exist. 
Therefore this chapter focuses more on the partnerships between energy companies and civil 
society groups, particularly environmental and social welfare NGOs.   
4.1.3 Cross-sector partnerships as private environmental governance 
The developments outlined above have caught the notice of many social scientists with 
diverse disciplinary backgrounds, the most evident being sociology, political science, 
organisation studies and management. 
In a relatively short amount of time, the various kinds of research have delivered a 
considerable volume of knowledge. The research to date has produced insights on three main 
topics related to business-NGO interactions326: 
1) The drivers behind the appearance and an amplified significance of business-NGO 
interactions, 
                                                          
323 “Working with communities”, Shell Global, Model community agreements, available at: 
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2) The incentives for both parties (i.e. businesses and NGOs) to take part in business-NGO 
interactions, and 
3) The conditions under which the character of the interactions may take a cooperative 
form. 
 The central idea in this chapter is ‘partnership’. Although many disciplines that study 
partnerships exist327, the idea can be focused into two central perspectives: actor perspective 
and institutional perspective328. Overall, these two perspectives are said to focus on varied 
facets of the partnership phenomenon and respond to a wide range of relevant questions. The 
first one, the actor perspective, deems partnership as an appropriate instrument for achieving 
set goals and problem solving of individual actors. The second, the institutional perspective, 
views partnerships as new mechanisms in the environmental governance regime. 
1) The actor perspective 
The actor perspective considers partnerships as tools for fostering the actor’s goals329. This 
perspective focuses on reasons for partners, the merits and demerits of partnering and 
identification of paramount success aspects. Notwithstanding, this actor perspective is 
criticised for not looking at the partnership phenomenon as a unique solution for fundamental 
societal challenges. 
2) The institutional perspective 
The second, the institutional perspective, looks at partnerships as new arrangements in 
environmental governance330. From this angle, the institutional perspective views partnerships 
as new arrangements in the modern environmental governance system that emerge naturally 
out of their institutional setting. The main issues researchers are concerned with is the part 
partnerships play and the roles they could accomplish in an assumed new environmental 
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governance landscape. Features usually included in such analyses make up the driving forces 
behind the partnership tendency and the institutional setting of this tendency. 
From an institutional perspective, the main issue is the real and presumed function and 
role of partnerships in a global environmental governance setting. This calls for collective 
determinations of actors throughout all sectors of society331. Inter-sectoral partnerships with a 
sustainable development aim can be interpreted as one such new configuration, and primary 
concerns are the levels of inclusiveness or democracy and the legitimacy of partnerships332. For 
instance, Patteberg333 discusses how the vital contribution of partnership can be unified into the 
democratic and sincere governance of global environmental affairs. 
To sum up, the current partnership literature distinguishes two significant perspectives 
that focus on the diverse features of the partnership phenomenon and address difficult questions. 
The actor perspective concentrates on how partnerships work and frame partnerships as 
possible strategic tools for achieving stated objectives and for solving the problem of individual 
actors. On the other hand, the institutional perspective looks at partnerships as new 
arrangements in the environmental governance system that emerge naturally out of their 
institutional setting. 
Beyond these two perspectives, there is a need to empirically understand the current cross-
sector partnerships landscape in different industries, regions and cultural contexts. Also, it 
would be necessary to look at the politics and social context beyond these cross-sector 
partnerships. Such an effort is needed to understand the type of agreements, the frequency and 
location of agreements, as well as potentially positive and negative effects, which can only be 
assessed from a general overview plus in-depth case studies. Thus, this research chooses the 
oil and gas companies operating in Greater China, for a more comprehensive case study. In 
order to make comparisons between partnering patterns and to provide insights for international 
investment regulations, this chapter covers the case studies of the international oil giants, 
Chinese state-owned oil and gas companies and Taiwan’s two major oil companies besides 
investing in this region.    
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4.2 Extractive industries and civil society in Greater China   
Before starting the empirical analysis, it is helpful to provide the background of the 
extractive industries in Greater China, the geographies of civil society activities, and the 
research already available on this topic. 
4.2.1 The extractive industries in Greater China 
The Chinese mines are globally known for the immense danger they pose to mining 
workers, in addition to causing a significant portion of pollution, experiencing fatal accidents 
and posing severe occupational health problems334. The sites have caused a great deal of 
desperation in population who moved from rural areas looking for better opportunities in urban-
based economies335. 
Over the last decade, Chinese extractive corporations have made a great global debut336. 
They are not only expanding their operations in China but are also engaging in some notable 
foreign projects primarily in Africa and South America. As a result, the Chinese corporation 
has quickly risen to the top tier of global rankings of extractive industries (See Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1: The largest Chinese and Western oil companies. Source: Production company websites; 
“Fortune Global 500, 2016“, published by July 2017 
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As reported by a notable energy consultancy based in Washington, a number of Chinese 
oil companies, such as Sinopec, CNPC, and CNOOC, are now competing with ExxonMobil to 
be the world’s greatest listed energy corporation337. Table 4.2 presents a comparison of the 
fundamental data of the four Chinese corporations listed on the Fortune 500 versus the largest 
four non-Chinese extractive companies. 
Table 4.2: The largest Chinese and Western mining companies. Source: Production company websites; 
“Fortune Global 500, 2016,” published by July 2017 
 
The metal and mining companies that had some notable foreign production projects as of 
December 2016 are listed in Table 4.3 with their respective profiles. 
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Table 4.3 Profile of Chinese mining companies with overseas operations. Source: Production company 
websites; “Fortune Global 500, 2016,” published by July 2017 
 
After China ‘opened up’ its economy in 1978 and entered the WTO in 2001, Chinese 
extractive corporations have played a notable role globally and also faced significant 
environmental challenges338. 
As of now, the geography of Chinese extractive industries is still undergoing significant 
changes339. Some of the major national corporations are making mergers with local and small 
companies. The full list of all these companies is not available. The researcher therefore has 
decided only to discuss the oil and gas corporations of the extractive industries of Greater China, 
which makes this research feasible and doable. 
4.2.2 State-owned companies (SOEs) in China 
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Due to the globalisation trend, China’s policy of establishing a ‘socialism market economy’ 
(since 1979) has caused major changes in the layout of state-owned corporations340. Enterprises 
are being privatised where the state is the major shareholder.  
The National Reform and Development Commission (NRDC) has been encouraging the 
companies to undergo mergers forming a small number of large, globally active corporations 
and to follow the novel concepts of corporate governance341. Currently, this process is about 
complete for the oil sector and is on-going in the mining industry342. However further changes 
are deemed necessary to merge companies into a small number of more significant, competitive 
corporation of each sub-sector. 
State-owned corporations are expected to work to meet the overall objectives decided in 
the country’s five-year plans. The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC) is the governmental body that holds the 
government’s shares in the state-owned corporations. SASAC works abroad from the state’s 
side and takes care of the state-owned entities of the corporations as directed by the law343. 
SASAC is responsible for promoting and directing the restructuring of SOEs. The council is 
also responsible for hiring and firing the CEOs of these enterprises under the guidance of the 
central government. The council validates the performances of the enterprises and proposes 
incentives or penalties for them when necessary.  
The operational processes of Chinese extractive corporations, even being greatly different 
from their western counterparts due to greater involvement of the state, are substantially similar 
to those of the Western Companies344. Notably, the Chinese corporations have to compete for 
assets not only with the Chinese competitor but also with the international companies both in 
their homeland as well as abroad and are listed on the stock market hence making them 
answerable to shareholders. This is measured by factors like being listed as Global Fortune 500 
                                                          
340 Nolan, P. (2004) Transforming China: globalization, transition and development. Anthem Press. 單文華 
(2014) 中國對外能源投資的國際法保護, 清華大學出版社, 北京. See also葛察忠、夏友富、智穎飆、
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341 Economy, E., & Levi, M. (2014). See also馮並 (2015) 一帶一路 – 全球發展的中國邏輯, 高寶出版, 臺北. 
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companies345 and improving corporate governing practices. Moreover, when these Chinese 
extractive corporations become members of international business associations like the 
IPIECA, they are also bound to follow the policies and guidelines issued by these bodies. 
4.2.3 Corporate philanthropy in China 
The number of NGOs operating in China has noticeably increased recently despite the 
many different types of restrictions and hurdles being created by political and regulatory bodies. 
The increasing number of NGOs ensures increased charity practices in the region346. Keeping 
this in mind, it must be noted that corporations are important because of the increase of charity 
activities and for their passive role in promoting activities related to civil society engagement 
in China. The socio-economic infrastructure of China comprises a noticeably uneven 
distribution of access to all forms of social services347. Because of this, philanthropy is regarded 
as an essential measure that can be implied to improve this situation, promote dialogue and 
help the activities related to social change in the country. 
Businesses in China are using charitable activities as strategic tools of differentiation348. 
The recent trend shows clearly that businesses that engage in actual philanthropic activities 
have higher chances of survival. On the other hand, the businesses which ignore the need for 
engagement are condemned to public penalisation. This is evident from the increasing 
discontent particularly from the ones at the economic progression of the country349. Due to the 
increasing demand among the Chinese masses for a raised standard of life as characterised by 
a clean and safe environment, there is a considerable difference in transforming material 
conditions, particularly in the urban regions.  
The tone of public dialogue has been greatly influenced by the increased use of internet 
and micro-blogging350 . This has resulted in a substantial alteration in public opinion and 
thinking which is now considered to be more diverse, volatile and unforeseen. The internet can 
lead to public discontent being spread uncontrollably across the cyber-space; hence, the 
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See also Hasmath, R. & Jennifer H. (2008) “NGOs in China and issues of accountability.” Asia Pacific Journal 
of Public Administration 30 (1), 1-11. 
348 Ibid. 
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corporations have considerably changed their style of dealing with the people. The companies 
that establish positive relationships with the citizens will surely take advantage of the 
opportunities as they arise.  
For multinational corporations, the impact of the opacity and complexity of the non-profit 
sector in China is quite noticeable351. They are mainly concerned with how they can spend their 
money on social activities in the most fruitful manner. Along with being confused by the setup 
of the Chinese social sector, these companies also face the challenge of dealing with the 
regulatory environment of China, which is quite different compared to Western nations352. This 
is partially the reason for the blunder most of the MNCs make in choosing philanthropic 
activities that are mismatched to the strategic objectives or benefit from the evolving local 
resources353. 
4.2.4 NGO landscape in China 
After the political reforms and opening policy, the Chinese government relaxed its control 
over the society which resulted in a social space being created where a number of associations 
evolved 354 . Naturally, the fast-growing associations attracted the attention of scholars 
undertaking Chinese studies355. A number of the researchers studied Chinese non-profit sector 
with the western mindset. 
It was soon evident to these researchers that the Chinese organisations were not 
comparable to their western counterparts. Most of the associations were initially formed as a 
government organised non-government organisations (GONGOs) run or mainly controlled by 
the government agencies regarding funding, employment and membership. Some of the well-
reputed GONGOs like the Chinese Red Cross, the Women’s Federation, trade unions and 
China Disabled People’s Federation are all grouped in this category. 
After investigating these organisations, some researchers established that only a very few 
numbers of these organisations could be regarded as NGOs by the western standards 356 . 
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According to the generally accepted definition of NGO as established by Salomon and 
Anheier357, NGOs have five main characteristics, i.e. they are private, formal, non-profit, 
voluntary and self-governing358. However, many of the Chinese organisations do not qualify as 
autonomous or voluntary.  
In addition to these, in the late 1990s, some new grassroots associations evolved in the 
society with a focus on issues concerning the public like womens’ rights advocacy and 
environmental conservation. Most of these started as registered secondary organisations or 
business bodies. With the passage of time, some managed to become listed as social enterprises 
or other non-commercial organisations. These organisations are distinct from the GONGOs. 
They are established by individuals, are self-governing, voluntary, formally organized and non-
profit distributing. These organisations are referred to as grassroots NGOs and are actually the 
real NGOs in China. 
4.2.5 CSP research on China 
Over the past few decades, China has reportedly been focusing on ways to increase its 
GDP. The steps China has taken to grow its GDP have however set in motion new social 
challenges that have urged policymakers to give priority to processes and approaches that will 
help with the application of social justice and will continue the prosperity of the entire nation359. 
In the thirteenth five-year plan, one of the key objectives is to focus on environmental 
preservation and social welfare360. 
Likewise, over the period of the last few years, the number as well as magnitude of 
grassroots NGOs has increased sharply. The growth is based on a number of crucial factors. 
After the Sichuan earthquake in 2008, not even a single institution in China was fully prepared 
to take over the gruesome task of full-scale post-quake disaster relief. This gap in requirement 
and provision of services created a great opportunity for grassroots NGOs to be born and 
evolved. Moreover, the government has reportedly reduced the hurdles from the process of 
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NGO registration mainly by reducing manifold bureau sponsorship to just one bureau. Even 
after this significant change, some NGOs still complained that the new policy has not reduced 
the complications involved in the process as a whole particularly for the NGOs with little 
networking resources361. 
Since the very inception of the very first NGOs in China in the 1980s, a plethora of 
challenges has been witnessed, and they are not likely to end any time soon362. The problems 
like lack of professionals and inconsistent funding in the grassroots are just a tip of the iceberg. 
Despite the problems, the private sector is still striving to contribute to society and the 
environment positively. The private sector can play its role not only by providing financial 
assistance but also by providing technical expertise, their time and products to the new and 
evolving NGOs so that they can better meet their objectives. On the other side, the NGOs do 
also reciprocate by offering expertise in areas they have experience in, and successfully 
executing the projects on the ground. So far the literature on partnerships has given some 
insights into their performance and impact on the society363. 
More recently, Ogilvy Earth and Brown364started a qualitative and quantitative analysis 
that aimed to establish a relationship between corporations and NGOs in China. They mainly 
focused on learning the way partnerships are being started, developed and continued between 
two parties. They studied more than 100 NGOs and about 44 corporations and interviewed a 
large number of significant players in the sector. 
Through the interviews, they established that a number of these relationships are based on 
the need to enhance public relations. They also noted that well-established NGOs have more 
potential to bring benefit to the brands, more than smaller NGOs and the emphasis is hence on 
them in the majority of the cases. This fact was supported by their research findings that 
maintained that 91% of the companies undertook CSR to improve their corporate image rather 
than to provide social services. 
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The report did also witness a tendency of increased CSR reporting in China with a growing 
number of corporations presenting their annual reports to take their initiatives forward365. The 
corporations mainly present rather vague information that is not based on any current news or 
any project that is supposed to need NGO collaboration. The main findings of the research 
carried out so far can be summarised in these three points: 
1. The driving forces behind the birth and elevated importance of CSP setups; 
2. The benefits of engaging in CSP engagements for private bodies (NGO and businesses); 
3. The circumstances which are likely to transform the interactions to collaboration. 
4.3 CSP landscape in Greater China  
In a world with limited resources and several global problems, cooperation between NGOs 
and corporations can be an efficient way to get the most out of the restricted resources to take 
care of significant issues. However, this hypothesis must be evaluated in light of factual data. 
Hence, this part provides the empirical analyses of CSPs carried out by three groups of oil and 
gas corporations in Greater China, including the international oil companies, Chinese state-
owned oil companies and Taiwan’s two major oil and gas companies. 
4.3.1 International oil companies 
As there are some NGOs operating in China which are continually changing, it is not 
possible to keep a full record of these non-profit entities. In order to evaluate the research 
hypothesis, the author has used the approach of collecting data from limited oil and gas 
corporations based in greater China. 
In Greater China, three types of oil and gas companies are working which are the 
international, Chinese state-owned and Taiwanese. The IPIECA and OGP provide the list of 
important global oil and gas companies. This chapter starts with analysing these two lists and 
then evaluates the companies based on standards for in-depth study. The three standards on 
which the companies are evaluated are 1) Does the company maintain at least one branch office 
based in Greater China? 2) Has the company set up a Chinese Website or a Website that focuses 
on its operations in Greater China? 3) Does the company have its CSR reports written in 
Chinese?  
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According to the lists issued by OGP and IPIECA, 72 oil and gas companies are operating 
around the globe which are either working with or are in a joint venture or retail agreement 
with the Taiwanese/Chinese oil and gas companies. Out of these 72 companies, 18 do have at 
least one branch office in Greater China, most in Beijing or Shanghai. Only a very few numbers 
of these companies operate a Chinese contact office in southern mainland China. For example, 
ConocoPhillips has an office in Shanghai.  
Regarding the next requirement, the author has pointed out that only 7 out of the 18 
companies have published CSR reports based on their projects in China and have websites in 
Chinese. With these two conditions fulfilled, it is safe to say that these 7 oil corporations 
namely, Chevron, BP, ConocoPhillips, Statoil, Shell, ExxonMobil and Total, are seriously 
concerned about the Greater China energy markets. Table 4.4 shows the profiles of the 
international oil and gas companies. 
Table 4.4 Profiles of international oil and gas companies in Greater China 
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Every single one of these 7 oil corporations working in China are members of OGP and 
IPIECA and are registered with the international stock markets. 
After shortlisting the companies for detailed study, this research move on to review all of 
their CSR reports and websites, with a particular focus on community/stakeholder engagement 
and other linked sections. The research did also find out the specific NGO partners of the 
targeted companies. The author went as far as contacting the companies directly to receive an 
update on their collaboration with the NGOs. Table 4.5 shows 43 multi-sector partnerships of 
the 7 global oil and gas companies and their NGO associates. 
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Table 4.5 NGO-Corporate Partnerships - International Oil & Gas Companies  
 
 




Shell has 10 CSPs which is the highest number as compared to other international oil and 
gas corporations. ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips follow Shell with 9 CSPs each. BP has 
established 4 CSPs whereas Total has 2. Statoil has the least (only 1) CSP with the China 
Children’s and Teenagers’ fund. The international corporations tend to provide parallel 
cooperation to big GONGOs such as the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation and other 
international foundations like the WWF. This chapter will address this point in further detail, 
focusing on more qualitative findings. 
4.3.2 Chinese state-owned companies  
This research focuses on the 4 largest Chinese oil and gas corporations, and all of them 
are state-owned. Hence, this research will focus on all four state-owned companies and their 
partner NGOs. Below is the profile of Chinese state-owned oil and gas companies presented as 
Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6 Profiles of the Chinese state-owned oil and gas companies 
 
The four Chinese state-owned oil corporations, China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), China Petroleum and Chemical 
Corporation (Sinopec) and China National Chemicals Import and Export Corporation 
(Sinochem), all have extensive global presence. All are listed on the international stock markets, 
such as the New York and London stock markets. Moreover, three of them have a membership 
of OGP (CNOOC, CNPC and Sinopec) and two of the four companies are members of IPIECA 
(CNOOC and Sinopec). 
As members of industry international associations, they are bound to follow the guidelines 
or rules issued by these international bodies. This collectively translates to the Chinese state-
owned oil and gas corporations being under the global isomorphic pressures both from the 
international financing partners or the industry associations.  
Table 4.7 sheds light on 18 cross-sector cases of cooperation between the 4 Chinese state-
owned oil and gas corporations and their NGOs partners. 
Table 4.7 NGO-Corporate Partnerships - Chinese National Oil & Gas Companies 




CNOOC has 7 CSPs within its own company to take care of corporate social 
responsibilities. Sinochem is currently working with 5 CSPs whereas CNPC has 4 CSPs. 
Sinopec, however, has just one CSP with the Lifeline Express. The majority of these CSPs are 
in collaboration with the GONGOs like the China Foundation for poverty alleviation, China 
Women’s Development Foundation, China’s Children and Teenagers’ Fund and China Next 
Generation Education Foundation. 
4.3.3 Two major Taiwanese oil and gas companies 
The Taiwanese energy markets including oil, natural gas and electricity, are not entirely 
liberalised. According to the current regulations366, these energy markets are not fully open for 
international oil and gas corporations. This regulatory environment makes Formosa Petroleum 
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Chemical Group and CPC Taiwan become the only two stakeholders of this industry in Taiwan 
as there is no permission for the international oil and gas corporations.  
Hence, this chapter actually focuses on these two Taiwanese oil and gas companies and 
their partnering NGOs. Table 4.8, below, shows the profiles of the two main Taiwanese oil and 
gas companies. 
Table 4.8 Profiles of the two major Taiwanese oil and gas companies 
 
CPC Taiwan is a state-owned oil and gas company and is the primary hub of Taiwan’s 
Petrochemical industry. Before February 9, 2017, the company was referred to as Chinese 
Petroleum Corporation (CPC) until the board of governors changed the name of the company 
on the said date effective immediately. Formosa Petrochemical Corporation (Formosa 
Petrochemical) on the other hand is the only private oil corporation that is allowed by Taiwan’s 
Government to operate on the island. 
CPC Taiwan and Formosa Petrochemical are both listed in the international stock markets, 
but neither of the two is a member of IPIECA or OGP. Resultantly they are not bound to follow 
the partnering principles, guidelines and regulations issued by these industry associations (for 
detail check Appendix). This added to the un-liberalised energy market which can lead to an 
even more isolated situation for the Taiwanese Petrochemical industry. 
Table 4.9 displays a total of 7 cross-sector partnerships between the two Taiwanese 
companies and their partnering NGOs. 
Table 4.9 NGO-Corporate Partnerships - Taiwanese major Oil & Gas Companies 
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4.3.4 ‘Critical cooperation’ is emerging both in the literature and CSP practices  
Looking into the current CSP environment in Greater China, a new pattern of 
collaborating is emerging, which is the case of critical cooperation led by basic level 
environmental NGOs.  
Critical cooperation is a combination of the co-operational and adversarial approaches and 
can be moulded easily to be used at different stages of cross-sector typologies and engagements. 
Practically, the NGOs using this approach tend to criticise the corporations at first, clearly 
demarcate the problem and can then force the corporations in question to be more 
environmentally responsible in their operations. In this way, the NGOs can be more effective 
when they target the major oil and gas corporations. 
At this level, the study maintains that ‘Critical cooperation’ is an effective alternative way 
for the NGOs, particularly the grass root level ones and the indigenous Chinese communities 
of China to engage with the major petrochemical corporations. 
As suggested by the literature, critical cooperation across both common and conflicting 
interests needs the focus on at least four aspects of the relationship367: 1) balancing power 
asymmetries 2) acknowledgement of critical rights 3) negotiation on both conflicting and 
converging interests and 4) managing stakeholder relations. 
As evident from the above discussion, the situation for grassroots NGOs is quite difficult 
in Greater China. The external regulatory and political atmosphere is not particularly healthy 
and also the businesses do not generally consider the grassroots as qualified enough to work 
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with. Hence, it is the best strategy for the grassroots to start with criticism and then force the 
corporations to cooperate with them at the later stages. The grassroots should find out the 
problems and then lead to communication with the corporations. Once the companies have 
realised the serious nature of the situation based on the recommendations of the NGOs, they 
should act in such a way as to rectify the situation causing concern to the NGO. It is not a viable 
option for the grassroots to wait for financing from the major oil corporations. In that case, the 
relationship is imbalanced, and it becomes impossible to make negotiations and keep the 
critical rights. This chapter quotes one such recent example to back this argument (Table 4.10). 
Table 4.10 Ma Chun’s Critical Cooperation Approach 
Back in 2012, Apple INC changed its policies regarding withholding any information related to 
the environmental impacts of its factories in China. This change was mainly due to the efforts of Mr 
Ma Jun, who won the 2012 Goldman environmental prize in recognition of his efforts. 
Ma Chun is an ex-journalist and the founder of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs 
(IPE) of China. IPE has revealed over ninety thousand water and air pollution events by domestic as 
well as foreign companies operating in China. Ma Chun believes in the power of citizens and the value 
of information transparency. Through the Green Choice Supply chain of IPE, (which has 41 local NGO 
partners) IPE has educated customers to use their purchasing power to create an impact on corporate 
manufacturing and management practices. Even without any regulatory within the government, IPE has 
successfully agreed more than 500 companies to make public their efforts and plans regarding cleaning 
up of their facilities. Now, IPE is working in collaboration with major brands like Sony, Levi’s, 
Unilever, GE, Coca-Cola, Siemens, Nike, Wal-Mart H&M, Vodafone Lenovo and Adidas and all of 
these corporations now refer to the digital mapping regularly and do self-regulating. 
IPE has most recently been involved in high profile effort regarding the US IT giant Apple. Apple 
is the only company to not respond to the requests of IPE. Apple made a long-term policy stating not to 
disclose its supply chain information. IPE worked with some other NGOs to launch a campaign by the 
name of ‘Poison Apple’ to protest against the company’s non-disclosure of supply chain information. 
Finally, in 2011, Apple reached out to the Chinese environmental organisations and began a movement 
to force its suppliers to make their practices cleaner and environmentally responsible. Ma Jun and his 
NGO colleagues keep contact with Apple staffs. It is due to the efforts of Ma Jun that the Tech Giant is 
making its factories more environmentally friendly and is taking care of the human rights issues. 
Source: China’s Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE) 
4.4 Evaluation: Practices, effectiveness and implications 
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The regulatory infrastructure and policies ruling over the non-profit sector have an 
enormous external impact on CSPs in greater China. This chapter, hence, focuses on and 
elaborates on three observations about external influence in the coming sections. 
4.4.1 The political economy of CSP in Greater China 
This part starts by providing three observations on the political economy of CSP in Greater 
China, including, political context, the role of third parties and regulatory environment for the 
development of CSPs. 
1. The political aspect of the development of civil society in China is considerably different as 
compared to the west 
This perspective can lead to quite different practices, regulatory infrastructure and 
principles. Understanding local facts and the particular challenges they have to cope with is 
critical for successful operation of NGOs in China. The industry is ruled by its own distinctive 
set of principles, derived from China’s socialist market and autocratic political system. A 
greater deviation is observed because of the reason that the Chinese government plays a 
tripartite role in the civil society sector being the direct partner, regulator and partner through 
government-owned and related agencies. 
A significant portion of the non-profit sector is under the direct control of the government, 
and all of the major agencies are owned by the government or mutually connected. Working in 
this atmosphere needs a patient attitude and strong commitment to understanding how things 
are supposed to work and being flexible and adaptable to the prevailing conditions. 
There exist strong political imitations that control scale, topics and magnitude of public 
discussion and the functioning of NGOs. The government of China is supportive of the 
NGOs368. The government tends to collaborate with these organisations on points that are in 
favour of the government’s own public welfare agenda (for example health, environment and 
education). The government is however not supportive of the NGOs whose operations tend to 
be contradictory with the authenticity of the national policy. NGOs do have to bring their focus 
areas in line with the political landscape of the country.  
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The situation in Taiwan, on the other hand, is an entirely different one. The NGOs of 
Taiwan have more freedom to even challenge the government and businesses. 
2. The current regulatory atmosphere ruling over the non-profit industry is significantly 
restrictive 
According to the Chinese regulatory framework, there is still a high number of barriers 
for setting up an NGO in mainland China. These barriers consist of a rigorous registration 
procedure, the requirement of a public sponsoring entity, very high minimum number of 
members and large endowment and capital minimums. Moreover, there also exist severe 
restrictions on public fundraising, the establishment of branch offices and eligibility for tax 
exemption369. 
The current rules and policies in China are restrictive and lack detail and clarity in a 
number of critical areas. A thorough understanding of China’s national and local regulatory 
system as well as the limitations on operation and management of non-profit organisations is 
immensely important to make better decisions on proper giving channels and partnering bodies 
and also for establishing and continuing impactful and effective corporate-NGO partnerships. 
The number of registered NGOs in China has doubled over the last decade. As of 2017, 
around five hundred thousand organisations were operating across China. During the last five 
years, the amount of donations given to these non-profits has rapidly increased from 1.6 billion 
US Dollars in 2012 to 15.2 Billion US Dollars in 2017370. To compare that amount to the US, 
the total charitable giving in China was just 5 per cent of that in America. Based on this, it can 
be assumed that there is an opportunity for expansion in this sector. 
The prevailing political and regulatory regulations do affect the CSP operations. The 
sustained increase and development of local NGOs should lead to a valuable chance for 
corporations to make constructive relations for CSR activities in China. 
3. There are enormous opportunities for ‘Matchmakers’ in Greater China 
The fast growth of China’s non-profit sector means there are new opportunities for new 
cross-sector operations, but that depends on the assumption that the regulatory environment 
                                                          
369 “China law puts foreign NGOs under tighter control”, Financial Times, 
https://www.ft.com/content/a61994da-3ec1-11e8-b7e0-52972418fec4. 
370 NGOs in China, South China Morning Post, available at: https://www.scmp.com/topics/ngos-china. 
122 | P a g e  
 
and market regulations continue to move in a favourable direction. There are many growth 
limitations for the grassroots NGOs in China. The uncertain legal status of as many as one-
third of these bodies, their lack of proper infrastructure and the continued dominance of the 
GONGOs leave the grassroots Chinese NGOs struggling for resources, funding, new members 
and volunteers. 
In addition, contrary to the rest of the world, public fundraising is not possible for the 
grassroots both online and offline. With both public as well as government funding extremely 
difficult to secure, grassroots NGOs must learn the way of building effective working 
partnerships with the corporate sector if they want to sustain and continue their operations. 
Taking this all into account, some organisations have come forth to help bridge the gap between 
the two sectors and to create opportunities for partnership by playing the role of matchmaker. 
The most important role played by these organisations is that of a facilitator to mitigate 
the issues regarding working with major corporations as this process can overwhelm the small 
organisations with little resources and insufficient experience. NPI is one such organisation 
working in Shanghai. According to the official website, NPI has collaborated with corporations 
like Baidu, China Merchants Bank and Lenovo371. 
4.4.2 Performance of these CSPs  
Then we proceeded to examine the performance of these CSPs in Greater China. Here this 
study again points out three key findings. 
1. Insufficient voluntary collaboration notably at real strategic partnership level among oil 
corporations and NGOs in greater China 
In comparison to the Western world, the development of CSPs in China is at a relatively 
initial stage. After studying 67 CSPs, it is safe to say that most of the current CSPs in this 
region are yet at the philanthropy level. IPIECA has never selected a single CSP case from 
Greater China as a notable collaboration example or case study. 
Even though, there are still some challenging and beneficial collaborations. The current 
CSP landscape is also regarded to be under a process of mass transformation. Increasing 
number of corporations are looking for opportunities to transform from sponsors to actual 
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partners of the NGOs. However, they do accept that there is an uneven distribution of resources 
across the country.  
Contrary to that, Formosa Petrochemical uses a foundation approach. They found their 
foundations and direct the funding to donations for the area they are concerned about. But, this 
must be noted that these collaborations are yet at a sponsor/charity level and cannot be regarded 
as real strategic partnerships. 
2. As of now, a considerable portion of the CSPs in greater China is company dominated 
The industry insists that they are making contributions to the societies, but, as said by the 
majority of the NGOs, these collaborations are not actually community-based. 
The geographies of the CSPs operating at this time indeed draw our attention. Majority of 
the engagements are between the Chinese GONGOS and China’s state-owned oil companies, 
and they are largely at the sponsor/charity level. All of these NGOs have offices in Shanghai, 
Beijing and Taipei. However, the extractive operations do not take place in these major cities, 
and the power and resources are not evenly distributed. Ideally, inter-sector collaborations 
should be issue based. All the stakeholders involved should sit down on the same table and 
debate on the issues created by the operations of the corporations. 
It is a fact that these engagements do benefit the society in some ways but they are not 
directly related to the communities where they are operating in. The current CSPs in greater 
China are not useful to cope with the actual challenges rather they work as corporate charities. 
GONGOS do receive important resources from the state-owned oil corporations, but they also 
work at basic philanthropy/charity level.  
3. The government acts as the main factor for developing CSPs 
It is a common concept that CSPs among the private sector and NGOs are only governed 
by the parties involved. However, this chapter, using empirical data, infers that the Chinese 
government does play a vital role in the formation of the CSPs. With the support of the 
authorities, the CSP can be founded and operated without any hurdle. The case study involving 
BP and WWF China about environmental education can be a good example here372. 
                                                          
372 See WWF China, news section: https://en.wwfchina.org/?2652/Spreading-the-Word---Nick-Young-reports-
on-BP--WWFs-Environmental-Education-Programme-in-China. 
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4.4.3 Companies’ strategies 
The following paragraphs investigate the way the energy industry operating in the Greater 
China region, where it is evident that the businesses use the CSP in the strategies of their 
corporations. Talking of the corporations’ partnership priorities, this research narrows down to 
three key findings below: 
1. International, Chinese state-owned and Taiwanese oil companies have different partnership 
tending in terms of 1) selection of partners, 2) Types of partnerships 3) Areas of work/projects 
Keeping in view the unique operational environment of China, international companies 
have to decide how to distribute their donations effectively and also how much involvement is 
needed from their side to oversee these charitable contributions. International oil and gas 
corporations have a greater tendency to partner up with the international NGOs and notable 
GONGOs in China. It is critical for MNCs to opt for the channels that are related to the 
corporation’s presence, proficiency level and involvement in the Chinese region. It must also 
be noted that the MNCs do want to establish and continue stable and constructive relationships 
with the Chinese government, particularly in the oil and gas industry. All the Chinese GONGOs 
receive funding from the Chinese authorities and are a part of the government373. However, this 
fact cannot be overlooked, as evident from the case studies, that there is still room for better 
Business-NGO cooperation in this area. 
The Chinese state-owned corporations behave somewhat conservatively on this partnering 
issue. They do not usually collaborate with the Chinese grassroots NGOs and do not have a 
strong trust on the international NGOs. Hence, they donate their money to the GONGOs 
comfortably. This behaviour can be easily explained by the fact that both these bodies are a 
part of the Chinese government and the personnel working in one organisation often get 
transferred to the other after a few years. For instance, the current CEO and chairman of 
CNOOC used to work for the high profile Chinese GONGO374, i.e. China Foundation for 
Poverty Alleviation375. Hence collaborating with their former colleagues is a much easier 
                                                          
373 Hasmath, R. & Jennifer H. (2008). 
374 Hasmath, R and Hsu, J.Y.J. (2014) “Isomorphic Pressures, Epistemic Communities and State-NGO 
Collaboration in China”, The China Quarterly, 2014. 
375 China Foundation For Poverty Alleviation, official website: http://en.cfpa.org.cn. 
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option for the Chinese state-owned oil companies and it is usually a way to show that they have 
modern CSR awareness. 
In comparison, Taiwanese oil corporations tend to prefer the local Taiwanese NGOs. Most 
of the notable international NGOs have not established their branch offices in Taiwan, and the 
civil society is mature and developed as of now. The local NGOs of Taiwan have a long history 
of working in some areas like social welfare, environmental protection and human rights376. 
Moreover, the Taiwanese government is very helping for these non-profit organisations, and 
they can quickly get funding from both governmental and public bodies. However, lack of 
international NGOs working in this area means that there is reduced global isomorphic pressure 
on development of Business-NGO partnerships in Taiwan. 
2. International, Taiwanese and Chinese state-owned oil and gas corporations have different 
understandings of their partnering NGOs 
Taiwanese oil corporations understand the capacitites of their NGO partners in more detail. 
The reason behind this is that the development of civil society in Taiwan is more mature as 
compared to China. Taiwan’s third sector is extremely professional, and they openly criticise 
the major corporations and the government. They have a well-established professional 
reputation and have been keeping an eye on the public and private sector for a very long period. 
In mainland China, however, the evolving NGO culture is still a new phenomenon, and 
the regulatory infrastructure seems to be a bit too restrictive as of now. This means that both 
the international as well as local Chinese oil corporations do not have very high-level 
information about the authenticity and capacities of their NGO partners, this is more evident 
with the grassroots NGOs. However, the case study of Exxon & Global Village Beijing does 
show a bright perspective for grassroots NGOs if they cooperate with the international 
corporations377. 
3. Oil companies have different strategies while working locally and abroad 
This is a good point to examine closely. The Chinese oil companies tend to have changed 
strategies when they step into a new market. For instance, the four major Chinese national oil 
corporations have recently made notable investments in Latin America and South America. 
                                                          
376 Yaziji M. and Doh J. (2009). 
377 China operations, ExxonMobil, available at: https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/company/worldwide-
operations/locations/china. 
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They face some difficult situations and conflicting issues when working in the African states 
like Cameroon. So, now they are starting to learn how to engage with the local communities in 
a better way and bridge the cultural gaps. This is the exact opposite of the situation when the 
Chinese companies stay in the domestic territory and work with the Chinese GONGOs. 
The international and Taiwanese oil corporations, on the other hand, do not act differently 
while working in their homeland or abroad. They maintain that their projects are the subject to 
the same standards and the same partnering strategies regardless of where they work. 
4.4.4 NGOs’ partnering strategies 
Focusing on the partnering strategies applied by the NGOs, this chapter infers three key 
findings from the data which are: 
1. NGOs based in mainland China are willing to work with corporations and believe that 
collaboration can be helpful for them in achieving their organisations’ objectives 
It is believed equally by the corporations as well as the NGOs that those CSPs can prove 
to be beneficial for social, cultural, economic and environmental issues. 
NGOs operating in the grassroots face a plethora of challenges. Most of them do not have 
proper infrastructure and also face considerable competition from the GONGOs. These 
organisations do not get proper attention regarding funding, staff recruitment and resource 
acquisition. Moreover, the Chinese regulatory environment does not allow online or offline 
fundraising, so the only choice for the grassroots is to maintain good working partnerships with 
the corporate bodies. However, recently some establishments have started the task of bridging 
the gap between the corporate sector and the NGOs. Ultimately, the NGOs, especially the 
grassroots, will benefit from this trend. 
The non-profit sector in China is increasingly becoming reliant on sponsorship from 
companies, especially the local and grass-root NGOs. The growing opportunities for 
philanthropic operations are receiving boosts from the substantial portion of the society that is 
mainly under the control of private investors and people in the business. This willingness to 
donate resources has created some opportunities for corporate charity. 
2. Even though most of the NGO partners were focusing on a diverse range of fields, a closer 
look reveals that social/community improvement and education are the areas where non-profit 
organisations and companies tend to invest the most of their efforts. 
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Even though the areas mentioned above do require the most attention, many NGOs have 
reportedly ventured into environmental conservation, which is said to be at the core of a number 
of corporations. Researchers maintain that this trend is due to media influence. 
The change from charitable donations to more sustainable projects is a clear indicator of 
the fact that NGOs do have the ability to do well for specific areas especially when they have 
in-depth knowledge and experience of the areas in question. Some of the corporations are 
optimistic that maintaining good NGO-Corporation relationships will be helpful in attaining 
their goals. As a result, these engagements have demonstrated that NGOs performed a 
considerable role in their achievement of corporate goals. However, there is minimal 
information regarding the functioning of NGOs. Even the NGOs themselves cannot be sure 
about the performance of their counterparts. Lack of this essential information has resulted in 
the decreased possibility of making strong collaborations. 
3. There is a severe lack of experienced talent in China’s non-profit sector 
This is one of the major obstacles in capacity building of these NGOs. There is a huge 
difference in the employment patterns in the non-profit sector of China and the developed 
nations like the US. Non-profit employment in the developed world is highly regarded and 
considered honourable, the exact opposite of the Chinese culture. This problem for Chinese 
non-profit organisations is made worse by the recent regulations imposed on them that even 
limit the payroll expenditures. Hence corporate organisations eyeing China as a potential 
playing field should consider the fact that local norms here are substantially different from the 
well-established global organisations.   
Another thing that must be noted here is that Chinese NGOs do not comply with the basic 
requirements such as having a solid internal control framework, financial management system, 
and information management. This situation means that strict measures must be taken to 
develop proper guidelines for selecting beneficiaries or partners in China. Professionalism and 
transparency in financial dealings should be the critical points for the proper functioning of 
established collaborations and partnerships. 
The current environment shows disagreement over whether NGOs working in China can 
yet be regarded as a community of experts in which their interpretive and symbolic abilities 
can be effectively utilised or whether it is the duty if NGOs to produce new knowledge or not. 
The NGO sector cannot yet be regarded as a community of experts because NGOs themselves 
128 | P a g e  
 
lack proper transparency. China does not have any well-formed NGO atmosphere. This must 
also be noted that the NGO sector is a hugely diverse sector and the people working for the 
NGOs represent a broad array of professions. However, the participation of NGOs across the 
sector can eventually lead the sector to succeed. 
A small portion of the NGOs can be regarded as having the expertise and inherent 
symbolic and interpretive abilities that are a result of this expertise. For instance, the Climate 
Change Action Network in China, which comprises an assortment of NGOs focused on the 
environment are in this category. However for most of the cases and especially when the NGOs 
are considered on their own, they have little experience. This situation is subject to debate that 
NGOs in China are responsible for the production of information or not, but one point is for 
sure, NGOs do play a vital role in the dissemination of information to the general public. It is 
most probably due to the coercive pressure that the Chinese NGOs fail to achieve a mature 
epistemic environment. However, NGOs can be more effective as agents of change not by 
pushing the boundaries of knowledge but using their abilities in a relatively low-key manner 
to bring the existing issues to new light and/or bringing forward the underrated economic, 
political and social issues. 
4.4.5 Summary of findings and arguments 
Cross-sector collaboration is considered being one of the major environmental governance 
methods to act on sustainable development and globally accepted commitments like the 2002 
WSSD in Johannesburg378, Agenda 21379 and Rio+20380 outcome. Extractive corporations have 
caused enormous environmental issues and have put in place CSPs for sustainable development 
for almost 20 years. 
Besides the ‘S-I’ dimension, This chapter has studied and examined in depth the 
geographies, politics and performances of the on-going CSPs among the oil and gas 
corporations operating in greater China and NGOs of the region (the ‘I-P’ dimension). 
Unfortunately, China does not use sustainable and human rights clauses very often in their 
                                                          
378 Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, http://www.un-documents.net/aconf199-20.pdf. 
379 United Nations Conference on Environment & Development Rio de Janerio, Brazil, 3 to 14 June 1992, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf. 
380 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/rio20. 
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investment contracts. Therefore, this chapter has turned to the alternative solutions on the ‘I-P’ 
dimension and examined these innovative instruments’ practical performance. 
This chapter focuses on seven international, two Taiwanese and four Chinese state-owned 
oil and gas corporations and reports that there are currently sixty-two CSPs working in greater 
China. However, the majority of these CSPs are yet at the charity level. This chapter studies 
social network and institutional perspectives to understand and compare the Chinese state-
owned, international and Taiwanese oil and gas companies on the issues related to partnering 
with NGOs. 
The results indicate that it is true that partnerships act as a progressive instrument to foster 
development but they also pose considerable limitations. The lack of constructive involvement 
between the non-profit sector and the corporate industry can be, up to some extent, attributed 
to isomorphic pressures within Business-NGO relationships in Greater China. Further, keeping 
in view that NGOs are relatively new to the social infrastructure of China, this chapter has 
recommended that oil companies do not have sufficient meaningful knowledge of the NGO 
field, just like the NGOs have not yet matured enough to become a part of an epistemic 
community where their experience or record can be used as reference material by the 
corporations. So, resultantly, the CSP landscape of this region is substantially defined by the 
major oil and gas corporations, and the CSP geographies are not very much community-based 
and problem-oriented.  
Due to the unique historical background of the development of NGO-business 
collaborations in greater China, this research establishes that ‘critical cooperation’ is a 
compelling strategy for the non-profit organisations, particularly for the grassroots to form 
partnerships with the energy corporations. In addition, authorities, including the Chinese local 
governments and other social entities, play a notable role in establishing an external 
environment for upcoming CSPs. 
To conclude, strategic partnerships between NGOs and businesses are yet at a very early 
stage of evolution and still have limited effect and scope particularly in greater China. However, 
there is the enormous potential for such strategic partnerships. NGOs can, on the one hand, act 
as watchdogs to monitor companies’ activities, and, on the other hand, cooperate with the 
private sector for environmental governance and social innovation. The relationships like these 
are beneficial not only for partner organisations but also for the society collectively. 
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As evident from the theoretical discussion in the previous sections, this chapter can 
summarise the major points for the practitioners. It is the responsibility of the Taiwanese and 
Chinese governments to establish a regulatory atmosphere to unlock the maximum potential of 
the CSPs, providing platforms where NGOs and businesses could engage to exchange ideas 
and information could be immensely helpful in the selection of suitable partners. Moreover, 
the Taiwanese government needs to provide incentives to the international NGOs so they can 
bring in their expertise. Due to the positive impacts of the global isomorphic pressures, the 
Taiwanese oil and gas corporations need to consider getting the partnerships of international 
industry organisations to avoid being cut off from the global picture.  
For the long-term future, this study can predict that the driving forces for further 
regulatory reforms should come from both the global pressures and China’s local communities. 
As discussed above, the ‘critical cooperation’ approach has the power to challenge the current 
governance framework. Moreover, when the Chinese companies increase their investment 
globally, they may face more challenges from the international communities and industrial 
associations. These pressures will accelerate the institutional reform procedures within and 
outside China.        
Possible ideas for further study can be based on a longitudinal analysis that considers a 
strategic partnership right from its inception and throughout its lifespan, which may acquire 
detailed information and understanding of the working dynamics involved in such a partnership. 
As a result, finding out while certain strategic partnerships fail while others are successful can 
develop an understanding of how to manage strategic partnerships effectively. In addition, it 
would be necessary to carry out a comparative study of CSPs in different states to note if there 
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Chapter 5 – The ‘S-I-P’ triangle and beyond: Proposing a multi-actor investment 
contract framework?   
“My notion of democracy is that under it the weakest should have the same opportunity as the 
strongest.” – Mahatma Gandhi (1932) 
The current system for regulating activities and relations in international and domestic 
investment regimes involves minimal engagement of host and affected local citizens in formal 
legal arrangements381. In this situation, various actors contest the interests derived from, and 
obligations imposed by, existing legal frameworks in the SIP triangle.  
A new type of multi-actor contract can outline the conceptual roadmap for future 
contracting in natural resource sectors and provide justifications underlying these patterns in 
global contracting practices382. By including affected third parties, local communities and other 
citizens, the new multi-actor investment contracts illustrate that host state governments and 
foreign investors are ‘trustees’ of these investment projects and the benefits of natural resource 
extractions should be mobilised for the public. Scholars also point out that contracts among 
multiple actors in the natural resource extraction context have the capacities to cope with the 
absence of responsibility and remedial regulations and can address the adverse impacts caused 
by extractive operations383. 
Examples of this new form of multi-actor contracts include contracts which can be 
designed to provide third parties with a legal right to sue the contract; multi-actor 
environmental contracts; human rights agreements, and state-investor-local community 
tripartite contracts. These new contractual arrangements illustrate that the law of contract has 
shifted from the early nineteenth-century model that contracts only protect the rights of 
contracting parties (e.g. foreign investors) without any concern for affected third parties (e.g. 
                                                          
381 Zillman, D. M., & Lucas, A. (2002) Human rights in natural resource development: Public participation in 
the sustainable development of mining and energy resources. Oxford University Press. See also Bradshaw, B., 
& McElroy, C. (2014) Company–community agreements in the mining sector. In C. Louche & T. Hebb (Eds.), 
Socially Responsible Investment in the 21st Century: Does it make a Difference for Society? (Vol. 7, pp. 173-
193): Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
382 Odumosu-Ayanu, I. T. (2014a) Governments, Investors and Local Communities: Analysis of A Multi-Actor 
Investment Contract Framework. Melbourne Journal of International Law, 15. See also International Civil 
Society Centre (2014).  
383 Moog, S., Spicer, A., & Böhm, S. (2015). The politics of multi-stakeholder initiatives: The crisis of the Forest 
Stewardship Council. Journal of Business Ethics, 128(3), 469-493. See also Odumosu-Ayanu, I. T. (2014b). 
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individual citizens and local communities) who are direct victims of harmful extractive 
operations384.  
Based on the discussions on the contractual mechanisms in the S-I and I-P dimensions, 
this chapter will discuss a new model of contracting for energy and natural resources which 
expands the scope for companies’ obligations to those adversely influenced by corporate 
activities, namely the multi-actor contracts in the SIP triangle. The chapter below will also 
evaluate this new type of multi-actor contracts, focusing on their functions, enforcement of 
corporate responsibility, and practical challenges and possible solutions. 
5.1 Introduction to the multi-actor investment contracts (tripartite contracts) 
Contracts are at the centre of extractive sector governance. Most natural resource sector 
contracts involve sizeable private business actors. However, the engagement of private 
business actors does not mean that all these contracts are only private contractual arrangements. 
As this study has briefly mentioned above, defining contracts in natural resource sectors as 
exclusively private ones does not adequately represent their current status. Such a narrow 
definition may have adverse impacts on any responsibilities, which could be owed to the most 
negatively impacted by extracting operations.  
Although contracts constitute the essential part of environmental governance in extractive 
industry regulation, the potentials and functions of these contracts for corporate liability and 
social responsibility have not been examined in detail. As Tienhaara notes, foreign investment 
contracts are “much less studied and poorly understood”385. Recent studies on extractive sector 
contracts, negotiation templates, and sustainable perspectives on these contracting practices 
have started to emerge386. However, most of these literatures primarily emphasised traditional 
state-investor contracts. Corporation liability and remedial implications of various contract 
types rarely have been reviewed in recent studies.  
                                                          
384 Shelton, D. (2011) Human rights and the environment. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. See also Percival, R. V. 
(2010) Liability for environmental harm and emerging global environmental law, Maryland journal of 
international law, 25(37). 
385 Tienhaara, K. (2013). See also Tienhaara, K. S. (2009) The expropriation of environmental governance: 
protecting foreign investors at the expense of public policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
386  Cotula, L. (2016). Foreign investment, law and sustainable development. International Institute for 
Environment and Development. London: IIED. See also Zerk, J. (2014) Oil and gas projects and human rights. 
In G. Picton-Turbervill (Ed.), Oil and Gas: A Practical Handbook (2 ed., pp. 141-158): Globe Business 
Publishing Limited. 
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Tripartite investment contracts are agreements between foreign energy corporations, 
governments and local communities. However, these contracts exist and are designed for 
critical purposes, particularly for deciding legal liabilities for extractive operations. This new 
type of tripartite agreement is the epitome of contractual responsibility in extractive industries. 
In these contracts, one of the key features is that the diversity of the actors engaged, the 
diversity of conflicting interests addressed and the public law nature of these multi-actor 
contracts. These contractual arrangements immediately transport the concept of sustainable 
development beyond traditional private contract law387.  
Because of the diversity of the actors and interests involved, this chapter argues that this 
form of tripartite investment contracts has indeed moved far beyond the concept of private 
contract and served as a useful policy instrument for multi-level environmental governance and 
other social policy implementation.  
Existing academic studies show that tripartite investment agreements so far have not been 
applied very commonly in the energy investment388. However, some apt examples still can be 
found, e.g., the environmental contracts conducted in Canada’s mining industries and some 
joint ventures signed in the oil and gas sector in South Africa.  
In 2011, De Beers Canada Inc., a mining company, entered into an environmental and 
social agreement with Canada’s government and the local communities in the Northwest 
Territories389. This multi-actor agreement details the environmental management plan, impact 
assessments, and monitoring mechanisms for the company’s extractive operations.  
In Australia, the Government of South Australia sometimes get involved in the community 
development agreements or extractive industry contracts, particularly in the cases regarding 
indigenous peoples390. A recent example of a joint venture which includes all three actors is the 
Richtersveld Pooling Sharing Joint Venture Agreement in South Africa391. This contract was 
                                                          
387 Odumosu-Ayanu, I. T. (2014b). See also Affolder, N. (2012) Transnational Conservation Contracts: A Primer. 
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting. 
388 Affolder, N. (2013). See also Odumosu-Ayanu, I. T. (2014a).  
389 Buchanan, S., & Marques, J. C. (2018). How home country industry associations influence MNE international 
CSR practices: Evidence from the Canadian mining industry. Journal of World Business, 53(1), 63-74. See 
also Affolder, N. (2011) Why Study Large Projects? Environmental Regulation's Neglected Frontier. UBC 
Law Review, 44(3), 521-554. 
390 O'Faircheallaigh, C., & Corbett, T. (2005) Indigenous Participation in Environmental Management of Mining 
Projects: The Role of Negotiated Agreements. Environmental Politics, 14(5), 629. 
391 Full text can be downloaded from: https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23376. 
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signed between the government of South Africa, the community of Richtersveld Alexkor and 
a state-owned diamond mining company Alexkor392.  
The new type of tripartite contracts, involving governments, foreign investors and 
communities, can also be found in the form of cross-sector partnerships/collaborations, 
community development agreements or other multi-actor agreements. Moreover, international 
organisations and industry associations also provide model contracts and publish these kinds 
of multi-actor contracts and collaborative initiatives online, such as IPIECA393 (for the oil and 
gas sector) and ICMM 394  (for mining industries). Tripartite investment contracts are 
acknowledgements of the significant relationships among host governments, foreign investors 
and local communities. These contracts demonstrate the unique role these stakeholders play in 
the SIP triangle. However, it requires further assessment of the extent to which this kind of 
tripartite contracts could be broadly applied. 
This chapter therefore focuses on the functions of this new type of tripartite agreements. 
It is important to evaluate the external regulatory environments for stimulating this new type 
of multi-actor contracts, their pros and cons in governing the environment and community 
relations, theoretical implications they brought (whether a new contractual governance 
paradigm is emerging), as well as the prospect of this new multi-level governance mechanism.   
5.2 Assessing external regulatory settings for supporting multi-actor contracts 
Before evaluating the governance functions of those multi-actor contracts, it may be useful 
to review the current external regulatory settings first. The working hypnosis here is simple. 
The limitations of current regulatory frameworks - both international and national - provide 
both opportunities and constraints for formulating multi-actor contracts. On the one hand, 
multi-actor contracts can be useful to support the ineffectiveness of current legal frameworks 
and even provide strong fuels to advance regulatory and policy innovations. On the other hand, 
without strong supports from the current legal frameworks or the involvement of governments, 
multi-actor contracts may not be widely adopted in the extractive industries. As a result, it is 
                                                          
392 Gathii, J., & Odumosu-Ayanu, I. T. (2015) The Turn to Contractural Responsibility in the Global Extractive 
Industry. Business and Human Rights Journal, 1(1), 69-94. 
393 IPEICA (2006) Partnerships in the oil and gas industry, Retrieved from: 
http://www.ipieca.org/publication/partnerships-oil-and-gas-industry. 
394 International Council on Mining and Metals, ICMM 10 Principles, Retrieved from: 
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& McElroy, C. (2014). 
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necessary to have this macro-level overview on the limitations of current frameworks and the 
interplays between multi-actor contracts and other governance instruments, including those 
soft laws and initiatives.     
Existing literature on international investment law debate the proper policy and legal 
arrangements for addressing the interests between foreign investors and host states395. Early 
commentators396 even see investment contracts as ‘economic development agreements’397, and 
were keen to elevate these economic agreements to an international status that allocated them 
out of the national regime where nations’ sovereign powers prevailed.  
As international investment treaties started to proliferate, scholars like Andrew Guzman398 
questioned whether countries in the Third World would get harmed by signing these investment 
treaties. Recent studies of international investment law also have been focusing on investment 
dispute case laws, in particular, international investment arbitrations399 . Other commenters 
have questioned the centrality of FDI to international development400. Some researchers focus 
on the interplays between sustainable development values and international investment law401. 
Given that the discussion focus varies, these debates demonstrate a need for making the 
international investments work better for all stakeholders.  
                                                          
395 Levashova, Yulia, Tineke E. Lambooy, and I F. Dekker. (2016). See also Vinuales, J. (2015) International 
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5.2.1 Limitations of the current legal frameworks on FDI  
Of all the existing regulatory mechanisms, international investment treaties, national laws 
and State–investor contracts are the most prevalent legal frameworks that determine and 
regulate international investment relationships402. These ways of legal engagement should be 
of somewhat universal application, though the contents, focus and effectiveness of every 
instrument would depend upon the actual parties and jurisdiction. Global Memorandum of 
Understandings (GMoUs) and Impact and Benefit Agreements are specific to some 
jurisdictions and are principally adopted in mining and oil and gas projects403. Despite their 
varied focus and completely different composition of parties, all of these mechanisms 
contribute to governance within the foreign investment regime. However, these legal 
instruments all have their limitations. 
Firstly, investment treaties have historically been constrained in their scope. By practices 
of public international law, treaties are conducted between national states. If investment treaties 
had determined the rights and obligations of the state parties to the treaties without more, 
commentators might not have been as critical as they have been. However, these treaties confer 
enforceable rights on foreign investors who are not parties to the treaties. Also, the treaties 
mostly do not impose obligations on these investors. Further, they mostly do not provide 
enforceable rights for host communities who are equally important actors. While modern 
versions of these treaties have begun to incorporate human rights and environmental protection 
clauses within their purview, they do not provide enforceable rights for host communities like 
they do for foreign investors.  
Secondly, those bilateral contracts, including State–investor contracts and community 
development agreements, usually exclude a significant actor as a party to the contract. The 
conventional investment contract is signed between the host state and the foreign investor; the 
typical community development agreement and IBAs are negotiated between foreign investors 
and affected communities. These contracts do not include robust interplays amongst all the 
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related actors. Also, these agreements usually do not address obligations and duties towards all 
related actors. Currently, environmental harm and other damages to local communities are 
usually addressed by stakeholders applying a range of legal principles in lengthy litigations and 
by governments using recourses to sanctions designed in environmental law and other 
regulations404. Citizens’ capacity to hold the state accountable for the failure to protect and 
regulate properly is somewhat difficult. The protection of human rights is an essential 
responsibility of governments, because any of the actors in natural resource investment projects 
may incur human rights violations. Duties and rights are placed in carefully designed 
regulations, whereas the regulating practices point out the current regime cannot address the 
constant interactions comprehensively.  
Thirdly, although community development agreements and cross-sector partnerships offer 
some opportunities of directly engaging affected communities through contractual 
arrangements, the scope of these contracts sometimes is still limited. These bilateral 
agreements often do not have the active interactional functions that this research envisages for 
tripartite and multi-actor contracts. While community development agreements, to some extent, 
may sometimes involve states as contracting parties in some cases, they remain mostly bilateral 
development agreements. For example, even in some advanced jurisdictions, IBAs are mostly 
signed after the investment projects have been commissioned, excluding local communities 
and aboriginal peoples from having a voice at the time of contract negotiating the contents and 
conditions of the investment project405.  
Though governments must consult all these stakeholders, however, the scope of these 
public consultations sometimes could be very limited406. Other types of bilateral agreements, 
such as NGO-Business partnerships and GMoUs, are even less possible to have any significant 
pre-project engagements. These contracts and ‘collaborations’ are mostly dominated by the 
powerful corporations, such as the NGO-Business partnerships in Greater China (see Chapter 
4). Some confidentiality provisions within these agreements also make it more challenging for 
affected communities to get access to the detailed contents of the contracts. While all these 
bilateral development agreements and cross-sector partnerships can form a quasi-regulatory 
                                                          
404 Morgera, E. (2009) Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law. Oxford: Oxford 
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mechanism, the enforceability of these contracts and the generalisation of their effectiveness 
remain unclear in practice407.  
The existing bilateral contracts put effort into providing avenues for active engagements 
among governments, foreign investors and citizens, but all these mechanisms still have some 
significant limitations as mentioned above.     
5.2.2 Non-binding approach and other recent regulatory developments 
To address the sustainable challenges of the extractive industries, recently there are two 
major regulatory developments. One emerging approach is the application of a variety of non-
binding standards and voluntary mechanisms, at the international, national and local levels, for 
natural resource management408. The other major approach is the improvements of domestic 
and international regulations.  
There are many examples of the first voluntary and non-binding approach. Since the 1990s, 
the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations has been drafting a Code of Conduct for 
Transnational Corporations 409 . Following this critical step by the UN system, numerous 
voluntary and non-binding initiatives have been launched410. For instance, the Global Compact, 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, and Kimberley Transparency Initiative411 are all 
great illustrations of this kind of non-binding initiatives.  
As mentioned in the proceeding chapters, the UN’s 10 Guiding Principles on Human 
Rights and Business also require private enterprises to respect human rights in their global 
operations. Also, these Guiding Principles encourage both the public and private actors to 
provide effective grievance mechanisms for the affected individual citizens and communities. 
Moreover, many sector-specific and corporate-specific non-binding rules and standards have 
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been crafted and released over the past decades. However, some comments412 questioned that 
all these non-binding and voluntary codes mentioned above are mostly the negotiating 
outcomes of the Western-dominated international institutions and Western-funded non-
governmental organisations. The Third World’s real voices and the perspectives of those 
individuals who genuinely suffer the severe adverse impacts of extractive activities were not 
included in the public consultations or discussions for drafting these voluntary codes413. As a 
result, the outcomes of these non-binding principles, to some extent, may not adequately 
represent the most vulnerable people living in the extractive regions.  
The second significant regulatory development to responding to natural resource 
extraction challenges is a range of home- and host-country new regulations 414 . These 
regulations are new mechanisms undertaken by the countries where the companies operate in 
and by the state where these companies’ headquarters are based. This recent regulatory 
development may allow the affected citizens and groups to use favourable laws to sue those 
international extractive corporations for polluting the environment and human rights violations. 
The Canadian government, for example, conducted a new regulation targeting the overseas 
activities of Canada’s multinational mining corporations 415 ; the new regulation requires 
Canadian mining companies to set up a special office or department to enforce this home-
country act and monitor the environmental and social impacts of their overseas operations416.  
One of the features in these new home-country regulations addresses the issues of contract 
transparency, confidentiality and information disclosure. This transparency requirement is 
fundamental in monitoring companies’ real operations overseas, which can apply to the 
contracts signed by the international extractive companies with the developing countries. 
Contract transparency helps public engagement of all negotiated and signed resource contracts. 
The proper transparency arrangements can make sure that resource contracts should be 
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beneficial to all the citizens and the confidentiality clauses can only protect commercial secrets. 
Contract transparency mechanisms are also essential to prevent serious corruptions in the 
global extractive industries and promote the public’s abilities to oversee the activities of 
extractive industries and governments.    
 The issue of revenue transparency is also closely relevant to contract transparency417. 
Revenue transparency mechanisms aim to maintain credibility in the management and 
distribution of resource wealth and revenues created in the industry. For instance, the US’s 
corporate disclosure law418 requires the US corporations to disclose the information of any 
payments to a foreign government, such as Africa and other developing countries, in their 
corporate annual reports.  
It is clear that these new home-state approaches have offered a significant opportunity to 
hold transnational corporations responsible. These newly-developed mechanisms have opened 
up many policies and legal spaces for the home country of the investor to manage the 
contestation of extractive companies’ overseas activities. In this case, this new approach serves 
as a new policy and legal instrument to ensure investors and host countries are more amenable 
to ensuring the extractive operations of natural resources are genuinely beneficial to the citizens 
in the countries where these investors operate. 
In practice, these home-country mechanisms are usually ignored by host states and 
constrain the communities and citizens who are adversely affected to getting access to these 
mechanisms. Bringing litigation is an important and unique exception. For instance, the US 
Alien Tort Statute419 was applied to examine human rights violations where foreign investors 
had any connection with the US420 . However, the US Supreme Court, in 2013, decided to 
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eviscerate this perspective by stating that only litigations against businesses whose conduct 
truly affects and concerns the US could be allowed to bring suits under this legislation.  
5.2.3 Summaries 
 Establishing a comprehensive framework for incorporating host affected communities as 
essential actors within those enforceable multi-actor contracts is a challenging task. This task 
should aim to ensure the participation of affected communities at every stage of investment 
contracting, e.g. from the stage of negotiation, contract implementation and, if applicable, 
dispute settlement.  
 Negotiating these multi-actor investment agreements could be an even more complicated 
endeavour. The negotiating powers are imbalanced and unevenly distributed among all the 
actors. The existing legal frameworks are also complex in this regime, including investment 
treaties, State-investor contracts, other transnational agreements and national laws, which make 
the negotiations of multi-actor investment contracts even more challenging in practice. 
In summary, the above discussions on the existing legal frameworks have highlighted two 
key themes useful in this chapter. The first point is that the current international investment 
regime focuses mostly on the narrow relation between host states and investors. Secondly, the 
new regulatory mechanisms show that some achievements have been made at both the 
international and domestic legal regimes, which incorporate local communities’ interests and 
voices through a variety of regulations and contractual arrangements, such as the US Alien Tort 
Statute and the contract transparency mechanism in the mining and extractive industries421. 
However, our overall impression is that these voluntary, non-binding and home-state based 
mechanisms are by themselves still insufficient to ensure remedies to the vulnerable citizens 
who truly suffer the unfortunate outcomes of energy and natural resource extraction.  
The new form of multi-actor investment contract discussed in this chapter may have the 
potential to supplement the current regulatory approaches. Unlike the home-state mechanisms, 
the new type of multi-actor or tripartite contract is consistent with many Principles of the UN 
Principles for Responsible Contracts422. For example, Principle 9 contemplates that modern 
corporations should set up effective grievance mechanisms for those non-contractual actors 
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influenced by an investment project423 . Also, contract law has the ‘third-party beneficiary 
principle’ which supports the argument that both contracting governments and foreign investors 
should care about the situations of those powerless people and communities in extraction 
scenarios. Unlike the worldwide non-binding industrial standards and voluntary mechanisms, 
multi-actor contracts can enforce legal obligations of contracting parties at the end. 
In analysing a multi-actor contract framework, this chapter avoids suggesting that this 
new type of contact does not have any limitations. Though this newer form of investment 
agreements can provide a new way to allocate responsibilities of different actors and shift a 
new turn towards ‘contractual governance’ for natural resource regime, the design and 
application of this new form of tripartite agreement is still at an initial stage within the industry. 
The provisions of multi-actor contracts could be better drafted in the future, which can 
demonstrate the multiplicity of different actors’ interests. This type of provision is particularly 
necessary in the cases that weak states are lacking effective legal systems and control over their 
natural resources and territories. 
The next section will further assess the reasons to justify multi-actor contracts, their 
potential contributions to multi-level governance, as well as the possible difficulties to 
implement them. 
5.3 Multi-actor investment contract framework 
This section discusses the approaches of re-designing a new multi-actor contract 
framework for regulating foreign investment in the energy and natural resource sectors. At first, 
it would be proper to review the reasons to justify the need for producing this kind of new 
contract form. Then, the critical opinions on the limitations of this new multi-actor contracting 
approach will be addressed. Finally, the discussion will focus on the potential contributions of 
this new tripartite contracting approach for multi-level natural resource governance. 
5.3.1 Why do we need multi-actor contracts? 
Existing international investment law studies have a focus on international investment 
treaties, State-investor investment contracts, and investment disputes424. However, the recent 
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developments of new governance mechanisms (e.g. voluntary and home-based) have been the 
game-changers for reinventing the regulation and adjusting to actors’ relationships in this field 
of law. Now it would be a proper time to re-examine international investment law’s current 
focus on the two specific actors: investors and states.  
Questioning the current focus on the State-investor dimension is particularly necessary 
with multi-jurisdictional projects in natural resource and extractive industries425. The feature 
of these multi-jurisdictional infrastructure projects usually involve many directly-affected 
actors and even engage more than one state and region. These multi-jurisdictional projects have 
stronger impacts on the livelihoods of local people, and it is also questionable whether the host 
states can sufficiently represent the interests of these people.   
States have duties to protect their citizens and people’s wellbeing, but, unfortunately, 
recent history shows that states may lack capacities and interests (sometimes even conflict of 
interests) to enforce useful mechanisms for promoting their citizens’ socio-economic status and 
supporting legal empowerment. Due to the limitations and ineffectiveness of other bilateral 
approaches, the calling for a more direct and robust engagement among all the relevant 
stakeholders, especially local citizens, can be the origin of a new multi-actor contractual 
model426.  
Following this observation, the following paragraphs discuss several driving factors 
which may justify the emergence and needs of this new type of multi-actor investment contracts 
for governing extractive activities.  
Firstly, among all the factors is indeed the demand of local communities around the world 
for direct and active participation in significant economic transactions that impact them. 
Following movements for public participation, governments adopted public consultation 
procedures and environmental and social impact assessments. Meanwhile, corporations also 
began to conclude development agreements with local communities. The unrest in several 
resource-rich countries in the Global South is also an important impetus for reinventing the 
legal mechanisms for local community engagement and empowerment. For example, the oil 
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giant Chevron has signed several community development agreements and beneficial 
arrangements with the local people in the Niger Delta, which intend to bring stability and peace 
to the areas where the company operates. While environmental degradation in the Nigeria Delta 
area is very well-known, Chevron’s community agreements mainly focus on the clauses of 
benefits427. Some commentators therefore have pointed out that providing economic benefits 
while simultaneously polluting the environment is a problem of some of these business-
community benefit-sharing agreements. It is quite common that many community development 
agreements mainly and only focus on the clauses of benefits sharing. Some research has pointed 
out this could be the main weakness of the current community agreements between businesses 
and local communities428.   
The proposed multi-actor contractual framework is a direct response to local communities’ 
demand for stronger participation in economic and investment decision-making. This new type 
of tripartite contracts provides a chance to formalise all the public participation and affirm all 
the interests of various stakeholders that are represented appropriately. Although some types of 
community engagement are now occurring, multi-actor investment contracts can be viewed as 
a new attempt to formalise and legalise this participation and confirm that all the perspectives 
of various stakeholders are appropriately included.  
 Secondly, the impact of colonialism in areas around the world necessitates the need for 
specific attention to natural resource extraction and other significant projects. The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights states that Article 21 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘African Charter’)429 , which acknowledges peoples’ rights to 
‘freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources’, originated during the time of colonialism, 
when the human and material resources of Africa were exploited for the benefit of external 
actors. This case was tragic for indigenous Africans, depriving them of their birth right and 
alienating them from their lands.  
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The repercussions of colonial exploitation have left Africa’s cherished resources and 
people still exposed to foreign exploitation430. The writers of the Charter desired to remind 
African governments of the unsavoury legacy that blighted the continent and restore shared 
economic development to its rightful place at the centre of African society. The plunder of 
natural resources under colonialism has led to suspicion surrounding the further potential 
exploitation of natural resources, the surrender of large expanses of land as a result of biased 
and strongly opposed concession contracts, and the acute corruption of government officials 
that contributed to a distrust of both government actors and industry.  
Thirdly, following the decolonisation movement in the latter stages of the 20th century, 
the debate regarding the status of peoples and the rights attached to each status has risen in 
significance431. The African Charter was adopted in 1981, making provision for the specific 
rights of peoples. In the decision of SERAC v Nigeria432, the African Commission has pointed 
out that the Nigerian Government’s activities have in violated of the economic rights of the 
Ogoni people, whose territory produces significant amounts of fossil fuels in Nigeria433. 
Also pertinent is the indigenous status of peoples living on lands holding significant 
natural resource wealth. A major force for reviewing the agreements that influence foreign 
investment is the autonomous status of some of these peoples. Canada’s IBAs are based in part 
on the unique nature of the Canadian Government’s relationship with the indigenous peoples; 
indeed, the status of these peoples is a direct stimulus for the IBAs434. In areas of the world 
where indigenous status is being challenged, there has been demand for indigenous peoples to 
be formally recognised. For both indigenous and nonindigenous peoples, judicial recognition, 
the right to land, fishing rights and other rights, underpin their call for inclusive rights and 
recognition beyond the provision of benefits.  
A fourth consideration is the fact that some corporate social responsibility (‘CSR’) 
initiatives, particularly in the Third World, appear to be limited in their impact. Such CSR 
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initiatives are often driven by the benefits they provide. While the benefits model is potentially 
advantageous, as Idemudia and Ite observed in the Nigerian oil industry, it is also beset by 
significant challenges435. The failure of oil companies to demonstrate that they are striving to 
observe the moral minimum has served only to strengthen community perceptions of foreign 
investors as opponents that must be resisted and overcome. It is considered that no amount of 
road or bridge building, provision of energy supplies or the award of scholarships can offset 
the constant, 24-hour daylight that results from the gas flaring carried out by foreign oil 
companies. Such positive actions would not have an equal impact on the communities as the 
perceived adverse injunction actions undertaken by the oil companies. The critical issue here 
is that there is no substitute for failure to observe the moral minimum. Positive actions would 
doubtlessly create more added values if negative injunction actions were observed.  
A fifth significant driver for reassessing the focus on investment treaties and State–
investor contracts – with the accompanying focus on states and investors – results from the 
significance assigned to FDI and its essential contribution to economic development. Some 
scholars working in international investment law assert that the consequences of FDI may be 
more nuanced than many parties are willing to accept436. It was noted at the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development that “while oil has played an important role in Nigeria, 
data show that over 70 per cent of the citizens live on only one US dollar a day (this represents 
a quarter of all Africans living in this condition)”437. It is impossible to overemphasise the 
significance of a viewpoint that directly includes the poor – incorporating the peoples of host 
communities – to outside investment. The extractive industries in many Third World countries 
support a strategy of caution, considering conditions similar to those under a ‘resource curse’ 
scenario already exist. Regardless of the position taken on the importance of FDI to socio-
economic empowerment, it is imperative to explore the utilisation of a framework that directly 
recognises local communities as relevant actors in the framework.  
The final justification for reviewing the existing State–investor contract and investment 
treaty models is to utilise the democratic values that underpin local and international societies 
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and integrate these into the framework438. Implementing a democratic approach that does not 
offer an undue advantage to states and investors, but instead recognises their shared integral 
roles in the investment system, is not impossible but presents challenges. This democratic 
approach highlights the public law nature of investment frameworks, and the conflict with the 
prevailing tendency to traditionally classify this area as private. The Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative embraces democratic values and emphasises a multi-stakeholder 
approach that includes governments, industry and civil society, to ensure transparency439. It is 
important to present a framework for multi-stakeholder contracts in response to international 
acceptance of multi-stakeholder processes. An enforceable framework is needed that 
accommodates all relevant actors and is accessible to all.  
It is clear that local communities are occasionally consulted regarding project 
development, but they have no clearly defined means of recourse under current international 
investment law. The multi-actor framework goes beyond merely promoting consultation with 
all relevant actors to promoting sustained interaction and, eventually, contractual rights. While 
acknowledging the challenges when considering peoples’ rights, the framework’s main purpose 
is to strengthen peaceful socio-economic coexistence between actors in projects from the Niger 
Delta, to Canada’s Northwest Territories, to the Amazon. 
5.3.2 Potential difficulties of adopting a multi-actor contract framework 
A multi-actor contract framework has clear potential for success, but like other global 
models, it has its difficulties. It is important to highlight some of these challenges and how they 
can be addressed. 
First of all, multi-actor contracts would involve a need for negotiation between actors 
having a broad spectrum of interests and differing levels of resources, leading to the potential 
for biased power relationships440 . There is a precedent for this in existing State–investor 
contracts, in GMoUs and IBAs, and also in some investment treaties. An inevitable reality of 
many contracts negotiations is inequality in negotiating power441. 
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In order to address this challenge, developing expertise in negotiation skills would be 
crucial for all parties involved442. Government resources may be needed to develop the capacity 
of host communities to negotiate effectively. It would also be necessary to address information 
asymmetry by having mechanisms in place that ensure equality in the sharing of relevant 
information to all parties. Also, it would be necessary to develop consistent mechanisms for 
the settlement of local and regional disputes. Supervision at a regional level may help to 
mitigate the challenges presented by diversity in experience, availability of information and 
unreasonable use of power.  
Next, the relationship between these contracts and existing laws presents an additional 
challenge. Multi-actor contracts should not reduce the rights and obligations held by all parties 
under the law443 . Only if parties explicitly agree to relinquish some of their pre-existing 
entitlements should this occur. Nor should there be an argument that statutes should in any way 
cater to peoples’ needs if doing so obviates the need for contractual arrangements to stand. All 
actors should be free to make contractual arrangements offering direct recourse to the 
settlement of disputes under the protection of the law. Legal arrangements including statutes, 
investment treaties already exist; yet investors and other actors feel the need to insert additional 
protections when negotiating contracts. If beneficial, the same standard should apply to local 
communities as relevant and equal partners in the investment framework. The extent to which 
agreements provided in existing law may negatively affect and add to guarantees would be a 
topic of vigorous negotiation. However, multi-actor contracts should include enforceable 
contractual guarantees to all actors that ensure existing laws respecting the wellbeing of the 
actors and other affected parties, such as environmental protection, would be honoured.  
Third, corruption and ineffectiveness in some states still stand as both a driver towards 
multi-actor contracts and as a potential challenge444 . In a corrupt state, a framework that 
supports communities to negotiate their relationship, and provides enforceable rights in 
negotiations with extractive industry actors and governments, can mitigate the impact of more 
dubious government officials who do not appropriately represent the interests of peoples. Even 
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where corruption is not considered a concern, government preferences may be for natural 
resource extraction and infrastructure development rather than reflecting the interests of the 
communities affected by these projects. As a result, this potential corruption and possible 
government bias support arguments in favour of multi-actor contracts. However, corrupt, 
ineffective or compromised governments may also make negotiating and implementing 
appropriate agreements particularly difficult. Locating these contracts within the jurisdiction 
and competence of regional economic organisations may present a mitigating factor in 
addressing this issue.  
Fourth, it is possible that multi-actor investment contracts could effectively co-opt local 
communities, enforcing a system in which they are compromised445. Being parties to a multi-
actor investment contract could automatically make local communities part of a more extensive 
system that they would otherwise choose to resist. It could also be argued that by being parties 
to these contracts and being effectively co-opted, local communities would no longer have 
grounds for resistance. They could no longer resist unfavourable policies or assert their agency 
and, for example, secure more reasonable living conditions. Being parties to multi-actor 
investment contracts might achieve this goal. It is crucial to understand that a healthy 
ambivalence and scepticism would be useful here, as the other actors would then recognise the 
potential for resistance presented by the local communities. Under these conditions, local 
communities would not have to conclude contracts where they do not consent, for they would 
no longer be obliged to conclude contracts in which the terms are considered unacceptable.  
At last, it is important to consider the fact that some outcomes of multi-actor contracts 
might not be socially beneficial or represent the broader public interest 446 . Many of the 
impacted communities have a strong understanding of their position and potential and have 
been negotiated extensively — both with governments and investors — on a range of issues. 
When considering the broader public interest, the government is viewed as a significant 
stakeholder in multi-actor contracts with a responsibility to ensure that the broader public 
interest is served447.  
                                                          
445 Bellmann, C. (2016); Shemberg, A., & Saldarriaga, A. (2016). See also Roberts, K. (2015) Corporate 
liability and complicity in International Crimes. In S. S. Jodoin, M-C. (Ed.), Sustainable Development, 
International Criminal Justice, and Treaty Implementation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
446 De Brabandere, E., & Gazzini, T. (2014). See also Vadi, V. (2012) Public health in international investment 
law and arbitration: Routledge. 
447 About the discussion on the changing role of government, please see: Odumosu-Ayanu, I. T. (2014a). 
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For this framework to be successful, states would need to act both individually and as 
regional organisations. The strength of a state’s political will would be decisive in determining 
its willingness to adopt a framework with the potential to ensure positive outcomes for all actors. 
Despite the obvious challenges of multi-actor frameworks, they potentially hold considerable 
promise and could integrate the primary stakeholders within one framework, address 
democratic limitations in investment law and allow negotiation of interests, benefits and 
obligations for all actors. Multi-actor contracts would foster friendly relationships as well as 
defining the responsibilities for each of the actors. Such stronger relationships would encourage 
sustainable exploitation of resources and urge responsible development of projects through 
careful management. Some further research is undoubtedly necessary to fully establish the 
potential impact of this framework. 
5.3.3 Contributions of the multi-actor framework for energy investment governance   
When it comes to the positive side of this approach’s contributions for enhancing 
regulation and multi-level governance in the realm of global energy investment, some 
observations on this could be outlined below.  
Multi-actor contracts are principally used in projects involving extractive industries or 
similar projects that are closely linked to host and impacted communities448. Such industries 
can potentially involve a number of different goals that have a variety of impacts on different 
actors. In attempting to achieve the goals of extractive industry projects, foreign investors often 
fail to suitably compensate host communities, who are often displaced or not relocated to 
acceptable locations as promised. A multi-actor contract, negotiated correctly, would suitably 
address these diverse interests and guarantee that such communities have means to solve 
disputes under a framework that fully acknowledges their rights.  
It is only natural for actors to protect issues that are of importance to them. In guarding 
their interests, they become quasi-regulators of the actions of other actors449. For example, 
governments are usually thought of as regulators of FDI, yet they are also often regulated in 
that foreign investors hold them accountable and insist that they comply with a stipulated legal 
                                                          
448 Affolder, N. (2010) Rethinking Environmental Contracting. Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, 21, 
155. See also Biermann, F., Man-san Chan, A. M., & Pattberg, P. (2007). 
449 Cutler, A. C., & Dietz, T. (2017). The politics of private transnational governance by contract: Introduction 
and analytical framework. In The Politics of Private Transnational Governance by Contract (pp. 23-58), 
Routledge. 
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agenda. In order to achieve a robust regulatory framework, particularly in cases where 
governments fail to enforce the regulation, having all actors directly involved in decision-
making as part of multi-actor contracts would undoubtedly result in better regulation and 
enforcement450.  
The multi-actor contracts could themselves serve directly as regulatory mechanisms, 
though this would strictly depend on the context and nature of each contract. To establish 
effective legal foundations, any clauses in multi-actor contracts would have to be inside broader 
statutory frameworks451. In such circumstances, caution must be exercised by all relevant actors. 
Given that some such regulatory contracts between governments and industry already work 
effectively, there are grounds for further research on how multi-actor contracts can also serve 
as regulatory mechanisms. Some such government-investor regulatory contracts have been 
affected due to their voluntary nature and the lack of substantial legislative background. The 
advocacy of new regulatory approaches and on occasion, new regulatory methods, is often 
triggered by recent events and developments452. Further investigation is indeed necessary in 
order to ensure that multi-actor contracts serve effectively as regulatory mechanisms for 
balancing different policy goals. 
5.4 Turn to ‘governance by contract’?  
Competing goals are a common feature of investment in the extractive industries453. For 
example, for local communities, the goal of securing economic benefit as a result of foreign 
investment must be aligned with the goal of keeping negative environmental impacts of foreign 
investment projects to a minimum. Often, the emphasis on the potential economic benefits of 
such projects is to the detriment of other important factors including the potential impact of 
environmental damage on local communities454.  
                                                          
450 Ibid. 
451 Salacuse, J. (2013). See also Schill, S. W. (2014) Foreign Investment in the Energy Sector: Lessons for 
International Investment Law. In E. De Brabandere & T. Gazzini (Eds.), Foreign Investment in the Energy 
Sector: Brill Nijhoff. 
452 Smith, A., Seyfang, G., Hielscher, S., & Hargreaves, T. (2013) Constructing grassroots innovations for 
sustainability. Global Environmental Change; Muller et al (2016) Innovative Justice: Developing new ways 
to bring fairness between people. HiLL Publishing. See also Orts, E. W., & Deketelaere, K. (2001). 
453 Bebbington A., Bebbington D.H., Bury J., Lingan, J., Munoz, J.P., and Scurrah, M. (2008) Mining and Social 
Movements: Struggles Over Livelihood and Rural Territorial Development in the Andes. World 
Development, 36(12), 2888–2905. See also Greenovation: Hub (2014). 
454 Gunningham, N. (2009a). The new collaborative environmental governance: The localization of regulation. 
Journal of Law and Society, 36(1), 145-166. See also Odumosu-Ayanu, I. T. (2014a). 
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The more direct inclusion of local communities presents opportunities to understand their 
views and interests better when developing regulation and also to inform more effective direct 
recourse to settle disputes. It is clear that contracts have the potential to go far beyond their 
current purpose of regulating the technical and financial aspects of projects to be equally 
effective in imposing accountability mechanisms.  
Although multi-actor contracts would apply primarily to advocates of foreign projects 
rather than their local counterparts, it is nonetheless necessary to recognise this approach in the 
broader context of foreign investment regulating frameworks for two key reasons. First, 
investors in extractive industries are often foreign, especially in Third World economies. 
Second, the critical role of multi-actor contracts in regulating foreign investment must be 
carefully considered, mainly as conflict already exists between these regulations and 
international investment law. 
5.4.1 Some reflections on this new type of multi-actor contract 
The proposed multi-actor mechanism champions the use of multi-actor agreements. These 
contracts are formed between the three principal actors in the agreement: the foreign investors 
who are accountable for project development, the host Government(s) and the local 
communities that host the project or are directly impacted by it.  
Only the actors that are directly affected by such projects are involved in the multi-actor 
contract framework. This tripartite framework aims to integrate the interests and views of these 
actors directly. However, such a framework must also recognise its responsibility to regulate 
effectively in the broader public interest, leading to the involvement of government on the 
public's behalf.  
The legal and regulatory capacity of host governments is significant, and they have the 
authority to dictate the legal and economic structures of such projects and of the entire 
jurisdiction they control455. They are also obligated to establish that the broader interests of the 
public are served in any contractual and regulatory mechanisms they approve.  
Despite the potential for the entire country to benefit from such projects, it is the host and 
impacted communities who must directly bear the consequences, whether positive or negative. 
                                                          
455 Gathii, J., & Odumosu-Ayanu, I. T. (2015a). See also Lange, B. (2003) Regulatory Spaces and Interactions: 
An Introduction. Social & Legal Studies, 12(4), 411-423. 
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It is important to consider the property and other legal rights of impacted communities when 
engaging with investors and governments to develop extractive industry projects. Such 
extractive industry operations directly influence the economic benefits on such communities 
as well as their moral entitlements456. 
The proposed multi-actor framework is supported by the approaches to regulation found 
in other existing contracts; however, it goes beyond these existing perspectives. Rather than 
serving primarily as regulatory tools, multi-actor contracts could easily have quasi-regulatory 
functions and provide essential support for regulatory initiatives. However, this well-
intentioned support could equally have the impact of determining the regulatory decisions that 
governments take. Such contracts would actively include impacted communities with rights to 
make sure both the government and investors fulfil obligations set out regarding the contracts. 
The contracts would, therefore, be able to serve a quasi-regulatory role in any such extraction 
projects. 
Direct local community involvement has the potential to ensure robust decision-making 
and strengthen regulatory initiatives in order to overcome the inherent limitations in state 
regulation 457 . Multi-actor contracts are more likely to place states inside the investment 
protection mandate placed upon them by international investment law. As foreign investors 
would fully participate in negotiations and work out terms from their perspective, it is 
considered improbable that quasi-regulatory enterprises included in multi-actor agreements 
could be judged as discriminatory in international investment law.  
Balancing the conflicting goals of protecting investments with regulation in the interest 
of the public is often challenging and requires carefully crafted solutions, which are sometimes 
addressed by negotiated contracts. To properly address the issue of competing goals in such 
investment projects, it is essential that host and impacted local communities are fully involved 
in the decision-making process.  
Such involvement would significantly impact the framework. Regulators would be forced 
to consider conflicting goals that they might otherwise not adequately have addressed. The 
                                                          
456 Sovacool, B. K. (2013) Energy & Ethics: Palgrave Macmillan. See also Zerk, J. (2006) Multinationals and 
Corporate Social Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
457 Gunningham, N. (2009b). Environment law, regulation and governance: Shifting architectures. Journal of 
Environmental Law, 21(2), 179-212. See also Young, J., Septoff, A., (2002) Digging for Change: Towards a 
Responsible Minerals Future, an NGO and Community Perspective. Mineral Policy Centre. 
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proposed multi-actor contract approach is supported by existing literature on the participation 
of local communities in investment decision-making, and by current regulatory practices 
already used in other investment projects that incorporate citizens in regulatory decision-
making. 
Although these newer contracts are established more on environmental issues, they are 
still helping to establish accountability and responsibility mechanisms that did not previously 
exist. This groundwork is vital for the continued consolidation of the progress made so far so 
that these new mechanisms can be utilised effectively to establish greater human rights 
accountability. These contractual forms demonstrate a malleability to serve different means – 
the technical and financial interests at the centre of the state and investor relations, and also the 
broader impacts of extractive industry activities on environmental, social and human rights.  
Contracts can be written to provide remedies appropriate to situations involving all parties 
in extractive industry activities. Such contracts are viable alternatives for addressing issues 
most important to the specific parties that other frameworks cannot readily satisfy. However, 
these emerging contracts are not limitation-free. The idea that consent is the factor to be 
considered in contract law is contested, as this narrow perspective undervalues other purposes 
of contract law.  
Now, contracting for natural resource extraction must be understood in conjunction with 
concerns for human rights and environmental responsibility rather than guided solely by 
outmoded notions of consent458. The broad range of extractive industry contracts, particularly 
those affecting indigenous communities, sometimes involves new combinations of legal 
traditions to best reflect how extractive industry activities relate to the circumstances of the 
communities they impact.  
Initial steps have been taken towards establishing a framework that can be utilised to 
negotiate in the extractive industry context effectively. Such contracts may be limited to 
addressing the issues that impact third parties and, when they do, there may be challenges in 
the language adopted in drafting the relevant provisions regarding interpretation and 
enforceability. Relying on contracts that are traditionally considered to be the primary mode of 
                                                          
458  United Nations OHCHR (2016). See also International Bar Association Model Mining Development 
Agreement Project. Retrieved from: http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=41f1038e-dcbf-
44fd-ad17-898b7aa04a1a. 
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private ordering when extracting natural resources is limited because such a view ignores the 
broader social, environmental and human rights circumstances surrounding these activities. As 
a result, it is necessary to focus on newer contract forms that encapsulate a broader acceptance 
of all the actors involved in the process of extracting natural resources.  
It is clear that more holistic contracts that account for this broader context are favoured, 
and it is acknowledged that this sometimes comes at a cost even though these newer contractual 
forms account for a much broader context. 
In many CDAs or cross-sector partnerships, local communities seek benefits and trade 
some rights to achieve these benefits in the negotiations. In Canada, indigenous peoples 
regularly exchange legal rights when mitigating the negative impact of natural resource 
extraction or seeking economic benefits459 . The Pinehouse IBA – an accord between two 
mining companies (Cameco and Areva) and the local communities their project impacts– 
requires the support of the local community for both existing operations and future projects460. 
Any community opposition to the authorisation of proposed projects amounts to a violation of 
the agreement. The Pinehouse Agreement was ‘entered into in full and final satisfaction of any 
claim’ by the indigenous communities against the extraction companies ‘for any infringement 
of Aboriginal rights by the Operations’ 461 . Agreements that are more socially-inclined, 
particularly CDAs, exist to manage risk for investors and are not instances of free, prior and 
informed consent.  
Many CDAs are not entered into ‘prior’ to the approval of extractive industry projects; in 
fact; they are often formed months or even years after the extraction projects have commenced. 
Clear examples of this practice are the GMoUs in Nigeria462. As a result, investors regularly 
use these CDAs to protect their investments by significantly reducing ‘risk and potential 
                                                          
459 Affolder, N. (2010). See also O' Faircheallaigh, C. (2006) Environmental Agreement in Canada: Aboriginal 
Participation, EIA Follow-up and Environmental Management of Major Projects. Calgary: Canadian Institute 
of Resources Law. 
460 See the collaboration agreement between communities and Cameco and Areva, available at 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/01/Collaboration-Agreement.pdf. For comments, please see Odumosu-
Ayanu, I. T. (2015). Indigenous Peoples, International Law, and Extractive Industry Contracts. AJIL 
Unbound, 109, 220-225. 
461 Ibid. 
462 Ite, U. E. (2007a). Changing times and strategies: Shell's contribution to sustainable community development 
in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Sustainable development, 15(1), 1-14. See also Ite, U. E. (2007b). Partnering with 
the state for sustainable development: Shell's experience in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Sustainable 
Development, 15(4), 216-228. 
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downstream project delays’ through establishing cordial relationships with communities even 
after some initial challenges. Despite these challenges, contracts of this type remain a potential 
platform for establishing free, prior and informed consent.  
Questions remain regarding the form that such contracts should take. Some of these 
questions may be addressed through clear (legislative) mandates regarding the establishment 
of free, prior and informed consent. Regardless of the form of these newer contracts, most are 
not subject to public and legal scrutiny. Overall, there are still the opportunities for biased 
agreements to be formed that may not directly benefit the broader public, meaning that 
transparency is crucial.   
While modern contractual forms present apparent limitations when establishing 
accountability and responsibility frameworks for all actors, their potential is nevertheless 
evident. These contractual forms have potential, beyond their embryonic stages, to address 
adverse human rights, safety, health or environmental impacts, or to act as frameworks for 
guaranteeing investment in local education, health and other community areas.  
The next step is to develop and use contractual forms that provide enforceable support for 
those communities unfairly impacted by natural resource extraction. While there is 
considerable potential for broadening the impact of the actors participating in investment 
arrangements, there are also barriers. In fact, utilising democratic capacities available through 
arrangements that recognise the actors’ roles in the current investment system may be difficult, 
but not impossible. 
As a consequence, addressing responsibility in extraction industries through a contract 
approach highlights the risk of neo-liberalisation of resource governance or what might be 
referred to as ‘market-based solutions to social problems’463, especially for local communities. 
Self-determination remains one of the main drivers in relationships with governments as well 
as investors for many indigenous communities. It is, therefore, necessary to explore the 
relationship between neo-liberalisation and self-determination in establishing contractual 
                                                          
463 Castree N. (2010a) Neoliberalism and the Biophysical Environment 1: What ‘Neoliberalism’ is and What 
Difference Nature Makes to it. Geography Compass, 4(12), 1725–1733. Castree N. (2010b) Neoliberalsim 
and the Biophysical Environment 2: Theorising the Neoliberalisation of Nature. Geography Compass, 4(12), 
1734–1746. See also Schwartz, D. L. (2014) The Energy Regulation and Markets Review (Third Ed.) London: 
Law Business Research. 
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responsibility in the extractive industry. Ironically, negotiated contracts may well be a greater 
reflection of self-determination than is evident in the first instance.  
To summarize, there is a preference for contracts that recognise a greater awareness of 
responsibility in the extractive industry, despite the limitations that accompany them. Contracts 
have been part of the oil, gas and mining industries for a considerable time and, despite the 
increase in the number of investment treaties for protecting foreign investors and an approach 
to addressing corporate responsibility that is less than robust, they have remained vital. That 
recognition of responsibility is now being extended to actors other than states and investors. 
5.4.2 The prospect of multi-actor investment contracts 
It has been often asserted that to promote economic growth and social welfare, state 
regulation "needs to be both effective and efficient."464 If regulation must be both efficient and 
effective, the question is then whether multi-actor contracts can support these aims or not.  
Regulating FDI in the extractive industries cannot be cheap; effective regulations may 
require a high financial cost for governmental regulators465. These regulating costs are quite 
significant for those less economically-developed countries. The discussions in this chapter 
have addressed many issues in relation to the effectiveness and possible challenges of multi-
actor contracts in the energy investment context. At this stage, this section briefly outlines some 
further issues regarding the prospect of applying multi-actor contracts for regulating 
investments and engaging communities.  
Firstly, the role of governments in this new type of multi-level contracts may need further 
careful examination466. For instance, the interests of the wider citizens may be different from 
the interests of stakeholders included in these multi-actor contracts. Consequently, 
governmental regulators should retain its obligations to consider the more extensive public 
interests properly. The multi-actor investment contracts may offer a new layer of protection for 
local communities affected directly in a way that the broader public citizens are not. As other 
academic works on the effectiveness of community development agreements, multi-actor 
contracts should also consider setting up a contract registration mechanism (usually under a 
                                                          
464 Tietenberg, T. H., & Lewis, L. (2016). Environmental and natural resource economics. Routledge. See also 
Redgwell, C. (2016). 
465 Tietenberg, T. H., & Lewis, L. (2016). See also Kahn, A. E., Kahn, A. J., & Khan, A. E. (1988). The economics 
of regulation: principles and institutions (Vol. 1). MIT Press. 
466 Gathii, J., & Odumosu-Ayanu, I. T. (2015a). See also Odumosu-Ayanu, I. T. (2014a). 
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governmental agency) to ensure that the wider public also enjoys a sufficient level of protection. 
The governments should undertake this work.  
Secondly, some people may argue that the local communities and individual citizens do 
not have enough enterprise to participate in the negotiating procedures of multi-actor 
investment contracts 467 . There is an apparent imbalance of negotiation power between 
communities and large international energy companies. Also, there is an urgent need for 
governmental authorities’ further interventions and policy adjustments. For example, 
governments may consider providing financial funding, legal empowerment, and negotiation 
capacity building for the local communities and citizens. Governments can design some 
independent and external mechanisms to monitor and control the provisions negotiated in these 
multi-actor investment contracts. It is also possible for governments to officially link these 
contractual provisions with the external national and international legal frameworks. Of course, 
the issue of contract transparency should be addressed appropriately, because transparency in 
contract negotiations could ensure that the whole process is free and fair. 
Thirdly, from a regulation economics perspective, people may not ignore the considerable 
financial and procedural cost for public participation468. Requiring local communities and 
citizens affected by the investment projects to participate in these multi-actor contracts can be 
viewed, to some extent, as additional burdens on the citizens. The guidelines to the solution of 
this issue already can be found in existing community development agreements and 
environmental contracts. The internal relations of every local community is different, and the 
decision-making procedures also vary in different jurisdictions. As a result, the usefulness and 
prospect of these new multi-actor investment contracts are eventually context-specific.  
This chapter has considered the potential of multi-actor investment contracts to manage 
the conflicting goals often present in foreign investment regulation. There is undoubtedly a 
need for further monitoring of developments within this subject in order to form more definite 
conclusions. For example, the Canadian Government has developed the initial industry-
                                                          
467 Cotula, L. (2015). See also Cotula, L. (2016).  
468 Tietenberg, T. H., & Lewis, L. (2016). See also Kahn, A. E., Kahn, A. J., & Khan, A. E. (1988). 
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government regulatory contract in energy efficiency, and this contract was tested in practice469. 
In the future, the multi-actor approach undoubtedly requires more practical experiments.  
Despite the limitations and imbalances in the current international investment law 
architecture, there remains a need to share "instructive stories" that will enable the further 
improvement of regulation470. The multi-actor contract framework has the potential to create 
such "instructive stories" that can develop meaningful regulation and also develop more 
friendly relationships within the foreign investment framework.  
                                                          
469 Government of Canada announces energy efficiency contract at Base Petawawa, available at: 
https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2018/06/government-of-canada-announces-
energy-efficiency-contract-at-base-petawawa.html. 
470 Sornarajah, M. (2015). See also Wentzel, W. (2013). 
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Chapter 6 – Extracting governance dynamics and innovative patterns  
“Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed, citizens can change the world. Indeed, it 
is the only thing that ever has.” – Margaret Mead  
Based on the empirical evidence presented in the preceding paragraphs, this chapter aims 
to develop original conceptual charts to capture the interactions among the existing three major 
legal frameworks for regulating international energy investment. Also, the newly-developed 
charts hope to highlight the usefulness of the contractual approach for promoting legal and 
policy innovations and enhancing multi-level environmental governance.   
Through these original conceptual charts, this research puts the project-specific 
contractual mechanisms into the centre of international natural resource governance. It has 
revisited the ‘S-I’ (e.g. traditional investment contracts), ‘S-P’ (e.g. business-NGO 
partnerships), and ‘S-I-P’ (e.g. multi-actor investment contracts) by their real functions and 
reclassify them into three new categories, namely ‘soft contracts’, ‘enforcement contracts’ and 
‘innovative contracts’.  By applying this new contract classification, this research aims to add 
a dynamic perspective to the original ‘State-Investor-Population’ (S-I-P) triangle and 
highlights the potential of an ‘innovative contract’ for contributing to future formal and 
informal law-making (both international and domestic) and social innovations.  
For the discussion purpose, Section 6.1 below aims to chart the dynamic interactions 
between contractual, national and international legal frameworks, and investment dispute. This 
section uses the recent development of UN’s Principles for Responsible Contracts as a proper 
illustration. The functions of these contractual approaches for preventing investment disputes 
and stimulating future legal changes will also be discussed. 
Then section 6.2 of this chapter reclassifies various kinds of contracts previously 
examined into three major new categories: soft contract, enforcement contract and innovative 
contract. This research labels these contracts by focusing on their actual functions and argue 
that ‘innovative contracts’ can provide a beneficial platform for natural resource governance 
and have substantial impacts on further legal, policy and social innovations. 
Section 6.3 further explores the origins of these ‘innovative contracts’. This thesis also 
likes to argue that this kind of innovative contractual arrangements could not be easily found 
in those pure ‘top-down’ regulatory approaches. On the other hand, those innovative 
contractual mechanisms often emerge from the ‘bottom-up’ public participation and fierce 
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local resistance. When it comes to the reasons and ‘fuel’ behind these legal evolutions, this 
research highlights the significant role of multi-national companies, non-governmental 
organisations and commercial lawyers for launching and negotiating those ‘innovative 
contracts’. In the “bottom-up” governance approach, NGOs and commercial lawyers are 
crucial agents (or it is proper to call them legal and policy entrepreneurs) for promoting positive 
policy, legal and social changes  
In this research, energy companies are seen as both a critical objective subject to relevant 
regulations and a vital actor who can also act actively to bring positive regulatory changes and 
societal evolutions. Therefore, to establish these new and dynamic conceptual charts, the 
discussion below starts by rethinking the changing role of transnational energy companies in 
the modern society. In the view of this thesis, investors have a central role in the S-I-P triangle. 
The limitations of the existing legal frameworks for regulating international energy investment 
actually bring many opportunities for ‘informal regulation’, such as ‘corporate self-regulation’.  
Besides energy MNCs, this research also highlights the involvements of NGOs and 
commercial lawyers. Though the role of government today is changing in this context, this 
research argues that now the key function of government is to design an ecosystem which can 
encourage a ‘bottom-up’ and a more ‘collaborative’ approach for policy and social innovations.  
Finally, this chapter provides with some theoretical insights and the potential of these 
innovative contractual arrangements for future multi-level environmental governance (Section 
6.4).  And a new analytical framework for assessing other case studies in investment and the 
environment is also proposed in section 6.5.          
6.1 Dynamic interactions between contractual, domestic and international legal 
framework 
All the legal instruments discussed above have attracted some commentary in the current 
literature, but a full and systematic understanding of the interactions and mutual supportiveness 
between all these legal instruments still does not exist.   
Figure 6.1 shows a fundamental model of the tripartite interactions between regulations 
(R), contracts (C) and disputes (D). This research firstly frames the relationships in these three 
dimensions: R-C, C-D and R-D.  
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 Figure 6.1 Tripartite interactions between regulations (R), contracts (C) and disputes (D) 
Essentially, this fundamental model guides the researcher to look at the mutual impacts 
within each relationship. For instance, in the R-C interactions, one can think about both the C's 
impacts on R and R's impacts on C. This principle can be applied to both C-D and R-D 
relationships. The complete analysis would be beyond the main purposes of this research and 
require further primary and secondary empirical data. Here, this research presents critical 
questions in this triangle.    
1) R-C Interactions 
What are the impacts of international laws and standards on the contracts? Do these 
contracts adhere to international regulations? Are there any 'token clauses'? To what extent do 
contracting practices make contributions to regulatory reforms? How do negotiators integrate 
soft laws, standards or principles into modern contract negotiations? 
2) C-D Interactions 
Do claims under treaty and claims under contract make a difference to dispute procedures 
and outcomes? To what extent can judicial procedures or arbitration tribunals help to re-
negotiate the contracts? Does any key clause prevent or cause investment disputes? What are 
the possible problems of enforceability and application of stabilisation clauses in State-investor 
contracts? 
3) R-D Interactions 
How do the decision bodies apply these environmental and human rights regulations? 
What human rights and environmental issues do they currently discuss in the investment 
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disputes? To what extent can dispute resolutions become key drivers for future regulatory 
revolution?  
Therefore, Figure 6.1 shows that contracts (C) is at the crucial position within the C-R-D 
triangle. On the one hand, foreign investors apply the contractual devices, such as State-
investor investment contracts, to impact the contents and applications of national legislation to 
protect their investments. The contractual arrangements for many FDI projects in energy and 
natural resources are the outcomes of and are mainly governed by national, rather than directly 
by international, law frameworks. Also, international legal frameworks, i.e. international 
investment treaties and international environmental agreements, interact with the contractual 
and national frameworks in various ways. For example, foreign investors can use investment 
contracts to secure the added protection provided by international law, and sovereign countries 
can attempt to shape State-investor investment contracts to require private investors to follow 
the requirements under international investment treaties and other international agreements.  
An example is the UN Principles for Responsible Contracts. In a typical State-investor 
contract, stabilisation clause is one of the crucial tools for foreign investors to mitigate the 
regulatory risks brought by the states 471 . The State may apply their regulatory power to 
primarily change the conditions and domestic regulations applicable to the FDI project after 
the conclusion of that project’s negotiation. However, over the past few decades, stabilisation 
clauses have been facing criticism from the environmental activists and human rights advocates. 
A major concern of these advocates is that stabilisation clauses may become a serious obstacle 
when the State likes to implement domestic public policies and meet the state’s obligations 
under international environmental or human rights laws472. 
These policy and legal debates eventually attracted the attention from the UN Special 
Representative for Business and Human Rights. As a result, this special representative from 
the UN and the research unit of the International Finance Corporation started joint empirical 
research on the potential impacts of stabilisation clauses473. The main issue is whether these 
stabilisation clauses construct an obstacle for preventing States from fulfilling its obligations 
                                                          
471 United Nations OHCHR (2015) Principles for Responsible Contracts – Guidance for Negotiators. United 
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under public international law. After a detail analysis on 88 investment contracts as well as 
some model contracts from different jurisdictions and industrial sectors, the joint research 
between UN and IFC commented: modern stabilisation clauses are drafted in a way that can 
genuinely have negative influences on a host State’s public policies and its legal obligations 
under international environmental and human rights laws474. 
Following this large-scale empirical study, the UN’s SRSG still kept consulting with a 
range of stakeholders, i.e., governmental officials, MNCs, civil society groups and international 
human rights experts for over three years. According to the empirical findings of this research 
and the following public consultations, the SRSG finalised the UN Principles for Responsible 
Contracts and its updated report for the Human Rights Council. 
             
Figure 6.2 The development and impacts of UN Principles for Responsible Contracts 
Figure 6.2 demonstrates the evolution circle of UN principles for responsible contracts 
and how contracting practices interplay with investment disputes and other international and 
domestic regulations. From a dynamic perspective, contracts can play a crucial role in 
regulatory and policy reforms. The legal and policy reforms usually start from C (stabilisation 
clauses in State-investor investment contracts) and then move to D (commercial and investment 
disputes concerning the conflicts between stabilisation clauses and public policies). Finally, the 
debates appear in the disputes can lead to further research and the final product (R, UN 
Responsible Contracts Principles). 
6.2 Macro-level observation: Reclassifying contracts and exploring their functions 
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After examining the dynamic interplays between contractual design, regulations 
(international and national), and related investment dispute cases, it is proper to take a closer 
look at the central role of these contracts and their arrangements.  
So far the existing literature tends to categorise a variety of contractual arrangements 
mainly by their signed parties, such as State-investor contracts, community development 
agreements, and SIP tripartite contracts. This research is not only interested in the formats of 
these contracts but also the functions that different contracting practices can contribute to 
global environmental and social governance and legal innovations.  
While the original S-I-P triangle provides a useful structure for organising contractual data 
and discussions, this S-I-P analytical structure does not address much of the dynamic 
dimensions in the state-investor-population triangle. The dynamic dimension of the S-I-P 
triangle can provide a unique angle to explore new questions: How do the three different legal 
frameworks interact? How can the regulators design more sophisticated and innovative 
regulatory instruments for environmental governance and human rights protection? Moreover, 
what are the driving forces or key actors behind these legal and policy innovations?      
In this new perspective, this section starts to re-label the various contractual mechanisms 
in the S-I-P triangle based on their functions for stimulating regulatory and social innovation. 
By reviewing the assessments in proceeding chapters and some selected essential case studies, 
this thesis tends to reclassify all the contracts within the S-I-P into three different categories: 
‘soft’, ‘enforcement’ and ‘innovative contracts’. 
6.2.1 ‘Soft contracts’ 
‘Soft contracts’ in this research refer to those contracts which have some provisions or 
sections concerning environmental and human rights, but they do not have enforceability. 
Therefore, although these environmental and social provisions do exist, the contracting parties 
or the third parties, such as affected communities, do not have any legal right to enforce those 
contractual provisions475. This type of contract can appear in any phase of an investment project.  
                                                          
475 Cotula, L. (2015) Democtratising international investment law: recent trend and lessons from experience. 
London: IIED. See also Cotula, L. (2016). Foreign investment, law and sustainable development. International 
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Typically, the life cycle of an investment project can be divided into five phases476: 1) 
Preparation stage; 2) Promoting stage; 3) Initiating stage; 4) Implementation; and 5) Ending or 
decommissioning the project (Figure 6.2). 
 
Figure 6.3 The investment lifecycle. Source: London School of Economics & UNGP (2016) 
Usually, when an international energy investment project is launched, contracts may start 
to play a very crucial role in Phase 3 (Initiating Stage). Stakeholders should consider possible 
environmental and human rights consequences as early as possible. In particular, those 
investment projects operating in countries which do not have strong regulations and other 
effective mechanisms, because well-designed investment contracts or other ‘watchdog’ 
mechanisms may fill the governance gap in the existing international and national legal 
frameworks.  
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From a regulator’s perspective, when the calls for stronger environmental governance 
appear, it is more convenient to create some new provisions and mechanisms to the existing 
contracts rather than drafting new national legislation or even a comprehensive international 
agreement. In theory, well-designed environmental and social provisions inserted in investment 
contracts can respond to the challenges of transboundary projects’ public participation and 
compensation issues477. 
‘Soft contracts’ in this research mean a contract does have some mechanisms on 
environmental protection and human rights either in its preamble or any provision, but the 
language of these mechanisms is usually quite vague, and the content does not have any legal 
enforceability. For example, some preambles of the collected contracts mention principles of 
sustainable development or environmental protection but without any concrete substance. Also, 
some conventional CSR provisions do exist in these ‘soft contracts’.  
These contracts usually can be seen as corporate philanthropy and charity activities in the 
communities. Individuals and communities do not have any legal right to require the investors 
to donate or assist the local development. Though this type of contract may have the ability to 
raise people’s awareness on environmental and human rights issues, the researcher labels them 
as ‘soft contracts’ due to the unenforceable nature of their environmental and social clauses. 
This research also assumes these soft contracts are precisely the unsurprising outcomes of the 
traditional/state-centric international investment legal framework.  
There are several examples of this type of ‘soft contract’ which have been discussed in 
this research. Especially in the oil and gas sectors, many operators of the investment projects 
began to recognise the importance of environmental protection in the mid of 1980s and 
consider introducing these non-commercial clauses, i.e. environmental and community 
development, into their energy investment contracts. However, many of these initially 
developed clauses only use very broad and vague languages. Until the late 1980s, the contents 
of ‘soft contracts’ have been more sophisticated. However, overall these environmental and 
social provisions still demand much improvement. 
Chapter 3 has pointed out many investment contracts in the 1990s still kept silent on 
environmental and social issues regarding those large-scale extractive operations. Nigeria is 
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one of the biggest oil and gas producer in African countries 478 . However, this country’s 
published Model Production Sharing Contract 1995 remained quite weak on environmental 
protection and any other social dimension. In this version of the model contract, the only 
relevant provision is about insurance; it states as below:  
'all insurance policies...shall be based on good international petroleum industry practice...' 
Overall, this type of investment contracts, which this thesis terms ‘soft contracts” (or token 
contracts), is still widely used in modern extractive and natural resource contracts. Examples 
are those ‘corporate social responsibility clauses’ and provisions using vague language on 
environmental principles or community development.  
While these soft contracts may not have legal enforceability, it can still be an important 
milestone of contracting evolution. It was the first time commercial contracts have some non-
economic clauses, talking about other public policies. At least, these contracts, even as 
‘beautiful tokens’, are still helpful to raise sustainable development awareness for commercial 
partners and the public. Finally, this approach at least reminds contracting parties and other 
stakeholders to evaluate the effectiveness and other practical issues in the contractual approach. 
6.2.2 ‘Enforcement contracts’ 
The analysis of ‘enforcement contract’ here focuses on how these contracts can function 
as ‘quasi-regulatory’ mechanisms. The substantial contents of these ‘enforcement contracts’ 
can vary from one contract to the other, including well-designed environmental and social 
provisions embedded in State-investor investment contracts to those current multi-actor 
investment contracts. One key point about ‘enforcement contract’ is that all these contractual 
provisions are legally enforceable and can be taken into account as an essential part of the 
whole regulatory framework on the energy investment project.   
If investors fail to fulfil their contractual obligations, the governments can ask for 
improvements on the company side and eventually revoke the operating licenses. In many cases, 
these ‘watchdogs’ or safeguarding mechanisms are based on the existing legal frameworks 
within the jurisdiction, such as domestic environmental regulations, public health regulations 
                                                          
478 Omeje, K. (2017). High stakes and stakeholders: Oil conflict and security in Nigeria. Routledge. See also 
Ingelson, A., & Nwapi, C. (2014). Environmental impact assessment process for oil, gas and mining projects 
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and so on. Thus, this type of contract can be viewed as a powerful tool for assisting related law 
enforcement. 
1) Modern environmental and social provisions in state investment contracts  
During the 1990s, many improvements on environmental and social provisions in the 
State-investor investment contracts can be found in a number of jurisdictions. For example, the 
Model Concession Agreement 1996 in Romania has designed a quite sophisticated 
environmental and social clause. This provision states as below. 
“1) Compliance with all environmental permitting procedures under 'prevailing 
Romanian Law'; 
2) A 'full environmental assessment'; 
3) Conduct of petroleum operations 'in accordance with generally accepted 
international petroleum industry practice'; 
4) Remedial measures by the government in case the contractor fails to do so; 
5) Insurance Programme property, pollution damage and third-party liability; and 
6) Revocation of contract in the event of repeated violation of environmental 
requirements.” 
In this 1996 Model Concession Agreement, the environmental provision has been 
significantly improved in both the substantive and procedural designs and addressed every 
stage in the lifecycle of an investment project. 
2) Other bilateral and multi-actor environmental and social agreements 
According to the UN Principles on Responsible Contracts, any investment project is 
required to prepare a practical and feasible community development plan and agreement from 
the earliest phase and throughout the whole life cycle of the project479. 
Although it may not be possible to attach a very detailed community development 
agreement which can cover every aspect of an investment plan, the community development 
agreement should be agreed by all the contracting parties. If the community is not a contracting 
party, there should be some necessary participation mechanisms during the negotiations and 
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contract implementation. For example, if an investment plan may adversely influence 
indigenous peoples’ communities, a community development agreement will be necessary, 
which should detail the public participation procedures and the mechanism for gaining a ‘free, 
prior and informed consent’ from the affected community480.  
Recent developments in environmental contracts in the realm of natural resource 
extractive industries is an example of project-based 'watchdog' and ‘enforcement contract’. 
Affolder well noted that these ‘watchdog’ mechanisms in Canada's mining regions481, e.g. the 
Ekati diamond mining area, have been enhancing civil society groups’ participation capacity 
and creating strong practical measures to monitor all the environmental and community 
development commitments made by the foreign mining company482. 
In fact, in many ‘enforcement contracts’ concluded in the US and Canada’s extractive 
industries, the main feature of these contracts have been on enhancing public participation from 
the individual citizens and civil society groups as well as setting up adequate measures to 
oversee and enforce the community development and environmental commitments undertaken 
by the private enterprises.    
Other typical instances of ‘enforcement contracts’ are those contractually-agreed 
‘watchdogs’ mechanisms as well as so-called ‘transnational conservation contracts’. These 
‘enforcement contracts’ are a platform which can bring stakeholders to create safeguarding and 
synergistic means for promoting responsible and sustainable investment. For safeguarding 
functions, Article 4 of the Diavik Environmental Agreement established a specific 
‘Environmental Monitoring Advisory Board’ in the legal organisation form of NGO under 
Canadian law483.  
The ‘access and benefit sharing’ (ABS) agreements is a form of transnational conservation 
contracts, which also has a solid regulatory component, regulating the negative environmental 
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impacts of bioprospecting activities484. ABS is quite popular in the cross-boundary investment 
projects by pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. 
To sum up, in this research, “enforcement contract” means the contracts contain 
provisions on environmental management/social development and they are legally enforceable. 
In some advanced jurisdictions, such as Canada, the US and Australia, it is not uncommon to 
see that investment agreements do create some safeguarding and monitoring mechanisms for 
energy investment projects. ‘Enforcement contracts’ can be seen as a ‘technology’ to regulate 
the foreign investors’ activities globally. In addition, the examples of ‘enforcement contract’ 
may raise the debate of whether the contractual instruments can be viewed as a choice to the 
applicable legal regimes or just as a supplement to the existing regulatory frameworks. 
6.2.3 ‘Innovative contracts’  
Finally, what matters for multi-level governance so far is that some environmental or 
social development contracts do go beyond both national and international legal frameworks 
and truly have innovative elements. These innovative contracts play a significant role in 
governance functions, especially in the areas where legal frameworks are not complete or are 
quite weak.  
From the macro-level observations, this type of innovative contract usually exists in 
company-community agreements, Business-NGO partnerships and multi-actor agreements. 
Sometimes it is also possible to see some innovative contractual designs embedded within 
conventional investment contracts between states and foreign investors. Besides being a 
regulatory tool, one of the essential features of ‘innovative contracts’ is that they can be a 
crucial catalyst for future legal and policy revolution (with these contracts’ external impacts) 
at the international, regional or local levels. 
Similar to the UN’s Principles for Responsible Contracts and its relevant official research, 
in 2016, the Mining Law Committee of the International Bar Association also decided to 
initiate a large MMDA research project, aiming to design a model contract template for mining 
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development agreement485. This project’s advanced model contract can offer a guideline for 
negotiating for State-investor investment contracts in the mining and natural resource industries 
and other relevant community development agreements, particularly applicable in those 
developing regions486. 
This MMDA template can be regarded as an ‘innovative product’ designed by the experts 
in the research unit of the IBA. From the very beginning, this model contract aims to balance 
the economic interests of the international mining sector with other environmental and social 
values. The development process of this MMDA model contract is quite similar to the evolving 
circle for generating the UN’s Principles for Responsible Contracts addressed in section 6.2. 
The evolution of MMDA illustrates the importance of innovative contractual mechanisms for 
stimulating legal and policy innovations, at both a domestic and international scale, as well as 
for synergising economic growth with other sustainable development values.  
By applying the MMDA template, the Koidu Kimberlite and Rutile mining projects 
eventually lead to new mining legislative reforms in Sierra Leone487. Also, the mining projects 
using the MMDA template in Madagascar also help to introduce new national mining 
regulations to that country488. In Uganda, the discovery of abundant oil resources around the 
Lake Albert area attracted many foreign capitals. Extractive companies, such as Heritage Oil, 
even worked with the Uganda government to draft a new Petroleum Bill because of the 
requirements in their investment contracts489.  
At the multilateral level, the World Bank’s project-specific approvals on the investment 
projects also can stimulate domestic legal revolution490. These legal and policy innovation 
examples are reforming national environmental regulations, redrafting mining and natural 
resource laws, and harnessing financial support for energy infrastructure projects.  
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Importantly, innovative contracts of individual investment projects not only can have an 
impact on domestic regulatory reforms but also may alter international treaty instruments. For 
instance, the contracting and negotiating process of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline 
generated a new international treaty491. This new international agreement is among all the host 
states involving in this trans-boundary energy project, which aims to ensure the freedom of 
transit principle for transmitting petroleum across various jurisdictions. However, this new 
international treaty also had an unintended impact on environmental laws, which allows 
corporations to ‘freeze’ the local regulations and formulate an accelerated procedure for the 
expropriation of land targeted by this oil project. 
The instances above clearly demonstrated that the interactions between national 
legislation, international agreements and contractual instruments are not uni-directional. It is 
not always the case in which national and international law attempt to influence contracting 
practices. In contrast, the contractual arrangements, especially those ‘innovative contracts’, 
also have strong potential and abilities to transform and enhance the existing legal systems. 
6.3 Micro-level observation: Legal and policy entrepreneurs behind ‘innovative 
contracts’  
This section turns to another the micro-level dimension of these contractual governance 
instruments. As discussed in the previous paragraphs, the ‘innovative contracts’ are useful for 
future regulatory and policy innovation. Therefore, the key question here would be: What are 
the key actors or driving forces behind the ‘innovative contract’?  
Based on the empirical data and case studies examined in this research, this section below 
would like to focus on the potential of three legal and policy entrepreneurs, namely modern 
MNCs, NGOs and innovative commercial lawyers.    
6.3.1 The changing role of modern MNCs and the emergence of ‘corporate self-
regulation’ 
The primary function of the private business sector is to capitalise on market opportunities 
and create profits for investors and owners 492 . Economic globalisation has brought new 
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challenges and serious risks that modern corporations are increasingly facing 493. Now the 
discussion is directed towards corporations from a variety of stakeholders, including investors, 
consumers, governmental agencies, social media and NGOs. Businesses today are expected to 
have more social and environmental responsibilities other than solely maximising the 
economic interests of their shareholders494. Heap495 clearly states that businesses are a major 
cause of a variety of global challenges – i.e. human rights violations, financial crisis and 
environmental harm – but the private sector is also the strong driving force behind 
technological innovation and globalisation.   
Googins and Rochlin496 also suggest that, in the 21st century, the rise of corporate powers, 
accompanied by the decline of the public sector and government power, has formulated a new 
role for business enterprises. In this new role, businesses can be an interested partner whose 
success is linked with sustainable and healthy societies. Private enterprises have also become 
an attractive partner for communities and NGOs for several reasons497: 1) corporations have a 
range of resources, including financial and non-financial assets; 2) businesses have access to 
knowledge and cutting-edge managerial know-how for their technological innovations; and 3) 
businesses today are inextricably connected to each other and with the societies they have 
operations in. 
    In summary, the leaders of corporations today are becoming more aware of not only the risks 
ahead for their companies’ survival but the possible opportunities and interests that can be 
gained by collaboration rather than confrontation with other social sectors498. 
1) Does a corporation have an international legal personality? 
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A central debate on MNCs in public international law is the issue of whether private 
corporations can also be subjects of international law and regulations499. This discussion is 
significant in international law, as organisations and groups need this legal status to operate in 
the public international law regime, and legal personality is also a condition to file legal claims 
in a range of international tribunals and dispute settlement mechanisms. This situation is 
contrasted with entities which are only objects of the international law. As objects of the law, 
these entities might apply legal norms to protect them, such as the international treaties which 
protect human rights, children and women. However, these entities, as legal objectives in 
international law, may not own the legal rights and be able to enforce these rights in a tribunal 
system. In short, this question may be summarised as whether multi-national corporations are 
capable of possessing legal rights and duties in public international law, and own capacities to 
protect their rights by filing international claims. 
Brownlie (2008) defines an international person who would be a legal subject of public 
international law: “an entity of the type recognised by customary law as capable of having 
rights, duties, and powers to file a legal suit is a legal person.” 500  O'Conell (1970) also argued 
that “legal personality is only shorthand for the proposition that an entity is endowed by 
international law with legal capacity”501. Jennings and Watts (1992) addressed the concept of 
the international person as an entity that owns legal personality in public international law and 
possesses legal rights, liabilities or powers as established by international treaties and owns the 
capacities to act, either directly or indirectly, in the international law arena502.  
Conventionally, international law was regarded as governing only the formal and mutual 
relations between sovereign states. The traditional perspective is that only states are the 
principal subjects of international law503. According to these formal debates, the majority of 
international legal scholars think that transnational private companies do not own legal 
personality in international law. Based on this traditional opinion, transnational companies 
have not been granted duties and rights under public international law. Although these 
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transnational companies benefit from a variety of international treaty provisions, they are not 
necessarily allowed to enjoy equal legal rights. As private corporations do not have legal 
personality in international law, therefore, they are mostly subject to the specific jurisdiction 
where these companies are incorporated. 
On the contrary, some international law scholars have regarded transnational corporations 
as subjects of public international law504. Some of them have applied a de facto approach due 
to these companies’ significant participation in the international law, organisations and 
communities505. Moreover, these scholars’ arguments can be supported by the growing trend 
of privatisation of international law in many international investment dispute arbitrations and 
investment treaties506. There is also movement at the international level. This new movement 
promotes the draft code of corporate responsibility and requires MNCs should take their 
international legal responsibility and respond to citizens’ human rights claims globally507. 
However, these perspectives have not been fully adopted by the UN Human Rights Council or 
any national states 508 . Businesses have been taken into the international law arena only 
voluntarily based on those specific instruments, such as the Global Compact509. So far it may 
not be argued that these transnational corporations already have full international legal 
personality. 
In fact, the classic point of view - only sovereign states had legal personality in public 
international law - was radically challenged in the twentieth century. The advent of 
international institutions and the development of international criminal law began to recognise 
that international governmental organisations and individual citizens can also have 
international legal persons510. While this significant change is both for good and bad, the 
transnational company has hardly been viewed as a legal subject that is capable of having rights 
and responsibilities in public international law. It is believed that this perspective may be about 
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to change, given that multi-national corporations today may have the same or even stronger 
dominant economic power around the world. 
These lengthy academic debates about the legal subjectivity of transnational corporations 
have precluded engagements with the substantive issues of the obligations, duties and rights of 
corporates under public international law. Maljean-Dubois has argued that multi-national 
companies have an economic and political position that articulates themselves in a range of 
legal instruments (though they do not have a legal entity) 511. This opinion could be more helpful 
to lead the discussion focus to the features of MNCs and how these characters are different 
from nations.  
Unlike those domestic business entities (even those businesses who own manufacturing 
facilities abroad or export products, services and technological know-how), large transnational 
companies have the abilities to flexibly move their production sites and vital assets across 
national jurisdictions. They can easily re-structure their management units independently of 
state borders and lose every link to a country except for the formal and legal nexus of 
incorporation. These critical features of MNCs, including operational fluidity and the 
detachedness from domestic regimes, are some of the significant reasons why domestic 
legislators fail to implement adequate control over the power of these companies, and why 
transnational companies have played a critical role in the area of international law512. 
Having a position in this debate is not the purpose of this research. Instead, the present 
research will follow Alvarez’ suggestions and focus on “addressing which international rules 
may apply to and relevant to corporations rather than whether corporations are or are not 
subjects of international law”513.  
2) The emergence of informal regulations: ‘Corporate self-regulation’  
Because of the limitations of current international and national frameworks discussed, this 
section move the focus on the recent new types of self–regulation undertaken by corporations 
alone and their relations with the current legal frameworks and other contractual approaches, 
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i.e. in collaboration with NGOs in environmental and social policy areas via co-regulation 
strategies. 
Stephan Schmidheiny had addressed the rationale behind these corporate self-regulation 
mechanisms in 1992. His research points out that global enterprises have a duty to promote 
sustainable development, and one of the best approaches for making this happen is to combine 
public regulatory standards with the private voluntary initiative514.  
From an environmental economics perspective, environmental damages were viewed as 
a type of market failure that would be fixed by financial instruments which can also provide 
economic incentives to corporations to behave in a more ecologically sustainable way515. In the 
past, businesses see environmental problems and regulations as a barrier to their market and 
benefits, and they attempted to minimise the regulatory impact on their businesses. However, 
new thinking can be identified in the field, which is termed ‘eco–modernism’516. According to 
the main ideas of this ‘eco-modernism’ approach, businesses began to believe that evolving 
technologies have the potential to ameliorate the environmental harm occurred by corporates’ 
manufacturing activities and other operations 517 . Therefore, there is a robust synergistic 
dimension in the nexus of business-environmental regulation-technology.  
Of particular importance as regards to corporate self–regulation has been the widespread 
adoption of the international industrial standards on environmental management, such as 
International Standards Organization (ISO) 14000 series of standards for MNC’s 
environmental management518. These industrial standards illustrate a hybrid private-public 
collaborative regulatory model. The nature of this kind of standard is private. Multinational 
firms can follow these standards established by a non–governmental international institution 
that includes the 134 national standard-setting groups from all its country members. These 
standard-setting groups can be governmental agencies, hybrid organisations or entirely private 
                                                          
514 Schmidheiny, S. (1992). Changing course: A global business perspective on development and the 
environment (Vol. 1). MIT press. 
515 Tietenberg, T. H., & Lewis, L. (2016). Environmental and natural resource economics. Routledge. 
516 Bäckstrand, K. (2004). Scientisation vs. civic expertise in environmental governance: Eco-feminist, eco-
modern and post-modern responses. Environmental Politics, 13(4), 695-714. 
517 Fineman, S. (2017). The business of greening: an introduction. In The business of greening (pp. 1-10). 
Routledge. See also Grunwald, A. (2016). Diverging pathways to overcoming the environmental crisis: A 
critique of eco-modernism from a technology assessment perspective. Journal of Cleaner Production. 
518 Cashore, B., Renckens, S., Levin, K., Bozza, L., Auld, G., (2009) Can Non-State Governance “Ratchet Up” 
Global Standards? Assessing Indirect and Evolutionary Potential. Paper presented at the Conference on New 
Governance and the Business Organization, May 25-27. 
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institutes519. Those national industrial bodies, however mainly dominate the decision-making 
in this ISO standard-setting process. Usually, these national industrial standard setting groups 
have involved strong local industrial memberships in their home jurisdictions, and they are 
keen on participating in the formulation of ISO environmental management standards. 
Meanwhile, the ISO can be viewed as a public regime, because the environmental or other 
industrial standards adopted by this standard setting body will generally serve as benchmarks 
for state members’ national law and other inter-governmental institutions’ strong references520.  
It is true that effective corporate self–regulation still needs to depend on the proper 
industrial standard setting and vigorous enforcement of conventional ‘command and control’ 
model in host states 521 . Without these supportive mechanisms, only punishing private 
enterprises may not function in the right way. However, increased formal and official 
regulations can also cause many problems. In resource-limited state jurisdictions, it would not 
be very useful if the regulators require too much of corporations and make their duties 
overbearing. Other alternative approaches also exist, such as the contractual governance 
instruments discussed in the proceeding chapters. Good examples are the partnerships between 
energy companies and environmental NGOs, multi-actor investment contracts and other 
multilateral initiatives.  
Because of the increasing international environmental harm caused by MNCs, calls for 
stricter liability of these multi-national companies under public international law will continue 
to grow. As our review above, the mainstream scholars still argue that only national states have 
legal subjectivity in public international law522.  
This chapter has moved beyond this theoretical debate and turns to examine whether the 
limitations of corporate liability regulations caused the recent emergence of corporate self-
regulation. Indeed, both international and national legal frameworks have proven to be not 
effective and insufficient to reduce the adverse environmental effects and promote more 
sustainable business management. The demands for better governance at the international and 
national levels have contributed to the development of industrial standard setting, corporate 
                                                          
519 Clocksin, W. F., & Mellish, C. S. (2012). Programming in Prolog: Using the ISO standard. Springer Science 
& Business Media. 
520 International Organization for Standardization. (2006). Environmental Management: Life Cycle Assessment; 
Principles and Framework (No. 2006), ISO. 
521 Orts, E. W., & Deketelaere, K. (2001). See also Orts, E. W., & Coglianese, C. (2007) Debate: Collaborative 
Environmental Law: Pro and Con. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 156, 289-311. 
522 Lowe, V. (2007). See also O'Connell, D. O. (1970). 
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‘self-regulation’ and other forms of collaborative instruments, e.g. NGO-Business 
partnerships523.  
Based on these observations, this thesis argues that the constraints do exist in the ‘top-
down’ international and national regulation models and the ‘bottom-up’ innovative approaches 
have the potential to supplement the fragmentation of existing frameworks. MNCs now have 
power and capacity to mobilise assets to make important contributions to international standard 
setting and regulatory innovation524. 
3) Seeking new ways to regulate and harness MNCs’ power 
MNCs so far have not been recognised as a full legal person in public international law525. 
The subjectivity of MNCs in international law is still awaiting the positive granting of duties 
and rights526. However, due to the growing economic power and environmental impact of 
MNCs, the ongoing calls for stricter responsibilities of MNCs under public international law 
will continue to grow527. When the solutions turn to national law, the domestic legal system in 
many countries also faces challenges to control these large multi-national corporations and 
implement those new environmental and social regulations effectively528.  
Though MNCs have substantial and increasing influences on today’s global economy and 
the environment, this trend should not distract our attention from the primary responsibility of 
nation states. For a new multi-level governance model, a combination of traditional ‘command 
and control’ regulations, public-private collaborations, corporate self-regulation mechanisms, 
industrial standard setting actions, and a global agreement on corporate responsibility and 
liability should be considered. As discussed before, MNCs can have a strong position for 
contributing to a variety of ‘bottom-up’ standard setting and regulatory innovations. Now the 
                                                          
523 See World Vision (2015). See also Fues, T. (2017) How Can the G20 Promote the Global Partnership for 
Sustainable Development (SDG 17)? Development. Retrieved from http://risingpowersproject.com/g20-
global-partnership. 
524 Muchlinski, P. (2007) Multinational enterprises and the law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
525 Zerk, J. (2006) Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. See also Wouters, J., & Chané, A.-L. (2013) Multinational corporations in international law. 
526 Ibid. 
527  Roberts, K. (2015) Corporate liability and complicity in International Crimes. In S. S. Jodoin, M-C. (Ed.), 
Sustainable Development, International Criminal Justice, and Treaty Implementation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. See also Morgera, E. (2009). 
528 Gunningham, N. (2009) The new collaborative environmental governance: The localization of regulation. 
Journal of Law and Society, 36(1), 145-166. See also Odumosu-Ayanu, I. T. (2014a); Odumosu-Ayanu, I. T. 
(2014b) Multi-Actor Contracts, Competing Goals and Regulation of Foreign Investment. University of New 
Brunswick Law Journal, 65. 
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significant issues are about how regulators around the world can re-design the current legal 
frameworks by which the assets and power of MNCs can be harnessed for these critical social 
innovations. . Meanwhile, the local resistances and environmental and human rights litigations 
against the trans-national corporations also stimulate and enforce MNCs to keep evolving and 
participating in the field.  
Above all, powerful transnational companies can influence the law-making procedures at 
the national level by MNCs’ economic and social lobbying power529. Similar situations are also 
happening at the regional (such as the EU530 and ASEAN531) and international levels. However, 
conflicting interests and public policies among states, international institutions, and NGO 
activism, can reduce the influences of transnational corporations.       
6.3.2 NGOs: Local resistances are shaping investment contracting and law-making 
practices 
The rise of the third sector is usually regarded as the regime of non-commercial based 
values532. The decline of state power and the increasing intertwining of Neoliberal global 
economic policies have created a demand for various environmental, social and political groups’ 
participation in global governance. The NGO phenomena can be viewed as a societal response 
to the new situations dominated by Neoliberals and the supporters for increasing central state’s 
control power. 
NGOs are associations which do not seek economic profits, and they are not run by the 
state (or originate from it)533. NGOs can attract members and stakeholders who share the similar 
beliefs and concerns because they have their economic freedoms and usually do not have 
electoral constituents. Their features can cover the values of pluralism, solidarity, and 
                                                          
529 Kenny, S. Y., & Larson, R. K. (1993). Lobbying behaviour and the development of international accounting 
standards: The case of the IASC's joint venture project. European Accounting Review, 2(3), 531-554. 
530 van Schendelen, M. P. (2002). Machiavelli in Brussels: The art of lobbying the EU. Amsterdam University 
Press. 
531 Yoshimatsu, H. (2002). Preferences, interests, and regional integration: the development of the ASEAN 
industrial cooperation arrangement. Review of international political economy, 9(1), 123-149. See also 
Yoshimatsu, H. (1999). The state, MNCs, and the car industry in ASEAN. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 
29(4), 495-515. 
532 Yaziji M. and Doh J. (2009). See also Zerk, J. (2006). 
533 Austin, J. E. (2007) Sustainability through Partnering: Conceptualizing Partnerships between Businesses and 
NGOs. In P. Glasbergen, F. Biermann, & A. P. Mol (Eds.), Partnerships, Governance and Sustainable 
Development. Cheltenham: Edvard Elgar Publishing Limited. 
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autonomy534. One of the key features of the third sector is that these non-governmental groups 
have the freedoms outside the legitimate politics areas535. This feature also allows the civil 
society groups to take actions and become a supportive voice for the most vulnerable citizens 
and marginalised communities. 
NGO’s operations are also task-oriented and driven by citizens with common concerns. 
Working staff and members in NGOs can be pursuing specific public policy goals, such as 
several environmental and social policy missions. In practice, NGOs can perform a range of 
social service and humanitarian functions. For instance, they may help to bring individual 
citizens’ voices to the governmental departments, monitor the implementation of any 
significant public policy, and enhance public participation down to a local community level. 
Moreover, some NGOs are working on specific themes, i.e. environmental protection, social 
welfare, public health and human rights. 
The engagement of NGOs is critical to counterbalance the impacts of economic interest 
actors. The environmental externalities caused by these private actors are usually insufficiently 
addressed by the national states’ intervention or by consumer actions. Civil society associations, 
such as the Birds Life International, WWF or Greenpeace international, are a number of 
examples of a growing and leading body of conservation and environmental NGOs successful 
at both the international and domestic levels. Their primary mission is to channel public 
pressures and raise public awareness for conservation issues and other environmental harm. 
These environmental NGOs also have devoted their substantial efforts to assist in policy 
implementation and law enforcement. It is true that the functions of these environmental NGOs 
can be identified in many different approaches.   
In the global energy investment regime, the current study already witnessed that NGOs, 
on the one hand, can represent local communities and citizens to act against the harmful 
operations done by the transnational energy corporations. On the other hand, NGOs can also 
decide to cooperate with the private sector in the forms of Business-NGO partnerships and 
other collaborative initiatives. Examples have been addressed in Chapter 4 and 5. The 
                                                          
534 Pattberg, P. (2004). See also Steffek J. and Hahn K. (2010) Evaluating transnational NGOs: legitimacy, 
accountability, representation. New York, Palgrave Macmillan; Stewart, R. B. (2001) A New Generation of 
Environmental Regulation. Capital University Law Review, 29, 21. 
535 Tully, S. (2004). Corporate-NGO partnerships as a form of civil regulation: lessons from the energy 
biodiversity initiative. Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and 
Political Science. See also Howell, J. (2007). 
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paragraphs below  address another form of regulation – civil regulation – to highlight the 
usefulness of NGOs for enhancing multi-level governance and regulation innovation.  
1) Civil regulation 
The new type of ‘civil regulation’ refers to the active engagements of environmental and 
social policy NGOs in the procedure of policymaking, enforcement monitoring and compliance 
control 536 . Civil regulation is a natural response to the growing power of transnational 
corporations but is neither States’ formal command and control regulation model nor the firms’ 
voluntary CSR initiatives.                            
Peter Newell has argued that NGOs can choose to apply both the ‘liberal’ as well as 
‘critical’ governance strategies537. The more ‘liberal’ strategies cover a collaborative approach 
to corporates and can, eventually, participate in new standard setting and Business-NGO 
partnerships and other cooperative initiatives. As examined in Chapter 4, these collaborative 
initiatives in the Greater China area devoted to the specific environmental and social policy 
goals or to focus on monitoring the operations of one particular investment project. On the 
other hand, ‘Critical’ strategies refer to NGOs in a more typical position as a watchdog of 
company actions, as a monitor of business malpractices and as an advocate of stricter controls 
over corporation excesses. 
The ‘liberal’ collaborative strategy is evident in a wide range of cases of Business-NGO 
partnerships. The performances of these cross-sector partnerships vary in practice. In addition 
to the cross-sector partnerships in the oil and gas sectors, one of the most well-known cases is 
the establishment of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)538. Also, cross-sector partnerships 
have been widely applied in the context of market reforms and industrial liberalisations as these 
processes cause adverse environmental consequences. For example, in the water resource 
sector, NGOs, transnational companies, United Nations’ water-relevant agencies as well as 
national governments have successfully set up such cross-sector arrangements539. Another 
remarkable instance of Business-NGO partnerships is related to global insurance industries. 
                                                          
536 Zillman, D. M., & Lucas, A. (2002). See also Tully, S. (2004). 
537 Newell, P., Rai, S., & Scott, A. (2002). See also Nyambura, R. (2016) The energy fix. New Internationalist, 
24-25. 
538 See Moog, S., Spicer, A., & Böhm, S. (2015). The politics of multi-stakeholder initiatives: The crisis of the 
Forest Stewardship Council. Journal of Business Ethics, 128(3), 469-493. 
539 See UN-Water Decade Programme on Advocacy and Communication (UNW-DPAC), online report: 
http://www.unwaterbestpractices.org/WaterforLifeENG.pdf. 
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This kind of cross-sector partnership emphasised how insurance companies could apply their 
risk assessment tools to craft insurance incentives for companies to operate in a more 
environmental-friendly manner.  
Critical strategies may start with protests, campaigns and other resistance strategies540. 
However, eventually, these strategies still can lead to the formulation of cooperation and 
partnerships with corporations. For example, the FSC mentioned above is a direct outcome of 
local resistance led by both local and Western NGOs against the rapidly increasing 
deforestation in Brazil from the late 1980s and 1990s541. Additionally, the local campaigns 
against the oil giant Shell regarding the company’s operations in the area of Niger Delta, and 
the negative effects on the indigenous peoples assisted that transnational oil company to put 
more efforts significantly on corporate environmental management542. Some influential and 
leading international NGOs are very good at taking a dual critical and cooperative approach to 
the corporations. For example, Greenpeace launched a hostile campaign against genetically 
modified food produced by the Monsanto. In the well-known PVC-free credit card campaigns, 
Greenpeace was engaged in many conversations and meetings with the managers of those 
companies543.  
2) ‘Bottom-up' approaches’ possible contributions to international law-making 
While national states are the primary actors of public international law, transnational 
corporations still have many channels and participation opportunities to shape the international 
law-making procedures 544 . For instance, the private sector can make contributions to the 
missions of the International Labour Organisation through a ‘tri-partism’ negotiation 
mechanism and protect their interests in international commercial arbitrations or the WTO 
dispute resolution545.  
                                                          
540 Ekins, P. (2005). See also Newell, P., Rai, S., & Scott, A. (2002); and Nyambura, R. (2016). 
541 See FSC Brasil - Forest Stewardship Council, available at: https://br.fsc.org/pt-br. 
542“We're still active in Delta State,” Shell Nigeria, available at: https://www.shell.com.ng/media/2018-media-
releases/we-are-still-active-in-delta-state-shell.html. 
543 See Greenpeace in the 1990s, Greenpeace UK, available at: 
https://www.greenpeace.org.uk/about/impact/history/greenpeace-1990s. 
544 Noortmann, M., Reinisch, A., & Ryngaert, C. (Eds.). (2015).  
545 Casier, L., Fraser, R., Halle, M., & Wolfe, R. (2014). Shining a light on fossil fuel subsidies at the WTO: 
how NGOs can contribute to WTO notification and surveillance. World Trade Review, 13(4), 603-632. 
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NGOs’ contribution to international and national law-making is another emerging 
phenomenon546. NGOs often have a very critical attitude against the neo-liberal notions and 
Western capitals’ supporters. These civil society groups have repeatedly mobilised assets and 
capacities in several protests against the WTO meetings at Cancun and Seattle, as well as the 
actions by the World Bank Groups and International Financial Corporation. In the investment 
regime, one prominent example is that several NGOs launched a large-scale international 
campaign against the negotiations and adoption of a multilateral investment agreement547.  
Since civil society groups’ first engagement on the international stage was in relation to 
issues of foreign investment protection, it can be expected that NGOs can possibly play a 
crucial role in the international economic realm548. For instance, the establishment of the 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants549 was significantly initiated by a 
published report with engagement from World Wild Foundation WWF550. In addition, NGOs 
are very likely to strongly impact the procedures and outcomes of a legal case, such as the 
Brent Spar case551. In this famous case, Greenpeace channelled the public awareness and 
initiated a campaign to prevent Shell from some inappropriate decommission operations and 
sinking its oil exploration platforms into the North Sea.  
6.3.3 Commercial lawyers as agents for policy and social change 
Commercial lawyers are experts on legal affairs, business risks and significant agents for 
commercial contracting at a project-specific level. In modern society, lawyers, as commercial 
advisers, should be equipped with a more comprehensive and long-term view of business 
benefits; this requires knowledge and understanding of environmental and human rights issues. 
                                                          
546 Noortmann, M., Reinisch, A., & Ryngaert, C. (Eds.). (2015).  
547 Odell, J. S. (2009). Breaking deadlocks in international institutional negotiations: The WTO, Seattle, and 
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At the International Bar Association’s 2014 annual session in Vienna, the former UN General 
Sectary Kofi Annan mentioned this point in his keynote speech552:  
 “Lawyers have a very important role to play...All of you are persons of 
influence…Lawyers can influence and go beyond what they think clients want.”  
This thesis argues that innovative commercial lawyers, with a brand new mindset 
regarding sustainable development, can play a critical role in balancing their corporate clients’ 
business profits with other public policy considerations. The UN Principles for Responsible 
Contracts as well as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights both are good 
examples of modern contractual settings that attempt to have a synergistic combination of 
business, environmental protection and human rights. These new types of innovative contracts 
would have the power to guide national legal reforms as well as to create new standard-setting 
at the international level. 
 One approach taken by transnational companies in responding to these increasing global 
pressures is by inserting environmental and social policy provisions into the commercial and 
investment contracts. For this purpose, international energy companies need to consult their 
professional lawyers for innovative suggestions to do an environmental and human right due 
diligence on the investment projects. These assessments can help the energy companies to 
identify, mitigate and prevent potential adverse influences on the affected communities and 
individuals. Commercial lawyers are also able to participate in dispute settlement procedures 
and the compensation and remediation processes for actual damages.  
Therefore, this new type of innovative commercial lawyers not only need to have excellent 
commercial awareness as usual but also they should become quite sensitive to the multiple 
dimensions of an investment project, including the environmental and human rights risks 
caused by corporate operations. Legal professionals will be respected, because they know all 
the positive laws should be rooted in principles, natural law and ethics, rather than only relying 
on technical legal expertise. In this case, successful commercial lawyers today should have the 
capacity to safeguard the corporate integrity and to balance a range of conflicting interests. 
                                                          
552 See from Rivkin, D. W. (2016) The wise counselor and the frontiers of business and human rights. Paper 
presented at the Human Rights Law and the Extractive Industries, Panama City. 
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To provide benchmarks and guidelines for today’s innovative commercial lawyers, the 
International Bar Association, in 2016, has published a useful document - Practical Guide on 
Business and Human Rights for Business Lawyers, which came together with a very detailed 
working plan and a toolbox in its Reference Annex553.  
To draft these model contracts and principles, the experts in IBA’s research units have 
strived to understand the balance between corporate economic benefits with other public 
interests. The IBA research units have been studying and drafting two documents since 2014. 
The ‘Practical Guide on Business and Human Rights for Business Lawyers’ is a comprehensive 
and accessible guideline for commercial lawyers. These new Guiding Principles drafted by the 
IBA aim to empower and broaden commercial lawyers’ advisory capacities. Besides the 
traditional commercial considerations, these guiding principles cover the emerging issues of 
project risk management, transparency and information disclosure, human rights, 
environmental protection and climate change, the development of relevant global standards, 
and dispute settlements. In addition, the Reference Annex explores further the crucial 
implications of the Practical Guide for commercial lawyers and the particular issues that 
lawyers may need to consider in real-world practice.   
These guiding principles for human rights protection and drafting responsible contracts 
have provided useful templates and models for commercial lawyers, in particular, the 
paragraphs about contracting and making agreements. Here, it is necessary to re-address these 
guiding principles and model contracts would be especially useful for the projects in 
international energy sectors. 
Nowadays, transnational corporations in the energy sectors are increasingly willing to 
adopt environmental and human rights provisions in their energy investment contracts, 
especially in the joint venture agreements554. For the joint ventures in the energy sectors, a 
growing feature is the use of a new clause which requires contracting parties to ensure all the 
requirements in relation to public health, working safety, environmental protection and human 
rights affairs should be “cascaded” down their global supply chains555. These recent trends in 
                                                          
553 International Bar Association (2016) Business and Human Rights Practical Guide for Business Lawyers. 
(Practical Guide) https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=d6306c84-e2f8-4c82-a86f-
93940d6736c4. 
554 Cameron, P. (2016). 
555 Crockett, A. (2014) Human Rights Clauses in Commercial Contracts. Expert Articles, Investment & Human 
Rights Project. See also Laryea, E. (2011). 
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joint venture agreements in the energy sector are based on the negotiating experiences over the 
past decades and the active participation by commercial lawyers.  
On the one hand, from a technical perspective, many of the contracting practices 
inherently invole legal issues. For example, causation, proportionality, and grievance 
mechanisms are concepts which have developed in the legal regime over a long period of time. 
On the other hand, issues in practical terms are often not purely legal, especially in the energy 
industries. 
Modern innovative lawyers should be sensitive to the multiple dimensions of social and 
environmental risk. In the cases of large energy and infrastructure projects with severe impacts, 
innovative commercial lawyers (with a ‘green’ mind-set) have the chance to infuse the 
environmental and social values into a variety of contractual instruments. State-investor 
investment contracts and other contracts, therefore, can be a multi-actor platform for legal 
professionals, inviting several stakeholders and policymakers to do brainstorming on the policy 
and legal solutions for a responsible and sustainable investment project.  
Modern commercial lawyers will thus be empowered not only because of technical legal 
expertise but also because they understand that law is steeped in ethics. Therefore, modern 
lawyers should be empowered to embrace the role of guarding corporate integrity in today’s 
business world. A report submittd to the UN Working Group on Human Rights an Business in 
July 2018 also highlights the importance of business lawyers for human rights protection. The 
paragraph 41 of this report states: “Business lawyers- both in-house counsel and external firms 
– have a unique position for shaping the path an enterprise may take. Often, they are seen as 
one of the main obstacles to adopting effective human rights due diligence, with a traditional 
narrow focus on legal risk.  However, some bar associations, large law firms and in-house 
counsel endorse the GPs and acknowledge that human rights DD should be a core part of the 
advice provided by a wise counsellor. Companion note II: need for change in mindset among 
mainstream business lawyers.”556   
6.4 The usefulness of innovative contracts: Adding a dynamic perspective to the ‘S-I-P 
triangle’ 
                                                          
556 Full text can be accessed on UN Human Rights Office of High Commissioner, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Reports.aspx#hrc. 
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Usually, energy corporations have been granted the legal rights to implement their 
investment projects. Today, the global community has paid more attention to corporations’ 
obligations for gaining a ‘social license to operate’ (SLO)557. This SLO concept is firmly rooted 
in the local communities’ social acceptance to the foreign investment projects558. In an ideal 
situation, the total negative impacts of extractive projects should be offset by the benefits 
generated by the resource exploration.  
6.4.1 Community tensions and global resistances 
The current realm of international investment law is composed of bilateral and multilateral 
international investment treaties and the investment-related sections in recent free trade 
agreements. Existing research has illustrated that this existing regulatory architecture has 
presented a ‘top-down’ decision making and policy development rationale, which is rooted in 
a neo-liberalism ideology559. This neo-liberal model and dominate thinking has caused a long 
history of tensions between extractive industries and local communities. As discussed in this 
thesis, these issues can cover land grabbing, pollution, state violence, human rights violation 
and compensation.  
There is a sad truth about the tensions between investors and communities. In many 
investment arbitrations, governments even joined the side with foreign investors rather than 
standing with their citizens and communities 560 . Usually, individual citizens and local 
communities do not have equal economic and political power to compete with big transnational 
energy companies, such as Shell, BP and those Chinese state-owned oil companies. The 
‘resource curse’ case where governments corrupted and aligned with foreign investors will 
make the situation more complicated561. 
                                                          
557 See Moffat, K., & Zhang, A. (2014). The paths to social license to operate: An integrative model explaining 
community acceptance of mining. Resources Policy, 39, 61-70. 
558 Doh J.P. and Guay T.R. (2006) Corporate Social Responsibility, Public Policy, and NGO Activism in Europe 
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73. See also Coglianese, C. (2001) Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of the 
Environmental Movement. Faculty Scholarship (Paper 1404). 
559 Castree N. (2010b). 
560 Sabater, A., & Stadnyk, M. (2014). See also Junita, F. (2015) The foreign mining investment regime in 
Indonesia: regulatory risk under resource nationalism policy and how international investment treaties provide 
protection. Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 33(3), 241-265. 
561 The Bloomberg ‘Resource Curse’, available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/resource-curse. 
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Notably, these local community resistances are more likely to happen in the jurisdictions 
with weak investment, environmental, and social regulations. Governments in these 
jurisdictions have insufficient institutional capacities to defend individual citizens’ legal rights 
and respect communities and the environment. In those areas, the meaning of development is 
defined as strong economic achievement and energy security, though other stakeholders may 
have very different points of view on ‘development’.  
These debates are the central topic on international energy investment. From the 
perspectives of local community and civil society groups, both the current ‘top-down’ policy-
making model in the transnational investment regime and the existing international framework 
on energy investment remain largely disconnected from the real needs of local citizens. As a 
result, the current system of international energy activities can be featured by inequality562. 
Recent research in law and development has attempted to capture this social and legal 
pattern and to theorise the interactions between social movements and law563. This research has 
tried to argue that the NGOs and other civil society groups are also influencing the contracting 
practices in the investment situations. This argument can bring new theoretical insights to the 
SIP triangle, environmental contracting, and international investment law in general. 
6.4.2 Adding a dynamic perspective to the ‘S-I-P triangle’ 
So this research tries to summarise the empirical findings in Chapter 3 to 5 and present a 
new conceptual chart here.  
                                                          
562 Leal-Arcas, R., Filis, A., & Gosh, E. S. A. (2014) International energy governance: Selected legal issues. 
Edward Elgar Publishing. See also Cotula, L. (2016). 
563 Rajagopal, B. (2003) International Law From Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World 
Resistance. New York: Cambridge University Press. See also Coglianese, C. (2001). 
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Figure 6.4 Rethinking global resistances, investment contracting and legal innovations 
In Figure 6.4, this original chart intends to capture the roles of various ‘innovative’ actors 
and the position of contractual arrangements in the landscape of international law and policy 
innovation. In short, this new chart adds a dynamic dimension to the original ‘S-I-P’ triangle 
and highlights the usefulness of innovative contractual design which can bring the legal and 
social revolutions. 
By focusing on the external impact of the multi-actor contractual arrangements, this 
original conceptual chart may be able to broaden the current research horizon and add a 
dynamic perspective to the original ’S-I-P’ triangle and, more broadly, on the energy and 
natural resource management in a multi-level context.   
Based on the established empirical observations above, this chapter here suggests that the 
contractual approaches at the project-specific level, including State-investor investment 
contracts, NGO-Business agreements, and other bilateral and multi-actor environmental 
contracts with ‘innovative elements’ for regulation, can be positioned to integrate with other 
regulating frameworks. These contractual instruments can also serve as a social innovation 
platform where multiple stakeholders have some space to exchange dialogues on the designs 
of the project and the responsibilities for other public policy goals. As discussed before, this 
contractual arrangement sometimes can provide essential support to the current legal 
frameworks, especially in the developing countries without strong environmental regulations, 
and stimulate legal and policy synergies.  
Assessing the FDI contracting practices and social change with this original conceptual 
chart, the analytical perspectives could be not only static but also more dynamic. This 
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conceptual charts firstly capture, at the macro-level, the dynamic interactions between contracts, 
key actors, and the legal norm revolution. Also, at the micro-level focusing on contracts, this 
chart points out the critical legal and policy entrepreneurs behind the most innovative 
contractual arrangements. These institutional entrepreneurs can be: 1) MNCs (with their 
corporate self-regulation mechanisms), 2) NGOs (with their capacities for resistances and 
campaigns), and 3) Innovative commercial lawyers working in different sectors (with an 
innovative and green mind-set).  
In summary, this chapter can further address three key points. First, the ‘bottom-up’ local 
resistances against international energy investment globally are shaping the design of 
investment contracts, contracting practices and legal frameworks. Second, project-specific 
contracts play a central role in the regulatory network. Among all these contractual 
arrangements, some of the most ‘innovative’ contracts can make significant and positive 
contributions to the legal and policy revolutions at international, regional, and national scales. 
Third, three key driving actors behind the innovative contracts are MNCs, NGOs, and 
innovative commercial lawyers. They are individual and institutional entrepreneurs in the field 
of law and policy.  
Finally, with this new conceptual chart, this research suggests investment and 
environmental contracts can be a focal point for understanding multi-level and multi-actor 
environmental governance across various jurisdictions. The key points mentioned here are also 
helpful when researchers rethink the theories of collaborative governance, social movements, 
and law and development.   
6.4.3 Harnessing grass-root innovations for multi-level environmental governance 
Contractual approaches for environmental governance can cover a variety of legal and 
policy mechanisms, from conventional investment contracts, cross-sector partnerships to the 
new generation of multi-actor contracts. Such useful mechanisms all require foreign investors 
to re-estimate their projects’ impacts on human rights and the environment. More importantly, 
these contractual mechanisms can provide available grievances and prevent environmental 
harm and human rights violations at an early stage of project development.  
Drawing from the discussions above, a contractual approach for multi-level governance 
is an inherent part of regulating foreign investment and stimulating future regulatory and social 
innovation (Please see Figure 6.5).  
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Figure 6.5 Contractual approaches as an innovation platform for future synergies 
NGOs and innovative commercial lawyers (equipped with their professional legal 
expertise in both business operations and sustainable development), can be future guardians of 
corporate integrity and entrepreneurs for legal and policy revolutions. Therefore, at the project-
specific level, the contractual approach also provides a space for all stakeholder, i.e. 
professional lawyers, MNCs, civil society, and policymakers, for brainstorming new solutions 
and promoting sustainable investment. 
The project-based contractual approach is crucial because it can link with other aspects of 
a foreign investment project. Moreover, the contracting parties possess the capacity to create 
and shape the ‘social space’ of contracting and enhance companies’ competitiveness. This 
research has figured out at least five critical questions for this 'contract-based' model for multi-
level governance:  
1) Re-focusing on the scope of contracting parties (i.e. multi-actor contracts tend to 
include communities as a contracting party) and the practical issues of public participation and 
negotiation processes; 
2) Rethinking nations’ sovereignty over their natural resources and why global protests 
and resistances occurred; 
3) Noticing the significance of contractual design to prevent global resistances and energy 
investment disputes; 
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4) Reviewing the functions of these contractual mechanisms for environmental and social 
governance and their interactions with other regulatory frameworks; 
5) Reflecting on the role of contractual approach for future regulatory innovations and 
synergies between different branches of public international law 
The existing academic publications, both in law and non-legal literature, tend to analyse 
these various forms of contracts separately. The apparent problem is that these current 
discussions usually have been focusing on the formats of these contractual instruments – State-
Investor, Investor-Community and State-Investor-Community – rather than on the substantial 
contents, actual functions and their external impacts on other major regulating frameworks or 
mechanisms. Furthermore, the legal and governance significance of contractual forms already 
transcend issues of individual contract’s legality. This idea is supported by the fact that legal 
regimes usually need to be adjusted to open up for specific types of contract. The instance of 
the Peruvian conservation agreement mentioned in Chapter 5 reveals that regulatory reforms 
sometimes need to pave the way for some newly-designed conservation contracts.  
Contractual approaches to governance heavily depend on precedent. The application of 
standardised agreement templates and model contracts developed by international 
organisations can be very useful for contracting negotiations in energy and natural resource 
industries. These comprehensive model contracts usually provide the most advanced 
environmental and human rights protection mechanisms as contacts’ standard provisions. For 
example, the negotiation procedures of trans-national conservation contracts and forest carbon 
contracts usually need to engage repeat actors. The model contractual provisions significantly 
reduce the negotiation time and diverse setting of these cross-sector contracts and provide 
stronger safeguards for communities and the environment.   
6.5 Summary – A new analytical lens for assessing FDI in the energy sector 
Based on the empirical evidences (mainly in Chapter 3 to 5), this chapter has reclassified 
all the contracts within the S-I-P triangle into three newly-developed and legal-sensitive 
concepts, namely ‘soft contracts’, ‘enforcement contracts’, and ‘innovative contracts’. The 
discussion focus now should be put on the forms of ‘enforcement contract’ and ‘innovative 
contract’, especially those advanced model contracts developed by leading international 
organisations. These two types of contracts have the capacity either for supplementing the 
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existing legal frameworks or stimulating future legislative transformation and policy 
innovation.  
This chapter has also illustrated that MNCs, NGOs and innovative commercial lawyers 
can be critical drivers of positive social changes and innovative contracting practices. Also, 
local resistances and global protests against energy investment projects are both shaping the 
contractual and regulatory designs. This ‘bottom-up’ approaches for that they are more likely 
to meet the real needs of affected individuals and communities564.  
If we look at the contracting practices, especially the development of innovative contracts, 
and their dynamic relations with other national and international legal frameworks, this whole 
picture eventually outlines the future of multi-level governance within the S-I-P triangle. 
Moreover, contracts can have a central role in this new governance landscape. As the empirical 
part of this research has shown, studying project-specific contracts can provide useful insights 
for reflecting on the theories of law, development and social movements. 
In conclusion, these new research findings and developed conceptual charts can propose 
a new analytical lens for assessing energy investment projects across different jurisdictions. To 
apply this analytical lens to assess FDI projects in the extractive sectors, a researcher can start 
by reviewing the development of national and international legal frameworks of the investment 
project first and identify the gap (or space) for the contractual approach.  The newly developed 
contract classification would be useful to assess the contracting practices in that jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the analysis can focus on the key drivers and changemakers (e.g. NGOs, 
companies, commercial lawyers and governments) behind these contracting practices and how 
they make contributions to legal and policy changes.  
For the next chapter, this thesis aims to use China’s outward investment in the energy 
sectors as an important case study to apply this analytical lens developed here (Please see 
Figure 6.6).  
                                                          
564 Muller et al (2016). See also Pauwelyn, J., Wessel, R. A., & Wouters, J. (Eds.) (2012) Informal international 
lawmaking. Oxford University Press. 
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Figure 6.6 The analytical lens for assessing FDI in the energy sector 
In short, this analytical lens and the other conceptual charts developed in this chapter can 
provide useful angles to observe the changing landscape of multi-level governance in the 
natural resource regime. This research will mainly apply this new analytical lens to assess a 
significant (and arguably one of the largest) case study on China’s overseas energy and 
extractive industries investment. This case study can have strong connections with Chapter 4 
which is focusing on the oil and gas companies operating within the Great China regime and 
should be useful to explore China’s participation in today’s global energy governance.     
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Chapter 7 – A case study on China’s outward investment in the energy sectors 
“We have learned our lesson from focusing too much on the elites, and now we know that deals and 
agreements are not solid if they are not based on people-to-people relations.” – Fan Hongwei, a 
specialist from Myanmar, talked at China’s Xiamen University 
In Chapter 4, this research examined the cross-sector partnerships between international 
and Chinese oil and gas companies and the environmental NGOs in Greater China. Based on 
the previous observations, it is clear that China’s domestic regulatory environment has not 
provided sufficient policy support for initiating and maintaining cross-sector partnerships565. 
Thus, many grass-roots NGO and citizens need to apply the ‘critical cooperation’ approach 
(protest first and cooperate later) to force energy companies and foreign investors to respond 
to their requests. This research regards that this is probably also the case with China’s foreign 
investment projects in the energy sector.  
Starting from the “Going Out” plan introduced in the 1990s to all the way to the recent 
“One-Belt-One-Road” (OBOR) project and the formation of Asian Infrastructure Development 
Bank in 2015, China has considerably increased its foreign direct investment in the energy 
sectors over the last few decades566. However, these large investment infrastructure projects 
may cause severe negative impacts on the host countries’ environmental protection and local 
communities, which have also led to local resistance actions against the Chinese outward 
energy investment projects globally. 
This chapter analyses China’s outward investments in the energy sector and the related 
governing laws for keeping the economic, social and environmental interests in balance. The 
assessments in this chapter would be based on the conceptual chart developed in Chapter 6, 
which focuses on the innovative elements in the regulatory and contractual mechanisms and 
how the three principal key actors, namely corporations, environmental NGOs and commercial 
lawyers, can shape the legal and policy innovations in practice.   
                                                          
565 Hasmath, R and Hsu, J.Y.J. (2014) “Isomorphic Pressures, Epistemic Communities and State-NGO 
Collaboration in China”, the China Quarterly, 2014. See also Chu, C., (2011) Grassroots NGO's in China: a 
study of the legitimation process (Doctoral dissertation, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong 
Kong. 
566 Energy Charter Treaty (2017) China Investment Report. Energy Charter Secretariat. See also Economy, E., & 
Levi, M. (2014) By all means necessary: how China's resource quest is changing the world. Oxford 
University Press. 李平 (2015) “一帶一路”戰略: 互聯互通、共同發展 – 能源基礎設施建設與亞太區域能
源市場一體化, 中國社會科學出版社, 北京. 
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To respond to the environmental and social challenges brought by energy investment, 
efficiently formulated social and environmental policies can help point out and reduce 
unforeseen social and environmental risks involved in such investments567. Thus, this chapter 
focuses on the environmental and social consideration at three major levels – international, 
national and individual institutional - of China’s outbound investment policies. 
For the first part of this chapter, it starts by presenting the fragmentation and limitations 
of current international legal frameworks – e.g., Energy Charter Treaty, NAFTA and 
WTO/GATT - for regulating cross-boundary energy investment. As of now, the Chinese 
government, financial institutions, and multinational companies have started to realize the 
adverse social and environmental outcomes of their foreign operations. The “top-down” 
regulatory policy developments in this aspect are still insufficient, and the governing bodies 
are likely to face immense challenges for appropriately and effectively implementing such non-
legally binding policies.  
Based on the selected case studies of Chinese outward FDI in hydropower and extractive 
industries, the second part of this chapter (7.2) highlights the importance of local resistance 
and points out that these resistance activities can be a crucial catalyst to stimulate “bottom-up” 
legal and governance innovations at the local, national and trans-national levels. After a more 
in-depth analysis of this trend, this study argues that, if China likes to lead the way on 
sustainable governance in the near future, the Chinese government and investors may need to 
place people at the centre of investment processes and rethink the potential of grassroots 
resistance, instead of just viewing this phenomenon as ‘barriers’ and/or ‘risks’ of China’s 
international economic expansion.  
7.1 China’s ‘Going Out’ policy and its global implications 
Foreign investment is an integral part of China's economic engine568. Over the last thirty 
years, China did attract enormous foreign funding and technology to help itself grow 
                                                          
567 Cameron, P. (2016). See also唐曉陽、熊星翰 (2015) 中國海外投資與投資監管：以中國對非投資為例, 
外交評論：外交學院學報, (03), 26-45. 
568 Nolan, P. (2012). See also馮並 (2015) 一帶一路 – 全球發展的中國邏輯, 高寶出版, 臺北. 
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economically569, and China’s outgoing foreign direct investment has been proliferating during 
the same period.  
The “Going Global” policy initiative by the 10th five-year plan as well as China joining 
the WTO in 2001 has signalled the nation’s ambition to take a more proactive role in the world’s 
economy570. Consequently, this trend has also enhanced China’s capacities and experiences to 
invest overseas. 
As reported by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, China’s 
outbound FDI reached approximately US$183.1 billion in the year 2016. Spread over 192 
different regions and countries, about one-fourth of this enormous amount was invested in 
extractive industries571. 
More recently, China’s ambitious OBOR policy initiative, as defined in a 2015 official 
document from China's government, presents a vision for the future regional integration of 
Eurasia with China at the centre572. Some observers have pointed out that the next five to ten 
years will witness a new wave of Chinese OFDI following the recent launch of China’s Silk 
Road Fund, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the proposal of OBOR initiative573.  
As Chinese foreign investment is mainly focused on energy infrastructure large-scale 
projects574, exploration of natural resources, these fields are closely related to local land, the 
environment and the living standard of the inhabitants. Such projects, if carried out without 
proper environmental check and balance can easily result in substantial environmental damages.  
                                                          
569 See Hasmath, R. and J. Hsu, eds. (2009) China in an Era of Transition: Understanding Contemporary State 
and Society Actors. New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave. 隋平 (2011) 海外能源投資法律與實踐, 法律出
版社, 北京. 馮並 (2015). 
570 Leung and Zhao (2013) Environmental and Social Policy in Overseas Investment: Progress and Challenges for 
China. World Resources Institute. See also Nolan, P. (2004). 葛察忠、夏友富、智穎飆、龍風 (2010) 中國
對外投資中的環境保護政策, 中國環境科學出版社, 北京. 
571 See from Weng, L., Sayer, J. A., & Xue, L. (2017). 單文華 (2014) 中國對外能源投資的國際法保護, 清華
大學出版社, 北京. 
572 Ma, Y. (2014) The Environmental Implications of China’s New Bank. The Diplomat. See also Shan, W. (2015) 
Toward a Multilateral or Plurilateral Framework on Investment, E15 Expert Group on Trade and Investment 
in Extractive Industries Working Paper, Geneva. See also唐曉陽、熊星翰 (2015). 
573 Global Environmental Institute (2013). See also楊振發 (2013) 國際能源法發展趨勢研究–兼論對中國能源
安全的影響, 知識產權出版社, 北京. 
574 See Greenovation: Hub (2014). 
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Chinese overseas ventures have become a key concern in the international community575. 
As stated by a former leader of the US Export-Import Bank, American and international 
environmental organisations that were initially only concerned about the environmental 
externalities of Western transitional corporations have now also started monitoring the Chinese 
companies. 
Internationally, there are more pressing concerns about the likely threats presented by the 
enormous outbound Chinese capital in the natural resources and energy sectors576. A survey 
conducted on business managers from 15 African countries who have business links with China 
revealed that most of them regard that the Chinese are not an environmentally responsible 
nation577. A report from the Energy Charter Treaty showed that only 26 per cent of the surveyed 
Chinese corporations have carried out third-party environmental and social impact evaluation 
of their projects578. It must also be noted that disputes regarding Chinese projects have also 
started to surface579. 
As China is expanding its global footprint, several developing countries and least-
developed countries have abundant natural resources but lack having a sound institutional 
framework in place580. Hence, social and environmental regulations, practices and policies that 
Chinese investors follow in the countries they are carrying on the projects will have an 
enormous impact on the local life and environment. Another notable point is that China is not 
the only one in this business; emerging economies like India, Mexico and Brazil are just about 
to follow the same path. The intensity and complicated nature of these issues require a more 
detailed understanding with a scope beyond the traditional suppositions to find a long-lasting 
and feasible approach to solve the practical problems. If Chinese enterprises can fully embed 
principles of sustainability in their overseas investment activities, China will serve as a flagship 
example of how emerging market investments catalyse sustainable growth.  
                                                          
575 Energy Charter Treaty (2017). 
576  Weng, L., Sayer, J. A., & Xue, L. (2017). See also Wang, F. (2014) Analysis of Human Rights Policies of 
Chinese-funded Overseas Enterprises - Analysis of Human Rights Policies of Chinese-funded Overseas 
Enterprises. (2014) Human Rights 人權：英文版, (01), 25-27. 
577 Weng, L., Sayer, J. A., & Xue, L. (2017). 唐曉陽、熊星翰 (2015); 單文華 (2014). 
578 Energy Charter Treaty (2017). 
579 World Energy Investment Report (2017). 
580  Weng, L., Sayer, J. A., & Xue, L. (2017); OECD (2014) Creating an environment for investment and 
sustainable development, in Development Cooperation Report 2014: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable 
Development, OECD Publishing, Paris. See also Junita, F. (2015). 
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7.1.1 China’s recent outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) trends 
As FDI is regarded to be the precursor to economic development and innovation, China 
has set quite a few priorities in its 13th FYP581 to open up its economy even more , reduce 
restrictions on market access, attract more foreign investment and latest technology, and 
enhance the overall efficiency of the way foreign capital is utilised. 
China’s OFDI has been considerably growing since the ‘Going Out’ strategy was made 
official. By 2016, China’s net outward foreign direct investment touched $170 billion, which 
makes it the second largest investor globally after the United States582. Below is a graphical 
illustration of China’s OFDI since 2007: 
 
Figure 7.1 China’s net OFDI. Source: State Statistics Agency, Government of China PRC 
http://data.stats.gov.cn 
Regarding the sector-wise distribution of China’s FDI, the structure is optimised, with the 
real-estate sector and service industry getting the most attention. The service industry had the 
largest non-financial OFDI in the year 2015 which was roughly one-quarter of the total. 
Notably, the share of investment in information transit, software and IT increased from a mere 
4.9 per cent in 2015 to 12 per cent in 2016583. In the manufacturing sector, China’s share is also 
increasing. Manufacturing industries acheived 18.3 per cent of the country’s net OFDI in 2016, 
increasing from 15 per cent in 2015584. However, in the primary sector, China’s ODFI only 
                                                          
581 Post, S. C. M. (2016) Key takeaways from China’s 13th five-year plan and annual reports. 
582 Energy Charter Treaty (2017). 
583 Ibid. 
584 Ibid. 
202 | P a g e  
 
amounted to 9 per cent of the national total in 2016585. M&As have also been playing a role in 
the structural adjustment and growth of China’s overseas investment586.  
Moving on to the destinations the OFDI of China is aimed at, there is a trend of more 
investments in the developing countries than the developed ones587. One of the increasingly 
popular destinations for China’s FDI in Africa. China’s total FDI in this region has grown 
threefold from 2000 to 2015, going from 13 Billion to 35 Billion USD. China is focusing on 
Africa not only as a potential source of critical natural resources but also as a fast-growing 
market for Chinese export products. African nations, on the other hand, are keen to get Chinese 
OFDI as this is a source for creating employment, improving public infrastructure, boosting 
international trade and facilitating human development.  
However, over the last decade, investments and M&As aiming for industrialised countries 
have been a new trend for Chinese investors’ FDI operations588. Europe particularly became a 
popular destination for Chinese M&A practices589. In 2016, more than 35 Billion USD were 
invested by the Chinese in Europe which is 77% more than the previous year. In 2016, more 
than 50 per cent of China’s OFDI was in countries such as Germany and the UK, which has 
allowed China to maintain advanced technology and infrastructure assets in these countries590.  
7.1.2 Outward FDI trends in the energy sector  
China has evolved as a major investor in the energy sector with involvement in related 
infrastructure projects throughout the world. In the coming years, China’s OFDI is expected to 
focus on the development of cross-border power grid and transmission stations is already a part 
of the agenda of cooperation between China and its neighbour countries591. Chinese power 
corporations are also being encouraged to take part in power generation and grid projects in 
other countries as well 592 . In order to finance a number of such projects, the Chinese 
Government has founded a 40 billion USD Silk Road Fund to financially support the operations 
                                                          
585 Ibid. 
586 Nolan, P. (2012). 唐曉陽、熊星翰 (2015). 
587 Energy Charter Treaty (2017). See also Global Environmental Institute (2013). 
588 Ferdinand, P. (2016) Westward ho—the China dream and ‘one belt, one road’: Chinese foreign policy under 
Xi Jinping. International Affairs, 92(4), 941-957. See also Nolan, P. (2004). 
589 Ibid. 
590 Energy Charter Treaty (2017). 
591 Greenovation: Hub (2014). 
592 Shan, W. (2015). See also查道炯、李福胜、蔣姮 (2014) 中國境外投資環境與社會風險案例研究, 北京
大學出版社, 北京. 
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of Chinese SOEs around the globe with a goal of creating an energy network with the regions 
like Central Asia, Middle East, South Caucasus, Europe, Africa and Latin America593.    
In order to fund SOEs in their struggle for global impact in the international energy sector 
investments, the Chinese government has founded the Silk Road Fund to provide necessary 
financial support to the energy-related projects. Investment Banks of China have also been 
funding some of the major energy projects, and this trend is expected to continue in future594. 
China has been actively taking part in many energy-related infrastructure constructions 
all over Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America. Along with the progress of the ‘Going Out’ 
strategy and the OBOR Initiative, China’s OFDI in foreign energy projects and construction 
initiatives has been increasing over the last 10 years. Pioneers to invest abroad were China’s 
state-owned oil companies which intended to acquire more oil and gas resources595. Such 
projects were carried out in all the regions like Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and Latin 
America regardless of the political instability these regions were going through. Recently, 
China has been investing considerable amounts in emerging energy technology and developing 
projects for the energy sector to help the country adopt the latest technologies. China has 
become the 20 per cent contributor to the global energy research and development budget in 
2016 with a 7 per cent annual increase since 2012596. 
Now it is hard to deny that China is playing a vital role in the global energy sector. The 
country, even being one of the major producers of fossil fuels worldwide, is also the largest 
importer of the same597. China is more than likely to attain global dominance as a producer and 
provider of renewable energy. As of now, the challenge for Chinese decision-makers is to 
design and implement market and regulatory frameworks that will remove hurdles for overseas 
investors, catalyse energy transition and attract the much-needed investment while keeping 
stranded assets and disputes with the investors to a minimum598.  
                                                          
593 International Energy Agency (2017) and World Energy Investment Report 2017. 
594 Lee, W., & Hein, A. (2017) Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank. Politica Northwestern, 1(1), 6. See also Ma, 
Y. (2014). 
595 Ibid. 
596 Energy Charter Treaty (2017). 
597 Ibid. 
598 Leung and Zhao (2013). See also Liang et al. (2014) The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights 
in China and Globally. Global Business Initiative on Human Rights. 梁曉暉 (2014) 中國及全球範圍內企業
尊重人權的責任, 項目報告書. 
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7.1.3 Energy-related disputes are also growing 
China and other member states of the International Energy Charter have emphasised the 
importance of full access to adequate investment, dispute settlement procedures and 
international investment arbitration599.  
Under current records, Chinese companies are claimants in four cases before ICSID600: 
Beijing Urban Construction vs Yemen601; Ping-An Life Insurance (Group) vs Belgium602; Hong 
Kong’s Standard Chartered Bank vs Electric Supply Company of Tanzania603; Tza Yap Shum 
vs Peru604 and China is respondent in only one case registered in 2014 (Ansung Housing 
Company (Korean) ICSID A RB/14/25)605. 
The arbitration of these Chinese investment disputes against Central Asian illustrates the 
potential of the Energy Charter Treaty in protecting Chinese and foreign investments against 
expropriation and other political risks606. An overview of concrete cases of investment dispute 
settlement will highlight the lessons learned and possible improvements to the investment 
dispute settlement system. 
7.2 Legal frameworks for regulating energy FDI: International and China 
The Chinese government has made great efforts to make the domestic investment 
regulatory environment better for the investors and improve the business conditions for them607. 
First, the government now issues “five-in-one business licenses” for both domestic and foreign 
investors, which has largely streamlined and simplified the business registration procedure608. 
                                                          
599 Han, X. (2010) Environmental Regulation of Chinese Overseas Investment from the Perspective of China. The 
Journal of World Investment & Trade, Volume 11, Issue 3, pp. 375 – 408. See also Energy Charter Treaty 
(2017). 
600 Ibid. 
601 Beijing Urban Construction Group Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/30. 
602  Ping An Life Insurance Company, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company, Limited v. The 
Government of Belgium, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29. 
603 Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited v. Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/20. 
604 Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6. 
605 Ansung Housing Co., Ltd. v. People's Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/25. 
606 Han, X. (2007) The application of the principle of proportionality in Tecmed v. Mexico. Chinese Journal of 
International Law, 6(3), 635-652. See also 查道炯、李福胜、蔣姮 (2014). and 陳臻、楊衛東、周章貴 
(2015) 能源投資典型案例評析, 陽光時代律師事務所, 法律出版社, 北京. 
607 Global Environmental Institute (2013). See also Han, X. (2010). 韓秀麗 (2013) 中國海外投資的環境保護問
題研究–國際投資法視角, 法律出版社, 北京. 
608 Energy Charter Treaty (2017). 
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Second, China has also been taking measures to improve its intellectual property rights regime 
and towards greater liberalisation of capital flows609.  
However, a comprehensive review of all the applicable legal frameworks would be 
beyond the purposes of this chapter. The paragraphs below aim to provide a relatively concise 
overview of the fundmanmental international frameworks, namely the GATT/WTO, Energy 
Charter Treaty, and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Another important task is to 
re-examine China’s involvement as well as participation according to these international norms 
and evaluate the recent social and environmental policy formulations in China’s local 
investment-related regulations. More detail and critical discussions on these regulatory 
frameworks would be presented in section 7.4. 
7.2.1 International frameworks on energy investment 
Analyses have shown that at both national as well as international level, there is an 
emerging sustainability law that controls energy investments610. International law limits the 
exercise of sovereign power in such situations as can cause a negative impact on other countries 
or when it is pursued in an unsustainable manner. 
The main energy sources that are subject to specific international regulation are nuclear 
power and oil and gas611. The use of nuclear energy and fossil fuel causes a lot of potentially 
adverse social, cultural, environmental and health effects. Such projects may result in 
environmental havocs like oil spills, environmental degradation, pollution and the mass scale 
displacement of communities or other accidents that might affect a large number of people. 
Other energy sources, like the renewable ones, are seldom regulated because of the myth that 
their effects are limited only to the national border612.  
                                                          
609  Grunwald, A. (2016) Diverging pathways to overcoming the environmental crisis: A critique of eco-
modernism from a technology assessment perspective. Journal of Cleaner Production. See also李響、陳熹、
彭亮 (2016) 能源法學, 山西經濟出版社, 太原. 
610 De Schutter, O., Swinnen, J., & Wouters, J. (2013) Foreign Direct Investment and Human Development: 
Routledge. See also Redgwell, C. (2001). 
611 Greenovation: Hub (2014). See also 楊解君 (2012) 國際能源合作與國際能源法, 世界圖書出版社, 北京. 
612 Energy Charter Treaty (2017); Economy, E., & Levi, M. (2014). See also 盛斌、段然 (2016) 投資者-東道國
爭端解決機制的發展及對中國的影響, 國際經濟合作, (3), 60-65. 
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ECT and NAFTA are two major international organisations that are directly linked to the 
energy sector613. Both ECT and NAFTA have clear and specific provisions on sustainability. 
ECT was entirely designed for the energy sector while NAFTA has a chapter that expressly 
deals with energy. However, both ECT and NAFTA’s sustainability clauses are subject to 
challenges. The concerns related to these mechanisms overshadow the fairness and neutrality 
of the process. These include the slow pace and seemingly toothless nature of the 
mechanisms614. 
In addition to multilateral treaties, there are also several international soft laws guiding 
the international energy sectors 615 . For instance, the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable 
Development Process (MMSD 2000 – 2002)616, Equator Principles (EPs 2003 updated 2006)617, 
Natural Resources Charter (updated 2010)618, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative619, 
and the Responsible Mineral Development Initiative (2011) by World Economic Forum620 are 
some leading worldwide initiatives to enhance sustainability in the mining and metals sector. 
Review of the international initiatives above carried out over the past 10 years has 
revealed several emerging themes to inform the development of Guidance for Chinese Mining 
Companies and Investors621 by the Chinese government. 
7.2.2 China’s international engagements in treaty making 
                                                          
613 Bellmann, C. (2016). See also Shan, W. (2015); Arcas, R. L., Filis, A., & Abu Gosh, E. S. (2015) International 
Energy Governance. Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar. 
614 Wang et al. (2016) Sustainability Impacts of Chinese Outward Direct Investment: A review of the literature. 
International Institute for Sustainable Development. See also 李貴英 (2013) 在WTO與 ECT架構下檢視能
源貿易與投資之規範: 推動多邊能源規範架構之整合, 國際經貿整合與能源產業發展研討會, 能源局與
台灣經濟研究院, 臺北. 
615  Cotula, L. (2016). Foreign investment, law and sustainable development. International Institute for 
Environment and Development (iied). 薛景文 (2013) 第四代雙邊投資協議 (BITs) 與國際投資協議中環保
抗辯之研究: 國際投資協議之保障標準與地主國環保規範需求之衡平, 行政院國家科學委員會. 
616 Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD), available at: https://www.iied.org/mining-minerals-
sustainable-development-mmsd. 
617 Equator Principles, available at: http://equator-principles.com. 
618 The Natural Resource Charter is a set of principles for governments and societies on how to best harness the 
opportunities created by extractive resources, available at: https://resourcegovernance.org/approach/natural-
resource-charter. 
619 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), available at: https://eiti.org. 
620 The World Economic Forum's Responsible Mineral Development Initiative (RMDI), available at: 
https://www.weforum.org/whitepapers/responsible-mineral-development-initiative-implementation-manual. 
621 Industry Guidelines for Chinese Mining Companies Abroad (IB2017/26), available at: 
http://dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/publications/5764/ib201726-industry-guidelines-
chinese-mining-companies-abroad. 
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China formally joined the WTO in December 2001622. Under the WTO system, although 
the GATS, TRIPS, TRIMs systems are all related to investment, only exceptional clauses touch 
upon environmental issues. However, TRIMS does not say too much about a host country’s 
domestic environmental regulations623. 
The Chinese government also took part in sixteen multilateral environmental treaties, 
which China must implement through international corporation or transformation of its 
domestic legal frameworks624. However, not every treaty obligates the corporations to protect 
against environmental problems caused by their overseas investors. Environmental regulation 
of corporations occur only indirectly when, and if, each country implements any obligations 
the treaty may place upon them. 
According to China's recent bilateral investment treaties, the BITs concluded by China 
still put emphasis on investment protection and do not pay much attention the other public 
values, such as environmental protection and human rights. 
There is even no environmental clause in the China-India BIT in 2006625 and China-
Mexico BIT in 2008626 at all. The exceptions are the BIT between China and Albania627 as well 
as Guyana628. The prefaces of these two BITs have the following wording: “...agreeing that 
these objectives can be achieved without relaxing health, safety and environmental measures 
of general application.” Moreover, there are exceptional exemptions for interference by host 
states to protect the public interest, that means expropriation can be conducted for the public 
or national interest, but there are no explicit definitions about whether they include 
                                                          
622 Casier, L., Fraser, R., Halle, M., & Wolfe, R. (2014) Shining a light on fossil fuel subsidies at the WTO: how 
NGOs can contribute to WTO notification and surveillance. World Trade Review, 13(4), 603-632. See also施
文真 (2013) WTO、氣候變遷與能源, 元照出版社, 臺北. 
623 WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/trims_e.htm. 
624 Ferdinand, P. (2016). See also單文華 (2014). 
625 China - India BIT (2006), UNCTAD, available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mappedContent/treaty/912. 
626 China - Mexico BIT (2008), UNCTAD, available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mappedContent/treaty/938. 
627 China - Albania BIT (1993), UNCTAD, available at: 
https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mappedContent/treaty/9. 
628 China - Guyana BIT (2004), UNCTAD, available at: 
https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/2/treaty/9. 
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environmental interests, and this kind of exceptional clause always will be interpreted very 
strictly.  
Above all, each of these clauses is related to the host state, not the home state or its investor. 
Whether there are specific environmental clauses in BITs is vital because they can impose 
obligations on the parties and their investors, which can also become the reason for 
international investment disputes. 
The different bodies of law are tightly interconnected. For example, international law may 
have an impact on a country’s domestic law-making, and investment agreements may have a 
clause requiring the project to be compliant with other international and national laws. Also, 
the investors or other affected parties may seek compensation via national courts and 
international arbitration mechanisms. Thus, it is also necessary to review the recent 
developments in China’s national regulatory frameworks. 
 7.2.3 China’s national environmental and social policies in outbound FDI 
China has been developing policy mechanisms to address the environmental and social 
issues of Chinese investors629. The 2005 yearly meeting of the National People’s Congress 
stressed the need for Chinese Enterprises to focus on social responsibility when working on 
foreign investment plans; this requirement was made a part of Chinese Company law in 2006630. 
Numerous governmental lawmaking agencies are working on social and environmental 
guidelines to regulate the operations of companies under their control631.  State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration regulatory system looking over the foreign investment projects 
of central SOEs also requires advanced risk assessment and mitigation. In 2007, SASAC 
developed and released “Guidelines to the State-owned Enterprises Directly under the Central 
Government on Fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibilities”632, endorsing that CSR is critical 
for central SOEs to expand their foreign economic ventures. 
                                                          
629 Han, X. (2010). See also查道炯、李福勝、蔣姮 (2014). 
630 Article 5, Company Law of the People's Republic of China, available at 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4814_0_7.html. 
631 See Global Environmental Institute (2013). 劉筍 (2006) 國際投資與環境保護的法律衝突與協調 — 以晚
近區域性投資條約及相關案例為研究對象, 現代法學, 28(6), 34-44. 
632 Guidelines to the State-owned Enterprises Directly under the Central Government ... enterprises (SOEs), 
SASAC China, available at: http://en.sasac.gov.cn/2011/12/06/c_313.htm. 
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In February of 2013, Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) and Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM) jointly released guidelines that could reform the social as well as 
environmental impact of Chinese companies working on investment projects in foreign 
countries. The “Guidelines on Environmental Protection for Overseas Investment and Coop-
eration”633 require that all Chinese institutions working abroad should carry on environmental 
impact assessments, work on mitigation measures and work along with the local communities 
to find out the potentially harmful effect of their investment. Even though these guidelines are 
based mainly on environmental problems and do not focus much on social issues, they are a 
crucial first leap towards developing a more sustainable approach throughout China’s foreign 
investment projects. As of early 2017, the implementation of these policies was still in the 
pipeline. The actual implementation of these policies on the ground will be the second and the 
most vital step in bringing the change.  
Some financial bodies in China have formulated their policies634. The Export-Import Bank 
of China (China Exim) released some guidelines bringing the attention of their prospective 
clients to the expected social and environmental impacts of their operations. In 2008, China 
Exim and China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development 
(CCICED) together released a more precise framework: “Guidelines for Environmental and 
Social Impact Assessment of the China Export-Import Bank's Loan Projects”635. Under these 
guidelines, China Exim was given the right to address social and environmental aspects in both 
the local and foreign financing contracts. Companies that want to get bank financing are bound 
to conduct social and environmental assessments before starting an international project. They 
also give the bank the power to keep in check the client’s implementation of the said assessment. 
As one of the greatest export credit agencies in the world and one of China’s most powerful 
policy banks, China Exim’s approach to social and environmental risk management can be a 
trendsetter for other Chinese investors. CDB also endorsed environmental policies, like 
restricting access to credit to companies engaged in “high energy consumption, high pollution 
                                                          
633 Guidelines on Environmental Protection for Overseas Investment and Cooperation, MOFCOM, China, 
available at: http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/bbb/201303/20130300043226.shtml 
634 See Lee, W., & Hein, A. (2017). See also韓秀麗 (2013). 
635 Guidelines for Environmental and Social Impact Assessment of the China Export-Import Bank's Loan Projects, 
CCIECD China, available at: https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/guidelines-for-environmental-
and-social-impact-assessments-of-the-china-export-and-import. 
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and excess capacity” industries, and putting in place environmental impact assessment loan 
veto arrangements.  
Moreover, the Chinese-led AIIB also formed an Environmental and Social Framework 
(ESF)636 in 2016, which is a system meant to help the new development bank and its clients to 
achieve socially and environmentally sustainable development results637. It is achieved by 
integrating good international practice on social and environmental planning and risk 
management and impacts decision-making on, and development and implementation of, Bank-
supported Projects. 
Industrial associations and stakeholders are also starting to set up social and 
environmental standards638. For instance, in 2007 and 2009, two guides regarding sustainable 
foreign practices were released: “A Guide to Sustainable Overseas Silviculture by Chinese 
Enterprises” (State Forestry Administration)639 and “A Guide to Sustainable Overseas Forests 
Management and Utilization by Chinese Enterprises” (State Forestry Administration and 
MOFCOM)640. In October 2014, “Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining 
Operations” were released by the Ministry of Commerce China641. 
The guidelines deal with a number of operational issues like corporate environmental 
management, conservation of cultural heritage, labour issues, human rights and community 
engagement. Also, some associations, like the China International Contractors Association, are 
also working on developing new guidelines. However, most of the current guidelines are non-
legally binding642. 
7.3 China’s overseas investment in hydropower and extractive industries 
                                                          
636  AIIB's Environmental and Social Framework (ESF), AIIB, available at: https://www.aiib.org/en/policies-
strategies/_download/environment-framework/20160226043633542.pdf. 
637 Lee, W., & Hein, A. (2017). See also Ma, Y. (2014). See also 張曉君、孫南翔 (2016) 企業海外投資的非政
府性障礙及中國的對策研究, 現代法學, 2016年第 1期. 
638 See Greenovation: Hub (2014). 楊振發 (2013). 




640 Ibid.  
641 Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments, China Chamber of Commerce of 
Metals, Minerals and Chemicals CCMC, available at https://www.emm-network.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/CSR-Guidelines-2nd-revision.pdf. 
642 Ibid. 
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This chapter does not only aim to introduce the development of related rules and 
regulations but also plans to understand the key drivers behind these regulatory changes and 
the interactions between different values, such as human rights, economic development and 
nature conservation. 
Existing studies primarily emphasise the analyses of the international investment treaties 
and the investment arbitration case laws643 related to them. However, this chapter is more 
concerned with the local and individual levels and assumes that these local resistances and 
social movements against energy investment projects are a crucial driving force for legal and 
policy innovation. 
This section firstly reviews China’s overseas investment in hydropower and extractive 
industries as well as their negative impacts on the affected communities.  It is also useful to 
examine some positive cases of successful collaborations between Chinese energy companies 
and local communities. This chapter also discusses their achievements and potentials for 
improving environmental regulation and environmental governance model at different levels. 
7.3.1 China’s hydropower industry goes global 
Since the dawn of the 21st-century, Chinese corporations have emerged as major entities 
in global dam building. The first major overseas dam building project for the Chinese 
companies was the much debated Merowe Dam of Sudan (started 2003) which was funded by 
the China Exim Bank. As of now, Chinese Dam constructors and financers constitute 75 per 
cent of the global dams being constructed, mainly for electric power generation.  
However, dam building is the key point of all the social and environmental controversy 
regarding Chinese investment projects. Chinese dam constructors are generally willing to take 
high governance, environmental and geographical risks for their projects. A number of high-
profile protests against hydropower and mining projects of Chinese companies were recorded 
in 2005 and 2006644. 
                                                          
643 Gordon, K., Pohl, J., & Bouchard, M. (2011); Barra, M. (2015). Overview and Lessons Learnt in Central 
Asia from Investment Disputes under the Energy Charter Treaty. Meeting of the Energy Charter Industry 
Advisory Panel, China National Petroleum Corporation, Beijing; Segger, M. C. C., & Weeramantry, J. C. 
(Eds.). (2017). 查道炯、李福勝、蔣姮 (2014). 
644 McDonald, K., Bosshard, P., & Brewer, N. (2009) Exporting dams: China's hydropower industry goes global. 
Journal of environmental management, 90, S294-S302. See also葛察忠、夏友富、智穎飆、龍風 (2010). 
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The government of Myanmar halted the Myitsone Dam and hydroelectric power project 
in 2011, a project of the China Power Investment Corporation that continued for more than 10 
years645. The suspension was due to some prominent environmental and social issues pointed 
out by the locals, including conservation of biodiversity and migrant relocation. 
In Nepal, Chinese dam constructors are significantly involved in the hydropower projects. 
Nepal requires a generating capacity of 1,200 MW to cope with the regular blackouts that 
happen during dry seasons in Kathmandu646. As of now, two projects are on the way under two 
Chinese hydropower companies. Both of these projects raise serious concerns among NGOs 
and local communities about their impact on the environment and how risks are being managed. 
The public has boycotted the two projects due to the lack of institutional management by the 
Nepalese government. 
These cases have raised numerous concerns regarding the potential negative impacts of 
Chinese companies taking overseas dam projects. First, China’s foreign hydropower industry 
has followed the footsteps of its domestic hydropower industry. The Chinese dam constructions 
have yet to prove that it can be environmentally and socially responsible within China, only 
then the industry’s ability to do so abroad can be called into question. Second, the primary 
strategy of investors from China is to make those resources accessible which were inaccessible 
previously, such as the resources found in conservation sites. Third, major Chinese financiers, 
investors and equipment suppliers building dams abroad have so far not fully implemented 
human rights or environmental guidelines. And the guidelines they adopted may not be 
consistent with the global standards. 
Moreover, the Chinese dam builders have not been openly interacting with civil societies, 
but they have been adaptive and quick at learning to engage with NGOs. Some Chinese 
corporations have made efforts to collaborate with the local NGOs. Meanwhile, host countries 
also engage with the Chinese dam builders for constructive dialogues. The governments have 
invited local NGOs to provide recommendations and input to their environmental policy-
making including assessment of high-risk, sensitive projects. 
7.3.2 Chinese participation in extractive industries  
                                                          
645 Gleick, P. H. (2012). China dams. In The world’s water (pp. 127-142). Island Press, Washington, DC. 
646 Wilmsen, B., Webber, M., & Yuefang, D. (2011). Development for whom? Rural to urban resettlement at the 
Three Gorges Dam, China. Asian Studies Review, 35(1), 21-42. See also查道炯、李福勝、蔣姮 (2014). 
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Extractive industries produce non-renewable resources. The exploitation of non-
renewable natural resources, such as minerals, oil, gas and timber, needs a tremendous amount 
of energy as well as heavy machinery, and the negative impacts on water and land due to the 
infrastructure development of such projects affect states all around the world especially the 
ecologically and politically fragile ones647. 
For the past two decades, the Chinese extractive industries have been actively 
participating in search of non-renewable natural resources abroad648. After a series of riots and 
protests in states like Sudan, Gabon and Zambia, Chinese financiers and government bodies 
seem to be more aware that environmental deterioration and compromising human rights in 
Chinese projects can result in an unacceptable backlash. For instance, Zijin Mining Group’s 
project of the Rio Blanco Copper mine in Peru had to be suspended and aborted due to a local 
public outcry in 2006649. 
Case studies650 from Peru illustrated problems both in the Peruvian government’s policy 
and legal frameworks and the extent of Chinese companies’ CSR strategies. The Peru 
government increased taxes and duties on the mining firms. It is a reform plan to redistribute 
finance from mining projects. Also, Peru established the Ministry of Environment in 2008 and 
had also recently joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. 
The government made the International Labour Organization Convention a part of their 
constitution to guarantee prior consultation rights for tribal and local peoples on projects that 
can potentially impact their lives in any way651. Consulting the tribal people is crucial because 
there is a high level of social conflict surrounding these projects and the Chinese financiers and 
developers.  
How are the Chinese TNCs different from their western counterparts in this field? Some 
scholars suggested that there are minor differences and more similarities652. Just like western 
corporations, Chinese mining companies' projects are market-oriented. Their goal is to 
                                                          
647 Janson, J., Burke C. and Jiang, W. (2009) Chinese Companies in the Extractive Industries of Gabon & the 
DRC: Perceptions of Transparency. Center for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch. 
648 Ibid. 
649 “Significant progress in Rio Blanco Copper-Molybdenum Mine”, available at: 
http://www.zijinmining.com/investors/117500.htm. 
650 Jason, Burke and Jiang (2009). 
651 ILO Conventions, available at https://www.ilo.org/moscow/areas-of-work/gender-
equality/WCMS_249143/lang--en/index.htm. 
652 Weng, L., Sayer, J. A., & Xue, L. (2017). 
214 | P a g e  
 
maximise profit, identify the best location of resources, create stakeholder values, and cope 
with the social and environmental risks. One the other hand, a major difference is that some 
Chinese corporations have recently expanded their global presence and become real TNCs; 
they are still on the learning and experiencing stage. Examples are present of the Chinese 
companies that relocated whole communities and cleaned up the environmental damages 
created by the previous operations. 
Other than mining, Chinese oil and gas companies also struggle with local politics when 
working abroad. The Chinese involvement in the petroleum industry was considerably 
reinforced in August 2009 when Sinopec took over Addax, thus gaining rights over the 
Canadian company’s investments in Gabon. 
Gabonese stakeholders who were made a part of the consultation argued that now Sinopec 
complies with international standards regarding business operations, environmental protection, 
and community engagement653. The issue regarding initial insufficient environmental impact 
assessment for the Lotus block in 2006 has long been resolved, although many Gabonese still 
cannot forget this event. 
7.3.3 Positive recent changes: From resistance to collaboration 
According to the negative case studies mentioned above, it is possible to summarise the 
major environmental and social risks brought by the Chinese overseas energy projects654:  
1) insufficient CSR awareness and improper monitoring;  
2) the communication gap between the stakeholders and the inadequate disclosure of 
information;  
3) unplanned and inappropriate investment decisions that can cause social conflicts, and  
4) poor environmental policies and implementation in the host states.  
With the experiences, the Chinese investors have now realised that their relations with the 
host government can be improved significantly. They need to develop and maintain positive 
and constructive relations with the host communities, civil society groups and trade unions in 
order to be successful in the host regions for the long term. Besides negative aspects of these 
                                                          
653 Ibid. 
654 Leung and Zhao (2013). 
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protests, it would also be necessary to look at the positive values of these communities’ 
engagements.  
The following paragraphs present two examples of cross-sector collaborations between 
host communities, non-governmental organisations and Chinese investors, which, to some 
extent, demonstrate the power and potential of legal and policy innovation from below.  
1) “Gulf Community Agreement” 
The “Gulf Community Agreement” is a multi-sector agreement which is signed by the 
Government of Queensland, MMG (Minmetals Hanxing Mining Co., Ltd, China Minmetals 
Corporation) and local peoples655. The goal of this agreement is to protect local cultural 
heritage and environment and offer employment opportunities and related skills training for 
citizens in the gulf area. 
Working in collaboration with UN-Habitat and international environmental NGOs, this 
agreement focuses on public health, infrastructure construction, education training, micro-
credit and agriculture financing for indigenous communities656. In practice, this agreement 
leads the Chinese corporation to emphasise environmental protection and has gained an 
environmental certification of the ISO14001. This cooperative agreement also includes 
biodiversity protection plans that aim to protect the endangered species in the affected area. 
The cross-sector agreement also has developed a US $3 million community development 
trust fund managed by the Queensland Government as well as the Chinese company and 
representatives of the community. With the trust fund’s financial backing, the Chinese mining 
company worked in cooperation with Golden Grove and other local bodies to provide 
vocational training and help young locals secure jobs in mining and other fields. 
2) International Rivers Program 
The International Rivers is an American environmental NGO. The organisation is looking 
over 304 hydropower ventures in 74 countries in which Chinese energy corporations or 
investors are involved in some way657. This NGO does not only focus on overseas Chinese 
                                                          
655 Gulf Communities Agreement. 2008-2013, available at: 
https://www.csrm.uq.edu.au/MMG_Century_15_year_GCA_Review_FINAL.pdf. 
656 See Everingham, J., Barnes, R., & Brereton, D. (2013). Gulf Communities Agreement 2008-2013. 15-year 
Review. Brisbane: CSRM, The University of Queensland. 
657 China Global Dams Database, The International Rivers, available at: 
https://www.internationalrivers.org/taxonomy/term/1332. 
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investors but also studies and devotes similar services to dam constructors in the European 
Union, the United States and other regions. 
The International Rivers started a long-term plan in 2006, which, on the one hand, 
reinforces the capacities of indigenous communities and civil society organisations658, and, on 
the other hand, aims to enhance Chinese international dam constructors’ social and 
environmental performance. The approach is derived from the supposition that this model is 
fruitful to the public interest as well as to the long-term business projects.   
The program follows a range of strategies to engage with Chinese enterprises and other 
important stakeholders. 1) The International Rivers analyse the decision-making processes of 
the selected dam projects. The NGO staff also monitors the implementations through site visits. 
2) The program uses various social media approaches to create awareness about environmental 
and social impacts of China’s dam projects. 3) International Rivers establishes an effective 
dialogue mechanism directly with Chinese enterprises, financiers and community leaders to 
discuss environmental impacts and social policies.  
Since 2009, that effective dialogue mechanism has helped International Rivers converse 
with the staff and management of Sinohydro, the largest hydropower contractor in China as 
well as in the world. This string of dialogues encouraged Sinohydro to adopt a Sustainable 
Development Policy Framework that is at par with the highest global standards659. 
The mechanism respects the indigenous peoples’ rights as directed by the UN declaration, 
decides to develop grievance mechanisms for compensating the damages of project-affected 
people, promises to comply with the safeguard policies of the World Bank, and defines 
environmentally sensitive areas, such as national parks.  
Sinohydro has also focused on International Rivers’ recommendations on a range of 
foreign dam projects. It decides to give up some problematic projects, like the Agua Zarca Dam 
in Honduras, a project that had the potential for severe violations of the human rights. 
The SASAC, the State Council of China, and other government bodies started providing 
guidelines to bring forward environmentally and socially responsible overseas projects by 
                                                          
658 Hu and Wang (2014) Environmental and Social Risk Management of Chinese Transnational Corporation. 
Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies and WWF. 
659 Sinohydro’s Sustainable Development, Health Safety and Environment, and Ethics Policies, available at: 
https://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/sinohydro-corporation. 
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Chinese enterprises. The China Banking Regulatory Commission and China Exim Bank 
developed and released environmental guidelines660. 
Globally, China was also engaged in developing the safeguard guidelines of various 
development banks, including the World Bank661, to assess, avoid or mitigate the social and 
environmental risks related to hydropower projects 662 . The case studies above have 
demonstrated the power of community engagement for driving legal and governance 
innovations at the local, national and transnational levels. 
7.4 The “bottom-up” legal innovations: Challenges and opportunities  
The case studies above illustrate that China's overseas energy investment, especially 
hydropower, mining and oil extraction, has operated in various geographical locations around 
the world. According to the local resistance cases in Myanmar, Peru and Gabon, Chinese 
enterprises usually obtain official permission to develop from the host states but have to ensure 
they are also offered social licenses from local communities. 
Most of these actions of resistance have caused the suspension of China's overseas energy 
investment projects. In some cases, after constructive conversations with the residents, the 
Chinese enterprises and governmental authorities made some new adjustments to their legal 
rules and policies, responding to the pressure from resistances. These changes make the 
investment projects successfully restart.  
This section provides a closer analysis of this legal and governance evolution process. It 
also evaluates this process and trends by focusing on three major aspects: 1) the limitations of 
current international investment frameworks, 2) China’s challenges for implementing its 
related regulations and 3) the values of this “bottom-up” legal innovation process. 
7.4.1 Limitations of the existing international approaches  
International investment law regulates global capital; this body of international law 
focuses on international economic relationships. From a historical perspective, international 
                                                          
660 China Export-Import Bank - Environmental Management Framework, available at: 
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investment law usually excludes non-economic elements from its realm. The successful 
enforcement of international investment law, to some extent, relies on the stability and 
predictability of its instruments for investor protection663. 
Professor Sornarajah, in his recent book “Resistance and Change in the International Law 
on Foreign Investment” (2015, Cambridge University Press), argues that the current 
international investment framework is not functioning well664. Particularly, he argues an urgent 
need for recalibrating the international arbitration system for investment disputes, in which he 
pointed out the role of neoliberalism in the operation of the investment arbitration system. 
Regarding the possibility of balancing interests between foreign investors and public interests, 
Sornarajah argues that the application of the doctrine of proportionality in new treaties and 
investment arbitrations may not be regarded as an appropriate solution to current problems. 
He also divides the evolution of international investment law on into three major periods 
of change: 1) the period of expansion, which started in 1990, placing emphasis on investment 
protection; 2) the period of conflict during which modern model treaties, such as the 2004 US 
Model Treaty, paid attention to the host state’s interests; and 3) the period of uncertainty which 
began in 2008665. 
The historical origin favours the interests of investment protection at the cost of local 
citizens and their habitats 666 . In the period of uncertainty, the international investment 
agreements do not always provide clear guidelines for transnational corporations to engage 
with peoples in the Third World, who are usually the most vulnerable to the negative impacts 
of foreign investment and international investment law 667 . Though there is considerable 
diversity in the law governing energy investment projects in low and middle-income economies, 
a common recurring theme is the existence of imbalances in legal frameworks668. 
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When the energy investment is the subject, international law recognises that each state has 
sovereign rights over its natural resources and has the right to develop its domestic legislations. 
One of the most significant tasks that the ECT, NAFTA, WTO’s investment section and other 
investment treaties face is the need for autonomous regulation for the issues of human rights 
and environmental protection, and also complying with the obligations of the state parties 
towards any foreign investing parties669. A lack of clear guidelines in the investment treaties 
for the resolution of potential issues brings about strict policy and legal challenges for foreign 
investors and state parties, as they have to rely on the decisions made by independent tribunals.   
International energy investment law has been instrumental in fortifying the legal 
safeguarding of foreign investments 670 . In contrast, the efforts made for improving the 
readiness of the legal frameworks so that investments have a sustainable development have 
progressed more slowly. One example is the lack of advancements in international human 
rights laws, which have made them lag behind the legal protection that international law gives 
to foreign investment. 
In contrast to the legal arrangements to protect and promote foreign investment, the 
arrangements to address social and environmental considerations are often left to non-binding 
guidelines and standards that struggle to address the major power asymmetries at stake. In 
many issues regarding the environment or those with a social impact, the ruling is often left to 
the non-legally binding local customs and standards671. 
In the future, the recalibrating of the international energy investment law is necessary so 
that it acts in an environmentally and socially acceptable way672. 
7.4.2 Current challenges faced by China 
The Chinese government has encouraged its SOEs to invest internationally under its 
“Going Out” strategy; this has notably increased since the new millennium673. Regulations 
concerning outbound FDI have been rapidly developing in the past few decades. These laws 
have been created and drafted to increase overseas investments by accelerating the 
administrative approval process 674 . However, this chapter has observed that China’s 
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sustainable development and environmental protection laws for FDI are either incomplete or 
do not even exist. 
More recently, the Chinese government has begun creating different regulations which 
aim to mitigate the problems that investing companies face when they invest in global 
infrastructure and natural resource projects. In practice, the host countries in which Chinese 
companies invest also lack of strong legal frameworks for mitigating social and environmental 
risks675.  
According to CBRC’s new Green Credit Guidelines, Article 21 requires that financing 
institutes need to ensure project operators abide by the host country’s domestic regulations, 
especially the environmental, land, public health and safety laws 676 . Also, the guidelines 
(Article 5) set by China’s Ministry of Commerce asks corporations shall respect and obey the 
host country’s environmental laws and regulations677. 
However, only relying on local laws is not enough678. The first hurdle is the lack of 
understanding of the legal and regulatory clauses in the host countries. Environmental 
regulations are often seen to be insufficient in many developing nations. Local communities 
will not be satisfied and will suffer if the Chinese companies only adhere to the pre-existing 
guidelines in the host nation’s laws. Also on occasion, the foreign investors and host nation are 
both united in both the pursuance and detriment of public welfare, a phenomenon known as the 
“resource curse”. 
Elizabeth Economy points out another interesting aspect. In her recent book, she argues 
that the most effective method by which people can understand the effects of foreign Chinese 
investment on a host nation is the way that these companies operate back home, where it has 
been seen that neither the companies nor the Chinese government pay much heed to 
environmental preservation679.  
The example that Economy uses is of the Environmental Impact Assessment, whose 
practice has been discredited due to political hurdles created by local government officials, 
corruption, as well as data fraud. The Chinese government has only very recently begun to try 
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to regulate this field, its own “grow at all costs” policy has often been very damaging to the 
environment. As a result, the voluntary guidelines in place by the Chinese companies, their 
effectiveness when used in another country is a highly controversial topic. 
Future investment agreements, such as BITs and FTAs concluded by China, should pay 
more attention to the host country’s natural environment as well as the responsibility of Chinese 
transnational corporations to preserve the host country's environment. China should enhance 
its control of the environmental impact of the foreign investment, and this measure should not 
be seen as a conflicting measure with regards to the broader regulatory power of the host 
country. 
7.4.3 Place people at the centre of investment processes 
As mentioned, discussions about the international legal frameworks on investment are 
often framed in top-down, macro-level forms680. International investment law cannot ignore 
anymore that the massive resistance from developing countries has not altered its essential 
domain. 
Grass-root social movements are attempting to direct foreign investment law towards 
humanitarian causes which have had a fair amount of attention in international law. With each 
interaction with the concerned authorities, these ground-level movements align themselves 
with regulatory and participatory bodies. The international community is adverted to these 
groups’ statuses (or lack thereof) within the international economic order and the impacts of 
their actions on international investment law681.  
The ICSID case of Tenicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States 
("Tecmed v. Mexico") provides perhaps the best illustration of this changing wind682. The 
reason for this arbitration decision is the evaluation of the different stakeholders when 
developing international investment law. Before, the position of the developing nations with 
regards to these laws was not ideal or favourable, but now with increased activism from the 
domestic groups, a reconstructed international investment system is in transition. 
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The international investment regulatory systems are often altered due to the protests and 
resistance683. International investment law, therefore, should recognise resistance even though 
it makes an effort to exclude the phenomenon from its realm, especially when it emerges from 
grass-roots activists groups (those who do not fall within the expert and international NGO 
category). However, the question, resistance by whom and through which strategies, remains. 
This new approach brings the concerned people to the centre of the issue, rather than 
relegating them to being side-lined, passive victims or beneficiaries of the development 
projects.684 Such methods will both advance investment models that are in keeping with the 
locals’ real demands, as well as increase the faith and legitimacy of the foreign investors in 
those countries. 
In the case studies of Chinese overseas energy investment, leading Chinese transnational 
enterprises like to maintain a good corporate image and reputation.  Unfortunately, the Chinese 
extractive and hydropower companies are not precisely homogeneous representations of the 
Chinese government despite them being owned by the state. A better result can be obtained if 
the negotiations are both with the companies individually and also the governments of both the 
host and home nations. The modern foreign investment law has emerged through a highly 
dynamic process involving decentralised negotiations and contestation.  
Consequently, it would be able to claim that people welcome social movement activists, 
NGOs, and individual companies for their representation and safeguarding. These 
organisations push pre-existing governance mechanisms and investment laws towards a more 
environmentally and socially sustainable outcome. 
NGOs, and social activists and their movements are seen in this new model as the tools 
through which a new legal system is constructed which can be used for future partnerships685. 
Advocates may utilise the various legal norms strategically by utilising the law to its maximum 
potential and creating a room for bottom-up debates 686 . At the moment the different 
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organisations of law give many chances to activists to campaign for alteration at all levels, be 
it local, national, international and transnational.  
In September 2015, 17 Sustainable Development Goals were created by the UN General 
Assembly. These recognise the need for private investment in the achievement of these goals 
and put people in the centre of the global agenda from 2015 to 2030.  
Other international guidelines include UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Framework for 
Sustainable Development which was launched in 2012 (a revised edition was released in 
2015)687. The essential principles adopted by this policy framework ensures that investment 
policy promotes sustainable development, and provides insights for NGOs and local 
communities to harness multiple legal tools which can make a real difference to the regulatory 
architecture and enforcement of natural resource investment and governance. 
7.5. Conclusion: Can China lead the way in green governance? 
Ever since the country’s economic reforms, China’s FDI has increased at a very rapid rate. 
Due to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s roles and the “One Belt One Road” 
development plans, it is anticipated that Chinese outward infrastructure and energy investments 
will grow both in the Eurasian region as well as globally.  
The evidences has demonstrated that China had put much effort into improving both its 
international and domestic investment laws and policies for sustainable investment.  However, 
as the case studies regarding hydro-power projects and overseas extractive operations 
illustrated in this chapter, the ‘top-down’ regulatory approach alone may not be strong enough 
to resolve the conflicts that occurred in the affected communities. 
This chapter has presented the case studies of Chinese overseas investment in hydropower 
and extractive industries. These projects face severe local resistances, but some of these critical 
interactions become the catalyst for environmental law and governance innovations at various 
levels, such as the Gulf community agreement and the International Rivers programs.    
The international frameworks for regulating cross-boundary energy investment, including 
the WTO/GATT system, ECT, NAFTA and other bilateral investment treaties, so far are still 
incomplete and unbalanced; there are still legal and geographical constraints in the application. 
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The environmental provisions within those investment treaties usually do not have direct legal 
binding on the enterprises. China is now just joining the ECT system, but of course, does not 
involve NAFTA. International investment law indeed has a history of putting more emphasis 
on investment protection rather than public interests in the host countries and local 
communities.      
Though the Chinese governments and financial institutions have made some progress in 
enhancing the domestic sustainable development policies in outbound investment, the progress 
is relatively slow. The published voluntary standards and guidelines are also not legally binding, 
and they have faced many challenges in terms of implementation and enforcement overseas. 
On the other hand, this chapter has presented a model for legal innovation (stimulated by the 
grass-roots power). According to our observations, the Chinese investors can usually obtain 
legal permissions to develop from the host states' governmental authorities but have problems 
having social licenses to operate. Local resistance and social movements against Chinese 
investment projects eventually shape the companies' behaviours and stimulate the legal 
innovation both at the national and international levels.         
These local protests make the Chinese companies recognise the fact that they cannot just 
rely on the local laws and the permissions from the governments but also need to engage with 
the local communities and other stakeholders directly. These cross-sector collaborations play 
a significant role in improving transnational environmental governance and creating future 
legal reforms, such as the cases of the Gulf community agreement and International River 
program.  
Based on the evidence above, China’s energy corporations and commercial lawyers have 
not played a very influential role in designing innovative mechanisms to safeguard affected 
communities’ public interests. There is a huge space for these two important actors to enhance 
their awareness and capacities in this significant matter. China’s government, industry 
associations and international environmental NGOs may assist to meet the demand for 
capacity-building in the near future.       
Accroding to Harvard professor Joseph Nye, the concept of ‘soft power’ plays a key role 
in China’s future development and its overseas impacts. To be more specific, if China likes to 
become a real world leader in the future, the country should not only rely on its ‘hard power’ 
(such as the military, political and economic powers) but also has to enchance its ‘soft power’, 
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including leaderships in sustainable development, culture and the rule of law688. Economy also 
argue 689  that the creation of AIIB can be a chance to see how China introduces robust 
environmental standards to global infrastructure investment. 
Eventually, the purpose of this chapter is not to criticise China’s overseas environmental 
performance according to the Western or international standards. The world has seen 
improvements from the Chinese governments and enterprises, and the scenario of “China is 
buying the world” is so far not true. By examining the case of China’s outbound energy 
investment, this chapter highlights the importance of local resistance and presents a model of 
legal and governance reforms through cross-sector cooperation. This research argues that 
China should reflect on the positive values of these local protests or “bottom-up” resistances, 
rather than just seeing them as non-commercial risks to be eliminated. If China plans to lead 
the way in green governance, it should pay more attention to those “bottom-up” innovative 
ideas. 
Of course, in the future, there is a need for more detailed empirical studies on this topic. 
This chapter tends to address that resistance and survival are also an integral part of the public 
international law. Moreover, the concept of resistance may be applied to various bodies of 
international law, such as investment, trade, environment and human rights. After all, the 
essential spirit of international law is to seek peace of human beings and sustainable 
development of our planet. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion   
“You cannot get through a single day without having an impact on the world around you. What you 
do makes a difference, and you have to decide what kind of difference you want to make." — Jane 
Goodall 
This thesis so far has critically examined various modern contractual mechanisms by 
which the economic benefits of energy investment is balanced with other values of sustainable 
development through a ‘State-Investor-Population (S-I-P) Triangle’ lens (with a strong focus 
on China’s outward and inward energy investment projects).  
This final chapter concludes with summaries of the main empirical research findings, 
arguments and their implications for both theoretical discussions and practical policy-making. 
Some recommendations for further research will also be addressed. 
8.1 Summarising research findings and discussion narratives  
The relations between cross-boundary energy investment and other environmental and 
social values are not a brand-new topic. An example is BP’s Deepwater Horizon accident in 
the Gulf of Mexico.  
This thesis tackles this challenging issue and assess the functions of various innovative 
regulatory and policy instruments for regulating energy FDI and safeguarding affected 
communities and the environment. It critically examines contemporary bilateral and 
multilateral energy investment contracts via a sustainable development analytical lens and 
discusses their potential for future regulatory and policy innovations. 
1) Regulating FDI is an issue of global energy governance 
In order to establish the background narratives, Chapter 1 identified significant recent 
trends in global energy investment. The significance of energy FDI for energy security and 
sustainable development, energy investment’s negative impacts, and energy-related investment 
disputes are all on the rise. The bird’s eye observation of these recent trends help us to find the 
emerging and significant issues, identify the knowledge gap and adjust the suitable analytical 
lens to approach them. 
Indeed, law is only one aspect of the whole story and has many limitations for 
implementing; regulating FDI is an issue of global energy governance. A well-designed 
international agreement for regulating FDI in the energy sectors should balance economic 
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growth, energy security and other public policy (e.g. environmental protection and human 
rights) considerations appropriately. It is necessary to investigate how these international 
treaties, national laws, soft laws and other project-specific instruments interact with each other. 
2) Revisited the SIP triangle with the lens of sustainable development 
The concept of sustainable development provides a handy lens to assess quality in energy 
investment processes. Sustainable development is a flexible and evolving concept. In the 
investment context, corporations, states and affected citizens have the chance to discuss 
competing visions of what constitutes the nature of sustainable development and how to 
balance multiple values. 
Also, this research revisited the “State-Investor-Population” Triangle. Contemporary 
international investment law has become unbalanced in overemphasising investment protection 
over the regulatory authority of the host countries and, more importantly, the affected citizens 
and public interests. To understand the complex interplays within the SIP triangle, one should 
not only focus on the practices of State-investor contracts but also analyse the other different 
aspects, namely the P-I and S-P dimensions within the whole triangle that have other regulatory 
focuses. This tripartite framework provides useful insights for framing the inquiries of this 
research. 
3) The working hypothesis of this research 
The overall working hypothesis of this research is that the ‘bottom-up’ driving forces, 
such as energy MNCs, NGOs, and commercial lawyers, are increasingly mobilising the use 
and the design of contractual arrangements and quasi-contractual agreements/partnerships in 
the cross-boundary energy investment scenario. 
This research used different online resources open for the public in order to compile a 
dataset covering three major types of contracts: State-investor investment contracts, Business-
NGO partnerships and multi-actor investment contracts within the ‘S-I-P triangle’. 
4) The evaluation of State-investor contracts’ contracting patterns and performances 
A State-investor contract is a legal agreement between the host states and foreign investors, 
which can help enhance the S-I dimension’s governing functions in the whole SIP triangle. 
These investment contracts can be viewed as a significant segment of the whole legal 
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frameworks for regulating transboundary energy investments because these contractual 
documents can detail the obligations and rights of both host countries and foreign corporations. 
For the past decades, state investment contracts have dominated the investments in the 
extractive and energy industries. Since the early 20th century, investment importing host states 
granted excessively large concessions, especially in the oil and gas sector, to investors to 
extract natural resources within their territories, and sometimes these concessions spanned 
across the entire country or the region.  
This research has charted the evolution of the relevant environmental and social 
provisions embedded in the investment contracts. The discussions have covered their strengths 
for preventing environmental and social harm and for stimulating future regulatory innovation. 
In sum, investment contracts have both advantages and disadvantages. Though these 
investment contracts may include some provisions regarding environmental protection and 
human rights, in general, these provisions so far have not provided enough protection for local 
citizens, communities and the natural environment. Due to the current fragmented legal 
frameworks, third parties’ rights and interests sometimes may not be enforced effectively. The 
actual performances of these state-investor contracts would depend on the negotiators who can 
participate in the contract negotiations and how they design these crucial contracts. 
5) The Business-NGO partnerships in Greater China’s energy sector 
Regarding the contracts in the ‘I-P’ dimension, this research examined the contracting 
practices, namely the Business-NGO partnerships, in Greater China’s oil and gas sector. This 
research has examined in depth the geographies, politics and performances of the on-going 
CSPs among the oil and gas corporations and NGOs operating in Greater China. The study 
focuses on seven international, two Taiwanese and four Chinese state-owned oil and gas 
corporations and reports that there are currently sixty-two CSPs working in greater China. 
However, the majority of these CSPs are yet at the charity level. This research applies social 
actor and institutional perspectives to understand and compare the Chinese state-owned, 
international and Taiwanese oil and gas companies on the issues related to partnering with 
NGOs. 
The results indicate that it is true that partnerships act as a progressive instrument to foster 
development but they also pose considerable limitations. The lack of constructive involvement 
between the non-profit sector and the corporate industry can be, up to some extent, attributed 
229 | P a g e  
 
to isomorphic pressures within Business-NGO relationships in Greater China. Moreover, 
NGOs are relatively new social phenomena in the Chinese context.  
This research has pointed out oil and gas companies operating in Greater China have not 
fully recognised that NGOs have significant expertise in environmental protection and social 
development. On the other hand, NGOs in China have not been matured enough to be a member 
of an epistemic community where the energy corporations can use their experience or 
knowledge. So, the CSP landscape of this region is significantly defined by the major oil and 
gas corporations, and the CSP geographies are not very much community-based and problem-
oriented. Therefore, it would be difficult to deny that the major oil and gas corporations 
effectively and socially form the current CSPs.  
Due to the unique historical background of the development of NGO-business 
collaborations in Greater China, this research establishes that ‘critical cooperation’ is a 
compelling strategy for the non-profit organisations, particularly for the grassroots to form 
partnerships with the energy corporations. Furthermore, the authorities including the Chinese 
local government and other social entities play a notable role in establishing an external 
environment for upcoming CSPs. If this tendency continues to exist, policy changes that ensure 
the transparency of non-profit projects might be necessary to enable the corporate-NGO 
partnerships comfortable with external auditing.  
6) Assessing the proposal for new multi-actor (tripartite) contracts 
Finally, for the new type of multi-actor (tripartite) contracts, this research argues that the 
current system for regulating activities and relations in international and domestic investment 
regimes involves minimal engagement of host and affected local citizens in formal legal 
arrangements. In this situation, various actors contest the interests derived from, and 
obligations imposed by, existing legal frameworks in the SIP triangle. A new type of multi-
actor contract can outline the conceptual roadmap for future contracting in natural resource 
sectors and provide justifications underlying these patterns in global contracting practices. By 
including affected third parties, local communities and other citizens, the new multi-actor 
investment contracts illustrate that host state governments and foreign investors are ‘trustees’ 
of these investment projects and the benefits of natural resource extractions should be 
mobilised for the public. Scholars also highlighted that contracts among multiple actors in the 
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natural resource extraction context have the capacity to cope with the absence of responsibility 
and remedial regulations and can address the adverse impacts caused by extractive operations. 
Examples of this new form of multi-actor contracts include contracts which can be 
designed to provide third parties with a legal right to sue the contract; multi-actor 
environmental contracts; human rights agreements, and state-investor-local community 
tripartite contracts. These new contractual arrangements illustrate that the law of contract has 
shifted from the early nineteenth-century model that contracts only protect the rights of 
contracting parties (e.g. foreign investors) without any concern for affected third parties (e.g. 
individual citizens and local communities) who are direct victims of harmful extractive 
operations. 
For this framework to be successful, states would need to act both individually and as 
regional organisations. The strength of a state’s political will would be decisive in determining 
its willingness to adopt a framework with the potential to ensure positive outcomes for all actors. 
Despite the apparent challenges of multi-actor frameworks, they potentially hold 
considerable promise and could integrate the primary stakeholders within one framework, 
address democratic limitations in investment law and allow negotiation of interests, benefits 
and obligations for all actors. Multi-actor contracts would foster friendly relationships as well 
as defining the responsibilities for each of the actors. Such stronger relationships would 
encourage sustainable exploitation of resources and urge responsible development of projects 
through careful management. Some further research is undoubtedly necessary to fully establish 
the potential impact of this framework. 
8.2 Theoretical implications: Adding a dynamic perspective to the SIP triangle 
Based on the empirical evidence presented in the preceding chapters, this research has 
developed original conceptual charts to capture the interactions among the existing three major 
legal frameworks for regulating international energy investment. The newly-developed charts 
highlight the usefulness of the contractual approach for promoting legal and policy innovations 
and enhancing multi-level environmental governance.   
These original conceptual charts put the project-specific contractual mechanisms into the 
centre of international natural resource governance. This study revisits the S-I (e.g. traditional 
investment contracts), S-P (e.g. business-NGO partnerships), and S-I-P (e.g. multi-actor 
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investment contracts) by their real functions and reclassify them into three new categories, 
namely ‘soft contracts’, ‘enforcement contracts’ and ‘innovative contracts’.  
This new contract classification adds a dynamic perspective to the original ‘State-
Investor-Population’ (S-I-P) triangle and highlights the potential of an ‘innovative contract’ for 
contributing to future formal and informal law-making (both international and domestic) and 
social innovations.  
Assessing the FDI contracting practices and social change with this original conceptual 
chart, the analytical perspectives could be not only static but also more dynamic. This 
conceptual chart first captures, at the macro-level, the dynamic interactions between contracts, 
key actors and the legal norm revolution.  
At the micro-level focusing on contracts, the conceptual chart demonstrated the critical 
legal and policy entrepreneurs behind the most innovative contractual arrangements. These 
institutional entrepreneurs can be: 1) MNCs (with their corporate self-regulation mechanisms), 
2) NGOs (with their capacities for resistances and campaigns), and 3) Innovative lawyers 
working in different sectors (with an innovative and green mind-set). The ‘bottom-up’ local 
resistances against international energy investment globally are shaping the design of 
investment contracts, contracting practices and legal frameworks. 
Also, the new empirical findings and developed conceptual charts in this research can 
jointly propose a new analytical lens for assessing energy investment projects across different 
jurisdictions (please see Figure 6.6). This research applies this newly-developed analytical lens 
and uses China’s outward investment in the energy sectors as an important case study in 
Chapter 7. 
Importantly, this research has proposed a new multi-actor governance framework for 
international energy investment, and the previous chapters have demonstrated under what 
conditions such a multi-actor governance framework for energy investment might be 
implemented. It is also useful to summarise some fundamental elements here: 1) Due to the 
limitations of ‘formal regulations’ at the international level and domestic level, there is an 
urgent need to find out the alternative solutions and other project-specific instruments and 
understand their connections with the existing ‘formal regulations’, 2) Investment contracts 
have both advantages and disadvantages, and the actual performances of these State-investor 
contracts would depend on the negotiators who can participate in the contract negotiations and 
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how they design these critical clauses, 3) Strategic partnerships between NGOs and businesses, 
as a quasi-regulatory instrument, have the enormous potentials for transnational environmental 
and energy governance, which can also be a key element of the multi-actor contractual 
framework (namely the ‘I-P dimension), 4) A multi-actor contract, negotiated correctly, would 
suitably address the diverse interests in the energy investment context and guarantee that local 
communities have means to solve investment disputes under a framework that fully 
acknowledge their rights, and 5) As demonstrated in the Chinese investment case studies, the 
key to implement these multi-actor contractual approaches is the bottom-up driving forces 
supported by three legal and policy entrepreneurs, such as MNCs, NGOs and commercial 
lawyers. They truly added a dynamic perspective to the ‘S-I-P triangle’ and the way of thinking 
about international investment regulations.   
8.3 Practical implications (focusing on China) 
1) For China’s outward energy investment 
Ever since the country’s economic reforms, China’s outward FDI has increased at a very 
rapid rate, and it is anticipated that Chinese infrastructure and energy investments will continue 
to grow both in the Eurasian region as well as globally. 
The international frameworks for regulating cross-boundary energy investment, including 
the WTO/GATT system, ECT, NAFTA and other bilateral investment treaties, so far are still 
incomplete and unbalanced; there are still legal and geographical constraints in the application. 
The environmental provisions within those investment treaties usually do not directly legally 
bind the enterprises. China is now just joining ECT, but of course, does not involve NAFTA. 
International investment law indeed has a history of putting more emphasis on investment 
protection rather than public interests in the host countries and local communities.   
Though the Chinese governments and financial institutions have made some progress on 
enhancing the domestic sustainable development policies in outbound investment, the progress 
is relatively slow. The published voluntary standards and guidelines are also not legally binding, 
and they have faced many challenges regarding implementation and enforcement overseas.  
Indeed, China had put much effort into improving both its international and domestic 
investment laws and policies for sustainable investment. However, as the case studies regarding 
hydro-power projects and overseas extractive operations illustrate, the ‘top-down’ regulatory 
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approach alone may not be strong enough to resolve the conflicts that occurred in the affected 
communities. 
On the other hand, this research has presented a model for ‘bottom-up’ legal innovation. 
The Chinese investors can usually obtain legal permissions to develop from the host states' 
governmental authorities but have problems having social licenses to operate. Local resistance 
and social movements against Chinese investment projects eventually shape the companies' 
behaviours and stimulate the legal innovation both at the national and international levels. 
These local protests make the Chinese companies recognise the fact that they cannot just 
rely on the local laws and the permissions from the governments but also need to engage with 
the local communities and other stakeholders directly. These cross-sector collaborations play 
a significant role in improving transnational environmental governance and creating future 
legal reforms. This model has been proved useful in the cases of the Gulf community agreement 
and International River program. 
Based on the evidence above, China’s energy corporations and commercial lawyers have 
not played a very influential role in designing innovative mechanisms to safeguard affected 
communities’ public interests. There is a huge space for these two important actors to enhance 
their awareness and capacities in this significant matter. China’s government, industry 
associations and international environmental NGOs may assist to meet the demand for 
capacity-building shortly. 
2) For establishing CSPs in Greater China 
Strategic partnerships between NGOs and businesses are yet at a very early stage of 
evolution and still have limited effect and scope particularly in Greater China. However, there 
is enormous potential for such strategic partnerships. NGOs can, on the one hand, act as 
watchdogs to monitor companies’ activities, and, on the other hand, cooperate with the private 
sector for environmental governance and social innovation. The relationships like these are 
beneficial not only for the partner organisations but also for the society collectively by tackling 
the challenges and opportunities which are beyond the scope of a single organisation or sector. 
For the NGO personnel, particularly the ones working with grassroots NGOs in mainland 
China, it is a wise decision to apply ‘critical cooperation’ as an effective way to involve major 
oil and gas corporations in their operations. Furthermore, the NGOs can integrate the resources 
from social media, match-makers and governmental bodies. 
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On the corporate side, knowledge sharing regarding the potential of strategic partnerships 
outside as well as within organisations is necessary. Polling top-level officials on strategic 
partnership knowledge could provide a good indication of the current awareness of the strategic 
collaborations and to what limits the organisations see their potential and are willing to commit 
to them. Providing platforms where NGOs and businesses could engage to exchange ideas and 
information could be immensely helpful in the selection of suitable partners. 
It is the responsibility of the Taiwanese and Chinese governments to establish a regulatory 
atmosphere for realising the maximum governance potential of the CSPs. Moreover, the 
Taiwanese government needs to provide incentives to the international NGOs so that they can 
bring in their expertise and know-how. Finally, due to the positive impacts of the global 
isomorphic pressures, the Taiwanese oil and gas corporations need to consider getting the 
partnerships of international industry organisations to avoid being cut off from the global 
picture. 
Possible ideas for further study can be based on a longitudinal analysis that considers a 
strategic partnership right from its inception and throughout its lifespan to acquire detailed 
information and understanding of the working dynamics involved in such a partnership. 
Moreover, finding out while certain strategic partnerships fail while others are successful is a 
must to develop an understanding of how to manage strategic partnerships effectively.  
8.4 Implications for China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
Foreign investment has been playing an important role in China’s economic development 
since its beginning of the Open Door policy in the 1970s. As China is growing its global 
impacts, the Chinese “Belt and Road’ initiative sets a new vision for regional cooperation and 
integration of Eurasia.  
Energy investment is a key part of the Belt and Road Initiative. By the end of 2016, the 
countries along the Belt and Road Initiative have received a huge amount of Chinese 
investment, totalling USD$ 235 billion, of which over $95 billion are investments in the energy 
sectors, especially foreign oil, gas and other natural resources. These energy infrastructure 
projects are located in a wide swath of Eurasia, including around 65 countries. And the main 
purpose of these energy projects is to enhance China’s energy security and regional cooperation. 
This trend makes the observations and discussions in this research valuable and timely. 
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At this moment, China has signed BITs with many countries along the Belt and Road 
Initiative (Please see Appendix A and Appendix L). However, a large number of these 
investment treaties were established during the 1980s and 1990s. China has been rapidly 
changing its foreign and economic policies since the 1980s.  These investment treaties, on the 
one hand, do not include many sustainable development and human rights clauses, and, on the 
other hand, these state investment treaties provide limited scope for investor-state investment 
dispute arbitration.  
So far, it is still not very clear how much China’s policymakers and negotiators rely on 
these current BITs with developing economies along the Belt and Road Initiative. Though 
China’s official 13th Five Year Plan mentioned that negotiating new investment treaties that 
achieve the ‘high standard’ of sustainable development and human rights should be a priority 
of China’s government and those giant state-own investors, meanwhile, China is enhancing its 
domestic legal framework for outward investment. However, after reviewing the recent 
development of China’s investment treaty-making practices, the progress is relatively slow in 
this matter.  
At the international level, China seems to establish a Chines-led development bank, 
namely the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, rather than relying on the current major 
international frameworks for energy governance, such as Energy Charter Treaty and the 
investment-related instruments in WTO. This situation highlights the challenges and obstacles 
of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, which may increase the environmental and social risks 
in the target areas including those developing countries along the Belt and Road Initiative 
without strong domestic legal frameworks.    
Therefore, the multi-actor contractual framework developed in this research may be 
valuable to safeguard human rights and the environment across the Belt and Road Initiative’s 
target countries. And, of course, the successful implementation of this multi-actor contractual 
approach for energy governance relies on the efforts and awareness of those three important 
policy entrepreneurs, namely commercial lawyers, civil society and NGOs, and the 
governmental authorities (with a new sustainable development mind-set). To sum up, the 
approach proposed in this research is quite different from the Chinese government’s top-down 
approach, which pays more attention to other actors’ potential impacts on international energy 
governance. 
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8.5 Recommendations for future research  
Based on the overall evaluation outcomes, this research suggests that future research can 
do a further review of the transnational and domestic institutional settings for encouraging 
‘bottom-up’ legal and social innovations.  
Regarding the practical approaches for stimulating these ‘bottom-up’ legal and social 
innovations, the role of new technologies is very crucial. At this moment, over three billion 
people on this planet are active online. Four primary technological drivers – social media, the 
cloud, mobile and 'big data' – are significant components and ‘global game changers’ in the 
way networking and public policy are done today as part of what has been designated the 
‘Information Revolution’. The evolving data infrastructure associated with increasingly 
environmentally-minded citizens is concurrently reordering how local communities can 
interact with corporations and governments on global environmental issues, e.g. energy and 
climate change. 
In the era of digitalisation, the power of social media for advancing policy reforms has 
attracted attention from both scholars and practitioners. Existing international law studies have 
seen an eager debate over how current international norms and established principles can be 
applied to new cyber-circumstances in the age of social media. So far, these analyses have 
mainly focused on how international law can account for the emerging technological 
challenges and stay faithful to enduring legal principles and political commitments. As a result, 
a further exploration of how emerging new technologies (e.g. social, cloud, mobile and Big 
Data) may enhance citizen engagement with global issues and its possible influences on 
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Appendix A - Table of Treaties, Declarations, and Other International Instruments 
 
International environmental treaties 
Aarhus Convention/UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention)  
African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Revised African Convention) 2003  
Agreement on the Action Plan for the Environmentally Sound Management of the Common Zambezi River System 
1987 
Agreement on the Co-operation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin 1995 
ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 1985 
ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution 2002 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal 1989 
Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Liability Protocol) 1999 
Beijing Declaration on Environment and Development 1991 
Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) 1945 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 1973 
CLC Convention/International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC Convention) 1969 
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (Oslo Convention) 1972 
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources (Paris Convention) 1976 
Convention for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage/UNESCO Convention for the Protection of 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention) 1972 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 1992 
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment (Lugano 
Convention) 1993 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context / UNECE Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention) 1991 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 1973 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) 1979 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention) 
  
1972 
Convention on Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa (Bamako 
Convention) 1991 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL Convention) 1973/1978 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC Convention) 1969 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage (Oil Fund Convention) 1971 
Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change 1997 
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) 
Ramsar Convention / Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat 
(Ramsar Convention) 1971 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 2001 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC, UNCLOS) 1982 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 1992 
Washington Declaration on Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities 1995 
International economic treaties  
ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 1987 
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF Articles of Agreement) 1944 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 1965 
EC Treaty (TEC, Treaty of Rome) 
Energy Charter Treaty 1994 (ECT) 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 
ICSID Arbitration Rules 2006 
North American Agreement on Environmental Co-operation (NAAEC) 1993 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1994 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials In International Business Transactions 1997  
  
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 1976 
OECD Policy Framework for Investment (OECD PFI) 2015 
TRIPS Agreement 1994 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976 
UNCTAD Intra-MERCOSUR Protocol in 2017 
WTO Agreement 1994 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) 1994 
WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) 
Bilateral investment agreements 
Argentina–France BIT 1993 
Argentina–Spain BIT 1992 
Bolivia–Netherlands BIT 1992 
Botswana–Peoples Republic of China BIT 2000 
Canada–Costa Rica BIT 2010 
Canada Model BIT 2004 
Canada–Peru BIT 2006 
Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement 2004 (CAFTA–DR) 
Egypt–Morocco BIT 1976 
EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
French Model BIT 2006 
Germany–Peoples Republic of China BIT 2003 
India Model BIT 2015 
Intra-MERCOSUR Investment Facilitation Protocol 
Japan - Mozambique BIT 2013 
Lithuania–Ukraine BIT 2004 
Morocco - Nigeria BIT 2016 
  
Netherlands–Romania BIT 2008 
Peoples Republic of China–Albania BIT 1993 
Peoples Republic of China–Guyana BIT 2004 
Peoples Republic of China–India BIT 2006 
Peoples Republic of China–Mexico BIT 2008 
United Kingdom–India BIT 1994 
United Kingdom–Ukraine BIT 1993 
United States–Argentina BIT 1991 
United States–Canada FTA 1988 
United States–Czech Republic BIT 1991 
United States Model BIT 2004 351 
Uruguay–United States BIT 2005 
International human rights treaties 
African Charter on Human Rights and People's Rights (African Charter) 
American Covenant on Human Rights (ACHR) 1969 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC) 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 
ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001 
ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Responsibility Articles) 2001 
ILO Conventions 
ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 1977 
UN Convention against Corruption 2003 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) 2007 
Declarations 
Agenda 21 1992 
  
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992 
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment 1972 
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development  
The Addis Ababa Action Agenda 
UN General Assembly Millennium Declaration 2000 
UN Global Compact 2000 
UN Sustainable Development Goals 2015 
UN Johannesburg World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD) 2002 
Other International instruments 
AIIB's Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) 
Equator Principles 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
International Bar Association Model Mining Development Agreement (MMDA) 
International Bar Association Practical Guide on Business and Human Rights for Business Lawyers 
International Finance Corporation Performance Standards  
Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) 
Natural Resource Charter 
UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (IPFSD) 
UN Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations 
UN Draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities  
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) 
UN Principles for Responsible Contracts 
UN Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities 2001 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
World Bank Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) 
World Economic Forum Responsible Mineral Development Initiative   
  
Appendix B: Table of Cases 
 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case 
ARB/03/16, Award, 2 October 2006 
Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v. Sultanate of Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33 
Ansung Housing Co., Ltd. v. People's Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/25 
Azurix Corp. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 14 July 2006 
Beijing Urban Construction Group Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/30 
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 24 July 2008 
Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, 2 June 
2010 
Cementownia “Nowa Huta” S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/06/2, Award, 17 September 
2009  
CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, Award, 12 May 2005 
Commerce Group Corp. and San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/17, Award, 14 March 2011 
Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law 
and Liability, 30 November 2012 
Europe Cement Investment & Trade S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2, Award, 13 
August 2009 
EVN AG v. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/10, Award, 2 September 2011 
Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1 
Hrvatska Elektroprivreda d.d. v. The Republic of Slovenia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, Tribunal’s Ruling 
Regarding the Participation of David Mildon QC in Further Stages of the Proceedings, 6 May 2008 
Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, Order of discontinuance of the 
proceeding, 25 September 2005 
Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 14 January 
2010 
LG&E Energy Corp./LG&E Capital Corp./LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006 
Libananco Holding Co. Limited v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, Annulment decision, 22 May 2013 
  
Marion Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1, Award, 16 May 2012 
Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)97/1, Award, 30 August 2000 
Pac Rim Cayman LL.C. v. The Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on the 
Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, 1 June 2012 
Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. The Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), 
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6. 
Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 15 April 2009 
Ping An Life Insurance Company, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company, Limited v. The Government 
of Belgium, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29 
Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 (ECT) 
Reinhard Hans Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/20, Award, 16 May 2012 
SAUR International S v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case ARB/04/4, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 6 
June 2012 
Sempa Enegy v. Argentina epublic, ICSID Case No. AB/02/16, Decision on Annulment, 29 June 2010. 
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of 
the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004 
Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, 7 December 2011 
Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited v. Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/10/20 
Tecnicas Medioambientales SA (Tecmed) v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)00/2, Award, 29 
May 2003  
Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6) 
Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Award, 31 May 2012 
Other Investment Arbitration Cases 
Antoine Biloune v. Ghana Investment Centre, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 27 October 1989  
Bilcon of Delaware et al v. Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04 
Chemtura Corp. (formerly Crompton Corp.) v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, 2 August 2010  
Chevron Corporation (USA) and Texaco Petroleum Company (USA) v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 
34877, Partial Award on the Merits, 30 March 2010  
Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Fourth Interim Award on Interim Measures, 7 
February 2013  
  
CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 September 2001  
Frontier Petroleum Service Ltd v. Czech Republic, UNICTRAL, Final Award, 12 November 2010  
Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award, 8 June 2009  
Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award, 12 January 
2011  
Hulley Enterprises Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 226, UNCITRAL, Interim Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 30 November 2009  
Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Arb. No. 080/2005, Final Award, 26 March 2008  
Methanex Corp. United States of America, NAFTA, Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, 3 August 2005  
Methanex Corp. United States of America, NAFTA, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to 
Intervene as Amici Curiae, 15 January 2001  
Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-17 
Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. the Republic of Latvia, SCC CASE 118/2001, Final Award, 16 
December 2003  
Peter A. Allard v. The Government of Barbados (PCA Case No. 2012-06) 
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Interim Award, 26 January 2000  
Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, 17 March 2006  
SD Myers Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 November 2000  
United States Parcel Service of America v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for 
Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, 17 October 2001 
Veteran Petroleum Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 228, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, 30 November 2009 
Vito G. Gallo v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, 15 September 2011 
Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian Federation, PCA Case AA 227, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
30 November 2009 
World Trade Organization 
Canada – Certain Measures Affecting The Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WT/DS412/AB/R, 6 May 2013  
Canada – Measures Relating To The Feed-In Tariff Program, WT/DS426/AB/R, 6 May 2013  
European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS62/AB/R, 5 June 1998  
European Communities- Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, WT/DS135/R, 18 
  
September 2000  
European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS 135/AB/R, 12 
March 2001  
India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WT/DS 456  
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R  
Dispute settlement cases under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 
AES Summit Generation Ltd. (UK subsidiary of US-based AES Corporation) v. Hungary 
Alstom Power Italia SpA, Alstom SpA (Italy) v. Mongolia 
Azpetrol International Holdings B.V., Azpetrol Group B.V. and Azpetrol Oil Services Group B.V. (the 
Netherlands) v. Azerbaijan 
Cementownia "Nowa Huta" S.A. (Poland) v. Republic of Turkey 
Europe Cement Investment and Trade S.A. (Poland) v. Republic of Turkey 
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Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Jurisdiction, Judgment of 22 July 1952, ICJ Reports 1952, 
p. 93  
  
Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company (Belgium v. Spain), (New Application: 1962, Second Phase), 
Judgment, 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970 
Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States v. Italy), Judgment of 20 July 1989, ICJ Reports 
1989, p. 15 
Electricité de Beyrouth Company (France v. Lebanon), Order: Removal from the List, 29 July 1954, ICJ Reports 
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Appendix C: IPIECA's Practical Tips for Effective Partnerships  
 
 
Partnership drivers  
The actual drivers for entering into multi-stakeholder partnerships are many and varied. Through the case 
studies, there are examples of long-term strategic partnerships providing a mechanism for initiating targeted 
projects, tackling challenging global issues and responding to situations where relationship building is more 
important than project outcomes. The drive to partner is not only one-way. Increasingly as the mutual 
benefits are more visible and measurable, the NGO community, academia and other parts of civil society 
are seeking partnerships with the private sector. 
Partner selection 
There is growing awareness of the need to select partner organizations carefully to access the appropriate 
array of resources and competencies needed—and, equally importantly, to identify the appropriate 
representatives in terms of skills, status and organizational role from within the organizations. An 
increasingly competitive environment, when even NGOs sometimes compete for corporate partners, also 
suggests the need for a careful partner selection process. There is increasing recognition that thought should 
be given to sustaining the partnership activities beyond the life of the partnership itself. Therefore, it is 
important to attract certain types of partners—such as government authorities—who will go on to assume 
responsibility for sustaining or scaling up project outcomes once the initial resources supporting the 
partnership comes to an end. 
Partnership building 
The first phase of engaging in partnership is often characterized by a high degree of enthusiasm and 
goodwill. Building on this initial commitment and creating a strong foundation better equips partnerships 
to meet challenges at later stages. Equally, many of the partnerships in this publication functioned well 
simply by drawing on the relationship management skills of experienced staff within the partnering 
organizations. 
Managing the partnership 
At the stage of project implementation it is critical to maintain the partnership to address any flagging 
momentum. The case studies uncover a number of approaches being used in the oil and gas sector to ensure 
all partners retain focus and commitment throughout the project. 
Evaluating the success of the partnership 
Very few of the partnerships in this publication precisely measure their actual impacts. It is, however, in 
the interest of all partners to assess the value of their investment in a partnership. The individual outcomes 
of the partnership (i.e. for each participating organization) should be assessed as well as the common project 
outcomes. This is likely to reveal a number of unexpected, as well as expected, benefits for each partner. 
Agreements and contracts 
Contracts and agreements play an important role in almost all the partnerships profiled in this collection: a 
spectrum emerges ranging from partnerships that contain only minimal contractual elements to those that 
are mostly contract-based. 
This may be a particular characteristic of partnerships in the oil and gas industry, stemming from the 
complex drivers underpinning the partnerships, and from the involvement of multiple stakeholders. It is 
necessary to distinguish between partnering agreements and contracts: a partnering agreement signals a 
voluntary collaboration and describes shared risks and implementation on terms that are jointly decided and 
renegotiable. In contrast, a contract is legally binding and focuses on transferring risk to the implementing 
party. Terms are often decided by the party contracting out. The trend in the industry appears to be that, 
even where the partnership contains contractual elements, more of a partnering approach is used in its 
development by consulting and pre-agreeing the content of the contract. 
Exit strategies and moving on 
Many of the partnerships described in this publication were launched without a clear understanding of how 
the experiment would end; a plan for ‘closure’ or ‘exit’ is rarely built from the beginning. The need to move 
on is often only addressed (and then rather poorly) at a late stage or when an exit is imminent. Furthermore, 
departure or moving on is often interpreted as failure. In reality, however, a partner (whether an individual 
or an organization) leaving or a partnership being disbanded—specifically where a task has been 
completed—can be a significant indicator of success. And even when it is not, an exit can itself be a trigger 
for an interesting entry or an opening up to a range of new possibilities. 
Source: IPIECA. www.sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/sustdev/csd/csd15/PF/info/C_Morris.pdf 
  
Appendix D: ICMM Principles 
 
These 10 Principles represent the ICMM’s member companies’ commitment to implementing and 
measuring progress towards their goal of sustainable development. They are largely based on issue 
areas identified in the MMSD project and have been benchmarked against leading international 
standards. 
 
1. Implement and maintain ethical business practices and sounds systems of corporate 
governance. 
 
2. Integrate sustainable development considerations within the corporate decision-making process. 
 
3. Uphold fundamental human rights and respect cultures, customs and values in dealings with 
employees and others who are affected by our activities. 
 
4. Implement risk management strategies based on valid data and sound science. 
 
5. Seek continual improvement of our health and safety performance. 
 
6. Seek continual improvement of our environmental performance. 
 
7. Contribute to conservation of biodiversity and integrated approaches to land use 
planning. 
 
8. Facilitate and encourage responsible product design, use, re-use, recycling and disposal of our 
products. 
 
9. Contribute to the social, economic, and institutional development of the communities in which 
we operate. 
 
10. Implement effective and transparent engagement, communication and independently verified 
reporting arrangements without stakeholders. 
 
Source: ICMM, (2017) 
  
Appendix E: WWF's Working with Businesses Principles 
 
Business & Industry 
 
WWF believes that business, trade and industry have a crucial role to play in supporting conservation efforts and 
promoting greater environmental responsibility for our planet.  
 
WWF strives to build environmental awareness by working with businesses to help improve their environmental 
performance, as well as boost their economic bottom line.  
 
Governed by the principle Good for the Earth, Good for Business, WWF Armenia is committed to partnering with 
companies who wish to look towards relationships involving:  
Licensing  
Corporate Sponsorship of WWF initiatives  
In-kind Donations  
 
WWF's approach to working with the private sector is constructive and solutions-oriented. It is both collaborative 
in its methods, rigorous in its standards, and challenging in its objectives. 
 
Our guiding principles for corporate engagement are: 
 




• The right to public commentary 
 


























Appendix F: Table of State-Investor Contracts 
 
This research built up its own data sets mainly based on the Resource Contracts website and other data sources. 
ResourceContracts.org is a repository of publicly available oil, gas, and mining contracts. The repository features plain 
language summaries of each contract’s key social, environmental, human rights, fiscal, and operational terms, and tools 
for searching and comparing contracts. ResourceContracts.org promotes greater transparency of investments in the 
extractive industries, and facilitates a better understanding of the contracts that govern them. 
The new ResourceContracts.org site is developed in partnership with the World Bank, the Natural Resource 
Governance Institute (NRGI), and the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment. We are grateful for the contributions 
of a wide array of organizations including Global Witness, Oxfam, Publish What You Pay International, Open Oil, 
Open Contracting Partnership, Cadasta, The Carter Center, Open Corporates, African Mining Legislation Atlas, and 
the World Resources Institute, among others.  
 
Young Innovations developed the site as an open source platform available for others to use under an open source 
license. The ResourceContracts online platform already includes 1382 contracts (covering 47 resources) from 89 
countries worldwide and other associated documents.  
 
This user-friendly website has an "Advanced Search" function. Users can search contracts and other documents 
by region, by country, by resource, by company name, by document type, by signed date and so on.  
More importantly, this online platform also has annotated most of the documents, so users can apply the Annotation 
Category – e.g. environmental protections and Social/human rights impact assessment management plan - to filter these 
contractual documents very conveniently.   
  
 
Due to the large number of contracts and the word limit for this thesis, it may not be possible to attach a full list 
of investment contracts in this appendix. All the data sets have been managed and saved by Microsoft excel files. This 
research has selected around 435 contracts with environmental and social elements. Here the researcher just 










The researcher is happy to provide the original excel files (with a full list of all the State-investor contracts collected 






Appendix G: Table of other Cross-sector Contracts 
 
For exploring the current landscape of CSPs in Greater China, a powerful online tool already exists – NGO2.0 
Map. This platform is developed by MIT New Media Action Lab, which can be used for mapping the Business-NGO 
engagements in Greater China. 
 
By using this powerful online data bank and other data sources (such as the energy companies’ CSR reports), this 
research below provides the list of cross-sector partnerships between oil and gas companies and NGOs in the Greater 
China area. 
International oil and gas companies operating in China 
Company NGO Issue Date Active 





BP Junior Achievement Education 2013-
2015 
No 
BP Beijing Human and Animal Environmental 









Chevron China Children and Teenagers Fund Education 2016-
present 
Yes 
Chevron Boys' and Girls' Clubs Association of Hong Kong Education 2013-
2015 
No 
Chevron Jane Goodall Institute Conservation 2017-
present 
Yes 
Chevron China Women's Development Foundation Women Rights 2016-
2017 
No 
Chevron Operation Smile Charity 2016-
2017 
No 
Chevron Red Cross Society of China Charity 2011-
2012 
No 
Chevron Asian Injury Prevention Foundation Public Health 2010-
2014 
No 
Chevron Bridge2China Charity 2011-
present 
Yes 





ConocoPhillips China Association of Social Workers (CASW) and 





(TICH) of Tianjin 
ConocoPhillips International Crane Foundation Charity  2016-
2017 
No 





ConocoPhillips U.S.-China Environmental Fund Badaling Special 












ConocoPhillips Tianjin Dream Factory and Liu’s Institute of Child 






ConocoPhillips Yongning Education Aid Center Education 2016-
present 
Yes 
ConocoPhillips China Children and Teenagers’ Fund Education 2013-
2015 
No 
ExxonMobil China Charity Federation (CCF) Charity 2016-
2017 
No 










ExxonMobil Practical Skills Training Center for Rural Women Women Rights 2013-
2014 
No 
ExxonMobil Junior Achievement Education 2013-
2014 
No 
ExxonMobil Road Safety Council and Kwai Tsing District 




ExxonMobil Mobil China Environmental Education Fund / State 
















Shell Holland Wetlands International and the International 




Shell Friends of Nature Conservation 2011-
present 
Yes 





Shell Fuping Development Institute Charity 2015-
2016 
No 
Shell China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation Poverty 2013-
2015 
No 
Shell China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation Poverty 2012-
2013 
No 





Shell World Resource  




Shell China Association of Rural Energy Industry Energy 2011-
2013 
No 





Statoil China Children and Teenagers’ Fund Charity 2016-
present 
Yes 
Total France Marie Stopes International Charity 2012-
2014 
No 









Chinese National Oil & Gas Companies 
CNOOC Red Cross (South Osaka, China) Charity 2011-
present 
Yes 
CNOOC Lifeline Express Charity 2011-
present 
Yes 
CNOOC CNOOC Foundation Marine Environmental and 




CNOOC China’s Children and Teenagers’ Fund Charity 2013-
present  
Yes 
CNOOC China Legal Aid Foundation Legal Aid 2013-
present 
Yes 
CNOOC China Indonesia Thousand Islands Local NGOs Environmental 
Protection 
2016 No 
CNOOC Calgary Homeless Foundation Poverty 2015 No 
CNPC China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation Poverty 2016-
present 
Yes 
CNPC China Woman’s Development Foundation Women Rights 2016-
present 
Yes 
CNPC China Poor Mother’s Foundation Women Rights 2016-
present 
Yes 
CNPC Red Cross (South Osaka, China) Charity 2011-
present 
Yes 
Sinochem China Next Generation Education Foundation Education 2013-
present 
Yes 
Sinochem Zhoushan Municipal Charity Council Charity 2017-
present 
Yes 
Sinochem Far East Horizon Charity Fund Charity 2012-
2014 
No 
Sinochem Healing the Children Charity 2015-
present 
Yes 





Sinopec Lifeline Express Charity   
Taiwanese major Oil & Gas Companies 
CPC Taiwan Jane Goodall Institute Conservation 2011-
present 
Yes 





CPC Taiwan ROC Disable Association Charity 2006-
present 
Yes 





CPC Taiwan Taiwan Toy Library Charity 2013-
2014 
No 





Formosa Foundations Charity 2005-
present 
Yes 
Other multi-actor contracts discussed in this research: 
1. De Beers Canada Inc – The Canadian Government – Local Communities in the Northwest Territories 
2. Alexkor – The Government of South Africa – Local Communities of Richtersveld  
3. West African Gas Pipeline International Project Agreement  
4. Ekati Environmental Agreement (e.g., The Independent Environmental Monitoring Agency - Dominion Diamond 
Ekati ULC - the Government of Canada) 
5. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project (BP - OSIAF - Azerbaijan) 
6. Rio Tinto – Government of Madagascar – Various international NGOs (e.g., Birdlife International) 
7. IPIECA and ICMM Model Contracts 
8. IBA’s MMDA Model Contract 
  
Appendix H: UN Principles for Responsible Contracts (2015) 
 
The 10 principles that can help guide the integration of human rights risk management into contract negotiations are 
listed below: 
1. Project negotiations preparation and planning: The parties should be adequately prepared and have the 
capacity to address the human rights implications of projects during negotiations. 
2. Management of potential adverse human rights impacts: Responsibilities for the prevention and mitigation of 
human rights risks associated with the project and its activities should be clarified and agreed before the 
contract is finalized. 
3. Project operating standards: The laws, regulations and standards governing the execution of the project 
should facilitate the prevention, mitigation and remediation of any negative human rights impacts throughout 
the life cycle of the project. 
4. Stabilization clauses: Contractual stabilization clauses, if used, should be carefully drafted so that any 
protections for investors against future changes in law do not interfere with the State’s bona fide efforts to 
implement laws, regulations or policies in a non-discriminatory manner in order to meet its human rights 
obligations.  
5. “Additional goods or service provision”: Where the contract envisages that investors will provide additional 
services beyond the scope of the project, this should be carried out in a manner compatible with the State’s 
human rights obligations and the investor’s human rights responsibilities. 
6. Physical security for the project: Physical security for the project’s facilities, installations or personnel 
should be provided in a manner consistent with human rights principles and standards. 
7. Community engagement: The project should have an effective community engagement plan through its life 
cycle, starting at the earliest stages. 
8. Project monitoring and compliance: The State should be able to monitor the project’s compliance with 
relevant standards to protect human rights while providing necessary assurances for business investors 
against arbitrary interference in the project. 
9. Grievance mechanisms for non-contractual harms to third parties: Individuals and communities that are 
impacted by project activities, but not party to the contract, should have access to an effective non-judicial 
grievance mechanism. 
10. Transparency/Disclosure of contract terms: The contract’s terms should be disclosed, and the scope and 









“The IBA Practical Guide is a hugely important step for respecting human rights worldwide, given the influence 
many lawyers have with Boards and CEOs. Corporate lawyers and the IBA contributed significantly to the 
development of the UN Guiding Principles 
 
I warmly welcome this ‘next step’ guide for lawyers around the world.” 
John Ruggie 
Author of the UNGPs 
 
At its Annual Conference in Vienna in October 2015, the IBA Council adopted its Business and Human Rights 
Guidance for Bar Associations (‘Bar Association Guide’). The IBA noted that its founding in 1947 had been inspired 
by the vision of the United Nations, with the aim of supporting the establishment of the rule of law and the 
administration of justice worldwide. It described the unanimous endorsement by the UN Human Rights Council of the 
UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs), drafted by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on Business and 
Human Rights (SRSG), Professor John Ruggie. It recalled the IBA’s significant contributions to and support of the 
SRSG’s UN mandate, and noted that governments have evidenced strong support for the UNGPs as an authoritative 
policy framework, including through the development of national action plans to implement them. It described the 
reflection of the UNGPs in international and industry specific standards. And it noted the growing recognition of a 
strong business case for respecting human rights and the management of risks, including legal risks, resulting in the 
need for lawyers to take human rights into account in their practice of law.  
In order to help bar associations and lawyers better understand these issues, the IBA committed to prepare a 
Practical Guide for Business Lawyers on the Guiding Principles (the ‘Practical Guide’) that would ‘set out in detail the 
core content of the UNGPs, how they can be relevant to the advice provided to clients by individual lawyers subject to 
their unique professional standards and rules (whether they are in-house or external counsel acting in their individual 
capacity or as members of a law firm) and their potential implications for law firms as business enterprises with a 
responsibility to respect human rights themselves.’ At the conference, the IBA Council also adopted a resolution 
approving the Bar Association Guide, looking forward to the Practical Guide’s presentation for approval in May 2016, 
and stating that ‘in line with the provisions of the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers as resolved by the UN 
General Assembly in its ‘Human rights in the administration of justice’ resolution of 18 December 1990 (Basic 
Principles), nothing in the Guidance for Bar Associations or in the IBA Practical Guide for Business Lawyers (once 
approved) shall be interpreted as reducing respect for the fundamental human right of effective access to legal services 
provided by an independent legal profession to all in need of such services, including that all lawyers should always be 
able to fulfill their duties and responsibilities and enjoy the guarantees provided for by the Basic Principles, consistent 
with their legal and professional responsibilities.’ This Practical Guide has been prepared to fulfill these purposes. 
  
  
Appendix J: IBA MMDA Project Development Timeline and Events 
  
MMDA 1.0 was over one year in the making. The project encompassed two major innovations: (1) this website and (2) 
a series of consultations: collaborative stakeholder meetings on the content of MMDA 1.0. 
The official website originally served as a forum for comment on various drafts of MMDA 1.0. This website now 
provides public access to MMDA 1.0 and related resources. The website also provides MMDA 1.0 users with a forum 
to share experience using the document. 
MMDA 1.0 consultations involved a collaborative process engaging multiple stakeholders in mineral development, 
including industry, governments, and civil society. Below you will find the MMDA 1.0’s development timeline and 
links to presentations and other supplemental information from these past events. 
April 2009 International Bar Association Section on Energy, Environment, Resource and Infrastructure Law (SEERIL) 
Mining Law Committee formally kicks off the MMDA Project and identifies key Administrative Committee members. 
October – December 2009 MMDA Project teams ’deconstructed’ over 80 actual mine development agreements to 
identify provisions that represent alternative approaches and best practice in four broad subject matters: (1) Tenure; (2) 
Finance; (3) Party Rights & Obligations; (4) Other Terms & Conditions, leading to an outline of MMDA 1.0. 
March 2010 Public presentation of MMDA 1.0 outline and request for participation and comment, in conjunction with 
Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada meeting in Toronto. 
March 2010 Presentation on the MMDA Project and request for participation and comment on MMDA 1.0 at the World 
Mines Ministries Forum in Toronto. 
April 24 – 25, 2010 Civil Society Consultation on MMDA 1.0, organized by the Mining Law Committee of the 
International Bar Association with the assistance of the International Institute for Sustainable Development and the 
Sustainable Development Strategies Group.  
April 26 – 28, 2010 Presentation and discussion of MMDA 1.0 at a convening of the International Bar Association 
Section on Energy, Environment, Resource and Infrastructure Law (SEERIL) Mining Law Committee in Toronto. 
Late April – September, 2010 First phase of Web-based consultation on MMDA 1.0. 
June 2 – 4, 2010 Presentation on the MMDA Project and discussion of MMDA 1.0 at a Governance for Extractive 
Industries (GEI) forum in Wilton Park, UK.  
June 17 – 18, 2010 Presentation on the MMDA Project and discussion of MMDA 1.0 at a World Economic Forum 
Meeting on Fair Mineral Development Initiatives, Ulan Bataar. 
August 25 – 26, 2010 Presentation on the MMDA Project and discussion of MMDA 1.0 at a Public Finance 
Transparency Program meeting, Astana. In this meeting, Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan, the International Bar 
Association, and Revenue Watch Institute discussed MMDA 1.0 and issues surrounding transparency of investments 
in natural resource development. Participants included government, industry and civil society leaders. 
September 2010 Re-drafting of MMDA 1.0. 
October 4, 2010 Presentation of draft MMDA 1.0 at IBA annual meeting in Vancouver. IBA Annual Meeting 
Information 
October 12, 2010 IBA Mining Law Committee chair Peter Leon presented and discussed the MMDA Project at the 
John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.  
October 2010 Publication of draft MMDA 1.0 on this website. 
October – November, 2010 Second phase of Web-based consultation on MMDA 1.0. 
October 22, 2010 MMDA Project presentation and discussion of MMDA 1.0 with the African Union and the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa.  For further information contact Wilfred Lombe 
at wlombe@uneca.org. 
December 2010 MMDA Project presentations and discussions of MMDA 1.0 held in Beijing with China University of 
Geosciences and with the Law Centre of Chinese Ministry of Land & Resources. 
December 20, 2010 End of public comment period on draft MMDA 1.0. 
January – March 2011 Re-drafting of final MMDA 1.0. 
April 4, 2011 Presentation of final MMDA 1.0 at Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Special Institute on 
International Mining and Oil & Gas: Law, Development & Investment, April 4, 2011 in Rio de Janiero. 
April 2011 Publication of final MMDA 1.0 on this website. 
 
  
Appendix K: Examples of Multi-stakeholder Partnerships at the International Level (after 2015 Paris Agreement) 
 
 Background and objectives Lead facilitators, funders Governance structure Outcomes and challenges Monitoring 
The Global Alliance For 
Vaccines And 
Immunization (Gavi)  
Established January 2000 
and has raised over $.5 
billion. Vaccine provision 
and development, country 
level immunization 
programmes and health 
systems strengthening 
(HSS); special focus on low-
income countries. 
WHO, UNICEF, World 
Bank, Gates Foundation, 
International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturer’s Association, 
US AID (funders 1/3rd from 
bilateral donors, private 
donations and Gates 
Foundation. 
GAVI has a secretariat and 
Board – one third of Board 
elected on an independent 
basis with expertise in 
health; At country level 
GAVI works through 
Interagency Coordinating 
Committees and Health 
Sector Coordinating 
Committees. 
Built on the experience of 
the Vaccine Initiative 
launched by UNICEF in 
1990. Generally seen as 
successful in increasing the 
numbers vaccinated but less 
successful influencing 
vaccine pricing. 
A Monitoring and 
Evaluation Framework and 
Strategy; ensures valid, 
reliable, useful performance 
measures are available and 
used to support 
organizational and 
stakeholder learning, 
management of strategy, 
improvement of 
programmes, mitigation of 
risk and reporting of 
performance. 
The Global Polio 
Eradication Initiative 
(GPEI) 
Launched by WHO in 1998 
at the World Health 
Assembly –Objective to 
eradicate Polio by 2000; 
today polio reduced by 99% 
globally. 
WHO, UNICEF, the US 
Centre for Disease control, 
Rotary International – 
bilateral donors also 
included Russian Federation, 
Kuwait, UAE, Saudi Arabia 
and Malaysia, World Bank 
and African and Inter-
American Development 
Banks 
The Advisory Committee on 
Polio Eradication and the 
Global Commission for the 
Certification of the 
eradication of Poliomyelitis 
and the UN Interagency 
Committee play vital roles 
with WHO regional offices, 
large networks of health 
workers, public health 
managers & professionals 
Polio incidents have reduced 
by 99% but the commitment 
to global polio eradication 
by the World Health 
Assembly (WHA), is not 
legally binding on states, and 
therefore the enforcement 
mechanisms of GPEI are not 
strong. 
GPEI operates within a 
broad framework of inter-
governmental and 
interagency cooperation and 
participation. The 
Independent Monitoring 
Board assesses progress 
towards a polio-free world, 
convenes on a quarterly 
basis to independently 
evaluate progress towards 
each of the major milestones 
of the GPEI Strategic Plan;   
the IMB provides 
assessments of the risks 
posed by existing funding 
gaps. 
Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency 
Partnership (REEEP) 
Initiated by the UK 
government in 2002 as a 
WSSD Type 2 partnership – 
response to WSSD failure to 
Traditional bilateral donors 
(90 projects in over 40 
countries); 60% of REEEP’s 
activities deal with policy 
REEEP has a governing 
board that is responsible to a 
‘Meeting of Partners’ which 
is the ultimate authority of 
REEEP contributed to 
change in renewable energy. 
REEEP has used a multiple 
approach to establish 
Has a Governing Board 
responsible for the conduct 
of the business of the 
organization in accordance 
  
agree targets for renewable 
energy and energy efficiency 
– It aimed to promote 
collaboration to achieve a 
significant increase in the 
use of renewable energy and 
energy efficiency to improve 
energy security and provide 
for reliable delivery, and 
deal with climate 
change/energy issues. 
Project implementation and 
policy advice at national 
level, and advocacy at global 
level is its main thrust.   
and regulation, the 
remaining with project 
financing. 
REEEP. Projects are 
developed and proposed by 
the programme committee 
and final selection by the 
International Selection 
Committee. A governing 
board is responsible to an 
assembly, ‘a Meeting of 
Partners’, which is the 
ultimate authority of 
REEEP. 
national partnerships 
involving small-scale private 
sector partners, NGOs and 
public partners. REEEP has 
also financed local projects 
that may not have been from 
the outset financially viable 
from a market point of view. 
South Africa proposed 
targets for of 5% of total 
primary energy use to come 
from renewable energy 
resources by 2010. By 2009 
IAEA estimate this had 
reached 13.1%, now 
increased to 19%.   
with the Statutes, and holds 
office for a period of four 
years. It is comprised of not 
less than six members and 
meets at least once a year. Its 
functions are to: develop and 
oversee the key strategic 
direction of the REEEP, 
including targets, timeframes 
and funding priorities; 
prepare the financial rules 
and accounting system of the 
organization, consider and 
decide upon applications to 
become Partners, provide 
instructions to the 
International Secretariat. 
The Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) 
FSC Founding Assembly in 
1993, the secretariat 
relocated in 2003 to Bonn, 
Germany. Main thrust from 
UNCED in 1992 to establish 
an independent and 
international forest 
certification system. Vision: 
the world’s forests meet the 
social, ecological, and 
economic rights and needs 
of the present generation 
without compromising those 
of future generations through 
promoting environmentally 
appropriate, socially 
beneficial, and economically 
viable management of the 
world's forests. 
Not for profit NGO with 
membership in over 60 
countries. It is financed 
through a multitude of 
sources – individual and 
corporate grants, donations 
and projects. It has a strong 
collaborative relationship 
with various UN bodies and 
has over the years worked 
with UNEP and had projects 
financed through the GEF. 
Governments cannot be 
members. 
Board of Directors and an 
international secretariat with 
the General Assembly of 
members as the highest 
decision making body. It has 
three chambers for 
stakeholders from 
environment, social and 
economic organizations. 
There is also a quota to 
ensure a more balanced 
north/south representation. 
Formally organised as an 
independent non-
governmental organisation, 
works outside of national 
regulations with its outreach. 
With expertise competence 
and project portfolio, the 
FSC can function as an 
incubator for multi-
stakeholder partnerships. 
The FSC administers a self-
elaborated third party 
certification system on wood 
and timber products that 
serves to verify whether 
products– 8% of global 
forest is certified and 25% of 
all industrial round-wood 
production. 
FSC has developed 12 
system indicators under four 
main categories – economic, 
social, environmental and 
general. The FSC 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
Program has also developed 
a Code of Good Practice for 
Assessing the Impacts of 
Social and Environmental 
Standards, works with ten 
credibility principles 







Royal DSM and World 
Vision partnership 
Royal DSM, the global life 
and materials science 
company, and World Vision 
DSM and World Vision are 
working with the millers to 
build business expertise, 
The collaboration sees both 
organisations jointly 
leverage their expertise, 
By 2016, the DSM–World 
Vision partnership aims to 
contribute to the reduction of 
The flagship of the 
partnership is the Miller’s 
Pride project in Dar es 
  
are working together to 
achieve lasting progress in 
global health and 
development by improving 
the nutritional status of 
mothers and children. 
improve food safety and 
increase markets and profits 
for the millers. 
resources and reach in order 
to address undernutrition – 
the root cause of stunting 
and one-third of preventable 
child deaths. 
the 165 million children 
under 5 across the globe who 
are stunted. 
Salaam which includes close 
collaboration with the 
Tanzanian government. This 
project focuses on fortifying 
maize flour with essential 
micronutrients. 
UN Global Compact CEO 
Water Mandate 
Launched in 2007 and 
developed under the UN 
Global Compact’s three 
environment principles 
derived from the Rio 
Declaration for business to 
support a precautionary 
approach, promote greater 
environmental responsibility 
and encourage diffusion of 
environmentally friendly 
technologies has a broad-
based analysis of the acute 
global water stress  with 
action taken, but the CEO 
Water Mandate is voluntary 
and aspirational and 
Participation in the CEO 
Water Mandate is open to all 
UNGC business signatories, 
and is funded and supported 
by companies, governments, 
and UN agencies and other 
stakeholders. 
Run by a secretariat in the 
UN GC and the Pacific 
Institute and overseen by the 
CEO Water Mandate 
Steering Committee, which 
includes business, civil 
society and other 
representatives. 
The CEO Water Mandate 
has set rigorous standards 
for reporting on companies’ 
activities in water and 
sanitation related areas, and 
the reporting policy follows 
those of the GRI. Member 
companies have changed 
their approach to water due 
to the work done under the 
CEO Water Mandate.  
Participating companies 
must also publish and share 
their water strategies, 
including targets and results, 
areas for improvement, in 
relevant corporate reports, 
using – where appropriate– 
the water indicators found in 
the GRI Guidelines. 
Companies must be 
transparent in dealings and 
conversations with 
governments and other 
public authorities on water 
issues. 
While a voluntary initiative, 
the CEO Water Mandate 
incorporates a mandatory 
disclosure mechanism. It 
reports through a system 
called Corporate Water 
Disclosure which reports 
information to stakeholders 
(investors, NGOs, 
consumers, communities, 
suppliers, and employees) 
related to the current state of 
a company’s water 
management, the 
implications for the business 
and others, and the 
company’s strategic 
responses. Disclosure is a 
critical component of a 
company’s water 
management efforts and of 
water-related sustainability 
more generally. Disclosure 
reports are posted on the 
CEO Water Mandate’s 
public website; further, 
companies which fail to 
report are expelled. 
 
Sources: World Vision report: Getting Intentional: Cross-Sector partnerships, business and the post-2015 development agenda, available at: http://www.wvi.org/united-nations-and-global-
engagement/publication/getting-intentional-cross-sector-partnerships; BCG/MIT report: Joining Forces: Collaboration and Leadership for Sustainability, available at: 
https://shop.sloanreview.mit.edu/store/joining-forces-collaboration-and-leadership-for-sustainability; Multi-stakeholder partnerships: Making them work for the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 
Felix Dodds, Global Research Institute, University of North Carolina; available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=400&nr=1619&menu=1515  
  
Appendix L: China’s recent investment arbitration cases and investment treaty practices (since 2010 to present) 
 
China’s recent investment arbitration cases 
 








Respondent State  
Home State 
Of Investor  
1 2017  Hela Schwarz v. 
China  
Hela Schwarz GmbH v. People's Republic of China ICSID Case No. ARB/17/19 
 
Summary: The outcome of this case is still pending. 
Pending  China  Germany  
2 2014  Ansung Housing v. 
China  
Investment: Capital expenditure of over USD 15 million for the development of a golf 
and country club in China.  
 
Summary: Claims arising out of the provincial government's alleged actions in relation to 
Ansung's investment in the construction of a golf and country club and luxury 
condominiums in Sheyang-Xian, Jiangsu province.  
Decided in favour 
of State  
China  Korea, 
Republic of  
3 2011  Ekran v. China  Investment: Rights under a 70 year lease over 900 hectares of land in the Chinese province 
of Hainan held by Ekran Berhad's local subsidiary.  
 
Summary: Claims arising out of the Government's revocation of claimant's subsidiary 
rights to a leasehold land due to an alleged failure to develop the land as stipulated under 
local legislation.  
Settled  China  Malaysia 
 
Cases as Home State of claimant 
1 2017  Sanum Investments 
v. Laos (II)  
Investment: Majority shareholding in the Savan Vegas Hotel and Casino.  
 
Summary: Claims arising out of the Government’s actions allegedly in breach of a 
settlement agreement concluded by the claimant and Lao Holdings N.V. with the 
Government in 2014.  





2 2014  Beijing Urban 
Construction v. 
Yemen  
Investment: Rights under an agreement concluded between claimant and the Yemeni civil 
aviation and meteorology authority for the construction of an airport terminal.  
 
Summary: Claims arising out of the alleged forced deprivation of claimant's assets and 
contract concerning a project for the construction of an airport terminal in Sana'a.  
Settled  Yemen  China 
3 2012  Ping An v. Belgium  Investment: Largest shareholding in the Belgian-Dutch financial institution Fortis.  
 
Summary: Claims arising out of the Government's bailout, and subsequent nationalisation 
and sale to a third party, of the financial institution in which the claimants had invested, 
in the context of the 2008 financial crisis.  
Decided in favour 
of State  
Belgium  China  
4 2010  Beijing Shougang 
and others v. 
Mongolia  
Investment: Rights under a mining licence.  
 
Summary: Claims arising out of the cancellation of licenses held by the claimants in the 
Tumurtei iron ore mine in 2012.  
Decided in favour 
of State  
Mongolia  China  
5 2007  Tza Yap Shum v. 
Peru  
Investment: Majority shareholding in a Peruvian company engaged in the purchase and 
export of fish flour to Asian markets.  
 
Summary: Claims arising out of the seizure of the bank account of claimant's enterprise 
due to tax debt and other alleged actions undertaken by Peruvian tax authorities that 
resulted in the substantive deprivation of claimant's investment.  
Decided in favour 
of investor  
Peru  China 
6 2011  Philip Morris v. 
Australia  
Investment: Shareholding in Australian subsidiaries engaged in the manufacturing, 
import, market and distribution of tobacco products; related intellectual property rights.  
 
Summary: Claims arising out of the enactment and enforcement by the Government of 
the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 and its alleged effect on investments in Australia 
owned or controlled by the claimant.  
 
Decided in favour 
of State  
Australia  Hong Kong, 
China SAR  
  
7 2012  Sanum Investments 
v. Laos (I)  
Investment: Contributions made in the form of loans extended to local companies; 
majority shareholding in two hotels and casinos: Savan Vegas and Paksong Vehas; 
ownership stakes in certain slot clubs; business know-how.  
 
Summary: Claims arising out of an alleged series of measures by the Government of Laos, 
including its courts and provincial authorities, that affected claimant's bundle of rights for 
the construction and operation of two hotels and casinos, among other gaming facilities 
in which the claimant had invested.  




China SAR  





















China’s recent investment treaty practices (since 2010 to present) 
 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
No. Short Title  Status  Parties  Date Of Signature  




1 China - Turkey BIT (2015) Signed (not in 
force) 
Turkey 29/07/2015 n/a no 
2 China - United Republic of Tanzania BIT (2013) In force Tanzania, United Republic 
of 
24/03/2013 17/04/2014 yes  
3 Canada - China BIT (2012) In force Canada 09/09/2012 01/10/2014 yes 
4 China - Congo, Democratic Republic of the BIT (2011) Signed (not in 
force) 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of the 
11/08/2011 n/a no 
5 China - Uzbekistan BIT (2011) In force Uzbekistan 19/04/2011 01/09/2011 yes 
6 China - Libya BIT (2010) Signed (not in 
force) 
Libya 04/08/2010 n/a no 
7 Chad - China BIT (2010) Signed (not in 
force) 
Chad 26/04/2010 n/a no 
 
Treaties with Investment Provisions (TIPs) 
1 China - Hong Kong CEPA Investment Agreement 
(2017) 
In force Hong Kong, China SAR 28/06/2017 28/06/2017 yes 
2 China - Georgia FTA (2017) Signed (not in Georgia 13/05/2017 n/a  
  
force) yes 
3 China - Macao Agreement on Trade in Services (2015) Signed (not in 
force) 
Macao, China SAR 28/11/2015 n/a yes 
4 Australia - China FTA (2015) In force Australia 17/06/2015 20/12/2015 yes 
5 China - Korea, Republic of FTA (2015) In force Korea, Republic of 01/06/2015 20/12/2015 yes 
6 China - Switzerland FTA (2013) In force Switzerland 06/07/2013 01/07/2014 yes 
7 China - Iceland FTA (2013) In force Iceland 15/04/2013 01/07/2014 yes 
8 China - Japan - Korea, Republic of Trilateral 
Investment Agreement (2012) 
In force Japan, Korea, Republic of 13/05/2012 17/05/2014 yes 
9 China - Taiwan Province of China Framework 
Agreement (2010) 
In force Taiwan Province of China 29/06/2010 01/09/2010 yes 
10 China-Costa Rica FTA In force Costa Rica 01/04/2010 01/08/2011 yes 
 
Investment Related Instruments (IRIs) 
1 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 2011 Multilateral Guidelines, principles, resolutions 
and similar 
n/a yes 
2 ILO Tripartite Declaration on Multinational 
Enterprises 
2006 Multilateral Guidelines, principles, resolutions 
and similar 
n/a yes 
3 Doha Declaration 2001 Multilateral Guidelines, principles, resolutions 
and similar 
n/a yes 
Data Source: UNCTAD (2019) Investment Policy Hub: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/ 
 
